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ABSTRACT
Market Making: Crises and the Global Production of Shipbreaking in Chittagong, Bangladesh
by
Elizabeth A. Sibilia
Advisor: Cindi Katz
Shipbreaking is a dismantling process with a primary objective of extracting large amounts of steel
from ocean-going vessels, oil tankers, bulk cargo carriers, and container ships. As mobile forms
of fixed capital, these devalued vessels have experienced a gradual or sudden loss of value. The
removal of devalued ships from the world fleet, through an increasingly sophisticated global
demolition market and expanding domestic shipbreaking markets, have played a critical role in
helping the global shipping sector solve its crises of overproduction since the mid 1970s. Since
the early 1990s Bangladesh has become one of the most important domestic shipbreaking markets.
The scrap steel extracted from the shipbreaking process is transformed into billets and rebars; these
finished and semi-finished construction materials are embedded into the built environment and
create a material foundation for economic development. The laborers central to this circulation and
market are known as shipbreakers and hold some of the most dangerous jobs in the world. They
are exposed to slow and spectacular forms of violence during a labor-intensive dismantling process
that has claimed 181 lives between 2005 and 2017. It is the daily lives of shipbreakers and the
arrival and disappearance of the scrap ships, that makes apparent continued circulations of global
capital through all its forms—fixed, fictitious, and money forms—and the human and
environmental stakes of these circulations.
“Market Making: Crises and the Global Production of Shipbreaking in Chittagong, Bangladesh”
examines how the contemporary shipbreaking market was produced, why it is in Chittagong, for
whom does it benefit, and what crises it endures and produces there? Using a multi-sited
ethnographic approach that drew on semi-structured interviews, participant observation, archival
research, and visual ethnography, the dissertation interrogates political and economic moments of
conjuncture that offer insight into how Chittagong became a viable and productive location for the
large-scale dismantling of ocean-going vessels. In order to locate shipbreaking in this way, my
research focused on an analysis of: the historical-geographic conditions of the industry in
Chittagong; the financialization of the shipping sector since the 1960s and the implications of
capital circulation on overproduction; the actors, devices, and spaces that reveal the workings of
the global demolition market; and the material effects of a new set of interrelated international
environmental and labor regulations and the affect they are having for uneven development. In
general, this research revealed how the shipping sector and shipbreaking market function in global
capital’s ability to reproduce itself and, at times of economic crisis, how the sector solves barriers
to accumulation through new and deepening forms of exploitation: people breaking up ships on
beaches.
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ABBREVIATIONS & DEFINITIONS
Beaching

The process in which a ship is driven into a tidal area and grounded
deliberately in shallow water.

Billets

Rectangular, square, or circular shaped pieces of semi-finished steel
that need further processing before they become a finished good.

BIS

Bank of International Settlements

Bulk carrier

A merchant ship designed to carry loose cargo in bulk such as grains,
Juice, and coal.

Bunkers

Fuel oil burned in a ship’s main engine.

BSBRA

Bangladesh Ship Breakers and Recyclers Association

Cash buyer

A company that specializes in the trading and movement of scrap vessels.

CILC

Confirmed irrevocable letters of credit

Classification society The shipping industry’s system for regulating technical and operational
standards for ships; also, in charge of making rules for construction and
maintenance of ships and issue certificates of compliance.
CTL

“Constructive total loss” is when the cost of repair is greater than the value
of the thing needing repair.

CNG

A casual term for a 3-wheeled vehicle that uses compressed natural Gas
and is a popular mode of local transportation in Bangladesh.

CoA

During the purchase of a vessel, a “Certificate of Approval” is given to a
cash buyer, master captain, or insurance company by a warranty surveyor
to confirm a ship can make a voyage and completes the sale.

Container ship

Is a ship designed to carry cargo stored in containers.

Convention

Hong Kong Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound
Recycling of Ships, adopted in 2009 thought not yet ratified, is aimed at
ensuring that ships, when being recycled do not pose any unnecessary risk
to human health and safety or to the environment

DMCC

Dubai Multi Commodities Centre

x

dwt

“Deadweight tonnage” is the weight a ship can carry when loaded to its
marks, including stores, crew, water, fuel and cargo.

EU SRR

The European Union Ship Recycling Regulation adopted in 2013, follows
that the ship is a form of waste and because of this is subject to regulations
by the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Waste.

ETFs

Exchange-traded funds are investments that are traded on a stock
Exchange.

FIDH

International Federation for Human Rights

FOC

‘Flags of Convenience’, also considered an “open registry” is a ship registry
that does not have strict environmental or labor standards so the ship owner
can use an FOC to save on operations costs.

G10

The G10, or group of ten is made up of eleven industrial countries including
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, the UK and USA.

GDM

global (ship) demolition market

GDP

Gross domestic product is an annual measure of the market value of all final
goods and services produced in a specific time period.

GMS

Global Marketing Systems Inc., is a cash buyer headquartered in Dubai.

GSRP

A “Green Ship Recycling Plan”, first developed by GMS in coordination
with a classification society.

gt

“Gross ton” is the internal measurement of the ships open spaces.

IGO

Inter-Governmental Organization

ILO

International Labor Organization

IMO

International Maritime Organization

IPO

Initial public offering

ISO

International Organization for Standardization

HYB

High-yield bond

IIS Forum

Invest in International Shipping Forum

xi

IMF

International Monetary Fund

ITCZ

Intertropical convergence zone

JLT

Jumeriah Lakes Towers

KDB

Korea Development Bank

Lascar

The translation in Hindi is “poor-soldiers”, while lascar has reemerged in
Bengali to mean “sailor”.

Lay-up (hot)

The processes of laying up a ship for a short period of time, keeping the
engines and machinery are kept operational and shipowner is held to the
standards of the Classification and Flag state requirements. Crew remains
on board that meets manning limits enough to maintain ship.

Lay-up (cold)

The processes of laying up a ship for an extended period of time, with a
ghost crew of two seamen and will have a longer re-commissioning time.

ldt

“Light displacement tonnage”, is the weight of a ship’s hull including
equipment and machinery. Ships sold for scrap are sold based on their ldt.

LC/Letter of Credit

The main function of the LC is to guarantee that a seller will receive a
buyer’s payment amount at a specific time for a previously negotiated
specified amount.

LC/Revocable

A “revocable letter of credit” can be revoked at any time without prior
notice to the beneficiary.

LC/Usance

A “usance letter of credit” is documentary credit that guarantees payment
to the seller’s bank at a specified future date, typically between 120 and 180
days.

LRF HEC

Lloyd’s Register Foundation Heritage and Education Center. The LRF
HEC in the City of London is housed in the Lloyd’s Register headquarters.
The LRF library was founded in 1852 by naval architect Augustin Bullock
Creuze, who was also one of the Register’s principal marine surveyors.

MARAD

United States Maritime Administration

MLPs

Master limited partnerships

MNC

Multinational corporation (usually oil, mining, or steel)

MPA

Singapore’s Maritime Port Authority

xii

MOU

A memorandum of agreement, also known as a “memorandum of
understanding” (MOU), is a nonbinding agreement between two or more
parties outlining the terms and details of an understanding, including each
party's requirements and responsibilities. An MOU is often the first stage in
the formation of a formal contract.

NGO

Non-governmental organization

NOAA

National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration

Oil tanker

A ship designed to carry oil in bulk in cargo space designed as large tanks

OECD

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OPEC

The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

OPL

Outer Port Limits

OSHA

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Platform

NGO Shipbreaking Platform

PSA

Port of Singapore Authority

PSC

Port State Control, the sovereign authority over territorial waters.

P&I insurance

Protection and Indemnity insurance which excludes insurance on the ship’s
hull and workers compensation.

Reinforcing bars

Also known as rebar, are long steel rods used as tension devices in
concrete constructions.

Re-rolling mills

A factory or machine that that “re-rolls” steel. There are two types of
re-rolling mills, auto and manual.

RoRo

RoRo is short for roll on/roll off. RoRo vessels are designed to transport
wheeled cargo.

Scrap value

Many banks and financial institutions valuing ships adopt a rule that after
a certain age the ship is valued at its scrap value rather than its market value,
also referred to as its demolition or recycling value. First, the lightweight
(ldt) tonnage of the ship must be established. Second the current scrap price
for the ship must be established. Scrap prices are quoted in dollars per
lightweight ton.

xiii

Secondary offering

A “secondary offering” is an additional offering of shares after an IPO.

Shipbreaking

OSHA defines shipbreaking as “Shipbreaking is the process of dismantling
an obsolete vessel's structure for scrapping or disposal. Conducted at a pier,
drydock, or dismantling slip, it includes a wide range of activities, from
removing all gear and equipment to cutting down and recycling the ship's
structure. The structural complexity of ships makes shipbreaking a
challenging process. It involves many safety, health and environmental
issues”.

Ship surveys

Periodic surveys (maintenance and operations) of ships in a certain class.

SoC

Statement of Compliance

Spot rate/market

A negotiated rate per unit of cargo paid to the shipowner to carry specific
cargo between two ports. Voyage costs are paid by the shipowner.

SV or SR Certificate A “special registration certificate” usually issued for a single voyage from
a FOC.
TEUs

Twenty equivalent units (a 40-foot container equals two TEUs)

Ton-miles

Ton-mile is a unit of traffic defined by a ship carrying one ton of freight
one mile.

TSS

Traffic Separation Scheme, a highway for ships in the Singapore Strait.
The TSS facilitates the safe and unimpeded movement of vessel.

ULCC

Ultra Large Crude Carriers

UNCTAD

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Upazila

An administrative unit in Bangladesh.

VLCC

Very Large Crude Carriers

WB

World Bank

YPSA

Young Power in Social Action Organization
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INTRODUCTION

Image 1: Empty lot in Chandgaon thana flooded during a monsoon

2

A journey by boat
One of my first visits to the shipbreaking yards in Chittagong, Bangladesh was on a small
lifeboat. I travelled with a companion from Chandgaon1 to Sitakunda, an industrial upazila (subunit of a district) in the coastal region of the Chittagong District where the shipbreaking yards are
located. It was late June and early in the wet monsoon season. A cyclone had already affected
the region flooding large sections of Chittagong. Built in a low-lying area of the city, the residential
streets and ground floors of buildings in Chandgaon were flooded for days, forcing the residents,
including myself, to remain in place. When the rains stopped, the waist high flood waters receded,
but puddles remained along the unpaved pockmarked roads, and still water filled vacant lots. As
another storm was anticipated, it became urgent to travel to the shipbreaking yards before they
became inaccessible again (Image 1).
My host in Chandgaon planned for a companion to meet me at my residence. We met in
the early morning, walked out of the Chandgaon residential area together to Bahaddarhat, to
arrange the first of three CNGs to Sitakunda.2 It was a half hour before we arrived to Chittagong’s
City Gate—the gate bordering Chittagong City and Sitakunda upazila along the Dhaka-Chittagong
(N1) highway.3 We were scheduled to meet up with a local resident who had use of a small

1

Chandgaon is a residential thana (a spatial unit established for tax collection and for police jurisdiction created in
1792 during a period of British territorial rationalization (Michael, 2007:5)) established for middle income people and
government employees during a period of increasing demand for housing (Kauser et al., 2016). As of 2016, there were
663 multi-storied residential buildings over 741 plots of land (Dhaka Tribune, 2015). There is also a high concentration
of government and Non-Government Organizations' offices, international schools and madras’ and the Chandgaon
Mosque completed in 2007. In recent years, the area has become overrun with commercial ventures, many of them
operating illegal leases for higher rents. The density of small businesses has added to the traffic congestion, making
noise more challenging for residents, in addition to the concern of becoming areas of security risk (Daily Star, 2007;
Hussain et al., 2016).
2
A CNG is a casual term for a 3-wheeled vehicle that uses compressed natural gas. It is a popular mode of
transportation in Bangladesh. Compressed natural gas is touted for being a clean fuel (Banglapedia, 2019a).
3
The Dhaka-Chittagong highway is a 250km, four lane national highway that functions as a vital economic artery
connecting commerce between Dhaka and Chittagong carrying 60% of commercial traffic (The Journal of Commerce,
2018).
3

lifeboat. Our meeting point was an access road off of the N1 highway in Bhaitari, 4 the
southernmost section of Sitakunda and the beginning of the 18 km stretch of coastal area
designated for shipbreaking (Figure 1).5 After passing through the City Gate, the landscape quickly

Figure 1: Access roads to beaches in Sitakunda Upazila (Source: Google Images, 2019 (left); Photo by the Author
(right)).

changed from urban, commercial, and densely populated to villages scattered among heavy
industries (Image 2). The CNGs and rickshaws diminished giving way to service, supply, and
construction trucks—the N1 highway was built to satisfy an expanding commercial and economic

4

Bhatiari is a “mouza” in the Sitakunda Upazila. A “mouza” is a small-scale administrative area of land, often thought
of as a village.
5
In 2011, Bangladesh Parliament adopted the “Ship Breaking and Recycling Rules, 2011”, that states an “Owner of
a ship Recycling plot/yard/facility" means any Person or Body permitted to operate ship recycling activities within
the declared Ship Recycling Zone.” Prior to this set of rules there was no official shipbreaking and recycling zone.
4

Chittagong- Dhaka connection (Image 3).6 The highway runs through Sitakunda parallel to the
shoreline. Coastal villages are located on the west side of the N1 with occasional food shops,
schools, and mosques. Small access roads leading to the Bay, off the N1 highway, were
increasingly common as we approached the concentrated shipbreaking area. On the inland side of
the N1 highway villages were dispersed between pharmaceutical corporations, plastic, rubber, and
cement manufacturers and some of the country’s largest steel rerolling mills.
There is a heavy concentration of roadside shops along the N1 highway in Sitakunda that
specialize in a wide range of materials and objects recycled from the scrapped ships. On our way
to the yards we drove past dozens of second-hand shops selling everything from ship anchors,
sinks and toilets, kitchen equipment, ladders, marine paraphernalia, steel tanks and cylinders, to
enormous plastic potable water containers, pipes, tubing and cords, ropes and wire (Image 4-7).
These economic activities have developed over the past four decades and today reflects the extent
the local economy is dependent on recycled, remanufactured, and repurposed products you find in
restaurants, office buildings, and construction sites, and as Gregson et al. have found, in an
expanding number of middle-class homes (2010). It is near impossible to quantify the value the
second-hand circulation of products adds to the local economy because there are no import records,
taxes, or inventories covering the items that arrive onboard the scrap ships. Ships that are sold for
scrap are based on their ldt, a measurement that takes into consideration the weight of the hull,
engine, and machinery and excludes all other items on board the ship. In 1989, the value based on
ldt imported into Bangladesh was $25 million, this increased to $400 million by 2007, while
stakeholders suggest that the value in 2012 was $1 billion (Gregson et al, 2012: 4). And, while

6

The Dhaka-Chittagong Highway Upgrade Project was set in motion in 2006 and begun in 2010. It was intended to
relieve the heavy congestion along Bangladesh’s most important artery by expanding two lanes into four with future
plans for it to become six (Road Traffic Technology, 2019).

5

difficult to quantify, it was apparent that the visibly dense concentration of economic activity
related to shipbreaking, that has developed since the early 1980s, is an important part of the local
and regional economy. Less visibly apparent was how intimately connected these activities are to
larger scaled production networks and global economic processes. The people of this coastal area
found a way to capitalize on objects that had been discarded initially by the businessmen who
bought and scrapped ships, and while this is an important economic activity, the second-hand
shops are not the primary reason for the development and continued development of the
shipbreaking market in Chittagong, nor as many stakeholders suggest, will they be the reason for
shipbreaking to remain. Bangladesh’s national appetite for steel, since the mid 1980s has been the
primary reason for the growth of the shipbreaking market.7
Limited infrastructure in the way of roads and highways characterized Sitakunda in the
early 1980s. Roads were often made of mud baked brick, stones, gravel or packed earth. This was
at a time when road transportation for commodity movement was becoming increasingly
important. By 1986, 69.7 million tons of goods were transported via road (77 percent) even though
only half of the roads were paved. Between 1981 and 1990, the Government of Bangladesh
launched a large-scale nationwide infrastructure development plan that provided funding for 4,343
bridges and a capital improvement plan directed at the national and regional highways (Road
Master Plan, 2009). During this period the linkages between the rural and urban areas were
improved and deepened the integration between the rural villages and growing urban centers like
Dhaka and Chittagong (World Bank, 2015:4). Bangladesh experienced a period of radical
transformations that began in the 1980s and impacted economic, political, and social life. The

7

The World Bank noted that in 2010 the amount of steel supplied by the shipbreaking market was 50 percent (Sarraf
et al.).
6

Image 2: Access road through coastal village to shipbreaking yards

7

Image 3: N1 highway northbound

8

Image 4: Shop selling sinks and toilets along the N1 highway, Sitakunda

9

Image 5: Jahanara Marine Store along the N1 highway, Sitakunda
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Image 6: Shop selling steel plates along the N1 highway, Sitakunda

11

Image 7: Shop selling repainted ladders along the N1 highway, Sitakunda

12

landscape was made to support a new economic regime driven by the widespread shift to a market
driven economy propelled forward by large-scale privatization programs. Capital entered into the
economy, often in the form of development loans such as the Structural Adjustment Program
(1980s) and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (1986 and 1987); both enforced fiscal and
monetary discipline and an opening up of the economy towards macroeconomic stabilization
(Khatun, 2016). This development context conditioned material needs, increasing the demand for
steel. The Government of Bangladesh identified shipbreaking as an inexpensive source of steel,
and they started to encourage the importation of scrap ships in the early 1980s through the removal
of tariffs on these imports and offered economic incentives to rerolling mills. After the industry
was firmly established and growing by the mid 1980s, the government began to charge tariffs on
scrap ships being imported at the rate of price per ldt (Chowdhury, 2014, personal communication).
International and government interventions created the foundation on which shipbreaking and its
interdependent and multi-scaled economies that spatially constituted the agglomeration economy,
could expand.
When we arrived at our meeting spot on the N1 highway, we got out of the CNG in front
of a second-hand shop selling used ship parts; huge cables were strewn on the ground near the
road, long metal pipes, tubes, and steel sheets were organized into stacks and piles. We crossed
the highway to the bay side and descended a sloping dirt access road towards the direction of a
village. Our boat driver met up with us there, and we followed him into the village located in a
forested coastal area, wedged between the shipbreaking yards and the highway. The first part of
the brick-laid pathway was slippery from the rain, broken, and uneven. The walkway cut through
a variegated landscape of structures comprised of private dwellings, covered communal areas, and
small food shops. Some structures were elevated by a concrete foundation and made of corrugated

13

metal riveted for stability, others were made of bamboo poles tied together with woven materials
and jute tarps. Informal shelters were covered in a patchwork of plastic trash bags, and more
permanent structures were made of concrete. Sandbags, packed trash bags, and sacks of unknown
material were placed strategically at the edges of the dwellings. These were barriers protecting the
interior spaces from unwanted flood waters caused by rainstorms and tidal surges.8 Lining the
walkway were piles of heavy-duty ropes and small pieces of steel and aluminum sheets used to
cover the ground near the entrances of homes. Metal pipes were laid lengthwise next to logs and
wooden beams, while pieces of bright orange plastic were leaned up against some of the dwellings.
All were collected and/or bought remnants from scrap ships. Walking further down the path, palm
and heritiera fomes (a type of mangrove) tree, created a canopy over the village, keeping sounds
from escaping and creating a sense of intimacy among village life. Sounds of birds, children
playing, babies crying, voices from dwellings in the distance, mixed with our footsteps as we
moved across the wet surface. Mechanized noises—vehicles, TVs, and phones—were refreshingly
absent. The village was a landscape of sound as much as a landscape of textures and materials. My
companion later told me that shipbreaking, rerolling and jute mill workers, fishermen and their
families, call this village home.
Our path ended at an inlet where the boat was tied up to a palm tree. I followed my
companion down a series of slippery rocks and unevenly placed sandbags towards the boat and
stepped in carefully. Another man in charge of the motor joined us. The small fishing boats were
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In Bhatiari, there are approximately 7,000 types of dwellings including kutchas (non-disaster resilient homes built
with bamboo, timbers, tin, clay, chan, wire, bolts, and rope), puccas (houses built with bricks, sand, cement and rod),
and semi-puccas, 50% of these dwellings are located below sea level placing the residents of kutchas in a vulnerable
context as it relates to coastal flooding (Gharoni, 2014:15).
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recycled, and repurposed lifeboats bought from second-hand dealers. The man started the engine
and as we were getting ready to disembark, three 11- or 12-year old boys climbed into an adjacent
boat and watched us curiously. I took my phone out to take a selfie in the boat and noticed the
boys were trying to get into the picture behind me. When I held the phone higher, they saw
themselves on the screen, pointed, and started giggling. My companion untied the rope and the
boys waved to us as we pushed off from the embankment.
The boat was equipped with a motor and on board was a large jug of gasoline and a smaller
one of motor oil. The man started the engine, the driver stood up to take the rudder in one hand
and a piece of rope attached to the motor in the other, and we embarked (Image 8). The loud and
rhythmic quality of the motor was counter to the melodic sounds of the village we just came from.
As we moved closer to the Bay dozens of orange lifeboats, repurposed as fisher boats, came into
view tied up to trees on either side of the inlet’s embankment. As we moved closer to the sea, the
density of the village diminished, and the trees opened up to reveal a gray and cloudy sky (Image
9). A fence appeared on one side of the inlet and extended out past the waterline. Behind it was a
small security lookout made of concrete and corrugated metal. On top of the lookout was a man
sleeping in a reclined position; below him, the ground was littered with debris, mustard and white
colored foam pieces, metal shards and plastic materials left to accumulate in an area steps from
the village we had just came from. As our boat carried us out of the inlet, I was shocked to see that
we emerged in the Bay of Bengal in the midst of the shipbreaking beaches. There had been no
previous indication of where the inlet would take us, and it was startling to think of our small group
in a lifeboat driving in such close proximity to the huge scrap vessels in the tidal zone. Immediately
in view, on our left, was a partially dismantled vessel. The upper part of the hull was painted red
and cyan blue, the exposed lower half revealed the vessel’s propeller, while the interior part of the
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ship had support walls for container stacking. The colors and details were the markings of an A.P.
Moller-Maersk container ship that had been sold to a shipbreaking yard in late spring of 2014
(Image 10).9 Also visible were smaller fragments broken off from the vessel that had been pulled
closer to shore. In the other direction was what appeared to be an endless landscape of scrap ships
lining the coastal area, at various states of deconstruction.
As the driver steered our lifeboat north towards the vessels and parallel to the shoreline,
more partially dismantled vessels came into view, lined up one right after the other in the tidal
zone. The high tide water line was cluttered with smaller fragments of the ships that had been
pulled closer to the beach. The gray skies and dark gray waters made the vessels appear smaller
than they were. It was only when we passed by the fragments at close proximity that we felt their
monumentality as they hovered over us (Image 11-12). Looking inland past the yards were huge
hanger like structures; these were rerolling mills located near the N1 highway. After passing
numerous scrap vessels, an arresting scene came into view: on the port side of our rescue boat, a
partially submerged form cast completely in shadow jutted out from the choppy waters. As our
boat moved closer, the ominous shape appeared to be attached to a ship that was lying beneath the
water. Our position to this submerged vessel shifted my awareness from the scrap ships visible on
and nearer the shore, to the fragments in the space below our lifeboat; fragments submerged under
the high tide waters that will appear when the tide recedes (Image 13). What will also appear when
the tide recedes is hundreds of laborers who will cut, break down, and disappear these ships during
a dangerous and labor-intensive process. Driving along the N1 highway, walking through the
village, and my boat journey through the intertidal zone where shipbreaking yards have occupied
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In 2014 the container sector was having one of its worst years on record (UNCTAD, 2015), and even though
Bangladeshi shipbreakers have a preference for oil tankers and bulk carriers over container ships, there were many
container ships being scrapped globally, some of which ended up on these shores.
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Image 8: On route to the shipbreaking yards via rescue boat
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Image 9: Exiting the inlet into the Bay of Bengal
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Image 10: A.P. Moller-Maersk container ship being scrapped
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Image 11: London, IMO 9005548
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Image 12: Ship fragments in the intertidal zone
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and dominated the space for almost four decades, reminded me of some of the general questions
and concerns that animated my dissertation research from the beginning, namely, how was this
market for ships produced, why is it here, and whom does it benefit?
“Shipbreaking” refers to a dismantling process, whereby ships are cleared of all loose items
then the hull and structure are cut up into small pieces, moved onto flatbed trucks, and sold to a
local rerolling mill. Other items such as lifeboats, engines, and furniture are sold to vendors in the
secondary market. Shipbreaking is a term that has been employed since at least the 1970s by
stakeholders, but other terminology used to describe the same process includes scrapping,
demolition, dismantling, and more recently recycling.10 Since the 1970s, the majority of ships have
been broken up primarily in five countries: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, China, and Turkey, but in
the past decade, more ships have been sold to the South Asian yards given each country’s high
demand for scrap steel and the competitive process offered for the ships. Bangladesh does not have
iron ore mine deposits and has historically relied on imported semi-finished steel products (billets
used to make rebars) to satisfy their domestic demand.11 This changed in the early 1980s when a
group of businessmen set up the first winch and bought the first commercial ship for shipbreaking
(Muhammad, 2016, personal communication; Islam, 2016, personal communication). As the
country’s domestic demand for steel grew, so did their ship and scrap imports. According to
bankers at Standard Chartered, Bangladesh’s national consumption (demand) for steel in 2016 was
4.1 million tons. There are two ways to feed this demand. The first is to import iron scrap; the
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The meaning of these different terms are used interchangeably. More recently “shipbreaking” is being phased out
by stakeholders since it is a politically charged way of describing the process. NGO activists use the term to bring
attention to the manual processes that are attached to breaking ships. I have noticed that the shipowners and others in
the shipping industry tend to use scrapping, government documents use dismantling, and ship brokerage firms use
demolition. I use the terms at times interchangeability but try to remain consistent with using breaking and dismantling
when taking about labor and environmental issues, demolition and scrapping when discussing the ships as
commodities in the global marketplace, and ship recycling in the regulatory framework.
11
A billet is a rectangular, square, or circular shaped piece of semi-finished steel that needs further processing before
it is a finished good. Rebars can be made from billets.
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second is to procure scrap steel from ships through the shipbreaking process (Bankers, 2016,
personal communication; Chowdhury, 2016, personal communication). In 2016, 1.8-2 million tons
of scrap steel originated from the shipbreaking industry, which helped to make up 50 percent of
the national demand. 12
Bangladesh’s demand for steel is tied to national economic development. Scrap steel is
used to make billets, and one billet can be made into 30 reinforcing bars, also known as rebars.
Concrete has a strong compression strength but weak tensile strength, rebars operate as a tension
device when embedded in concrete construction and reinforces the strength from elongation and
pulling that concrete lacks. Rebars are a necessity for any large-scale building project that uses
concrete. Wherever you have buildings, bridges, sidewalks, dams, and tunnels made of concrete,
you have an interior rebar structure ensuring its stability. This is particularly true in Bangladesh.
Everywhere you travel in Chittagong, you see rebars sticking out buildings, sidewalks, bridges;
lying on the ground, being sold out of roadside stands, moved by rickshaw flatbeds and trucks. In
Chandgaon, I watched workers spend hours forming the long bars into rectangular shapes on the
street in front of a new residential development. Along with rickshaws, rebars are one of the more
consistent features of Chittagong’s landscape (Images 14-16).
The process of extracting this steel from ships has been developed by yard owners over the
past four decades into what is now an organized series of stages, with some work done during high
tide, while the majority done when the tide is low. After a ship is beached in the intertidal zone,
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It is important to note that this percentage is hard to determine and fluctuates based on global prices for steel billets.
For example, leading up to the 2008 Chinese Olympics, there was a huge demand for steel in China. Prices were
$750/ton on the global market. Following the Olympics, steel demand dropped, and the price per ton declined to
$215/ton. Not only did the price drop but China flooded the global market with cheap (surplus) steel billets. In this
case, rerolling mills in countries like Bangladesh could buy directly from the Chinese suppliers and bypass the
shipbreakers, which they started to do. Shipbreakers pressured the government in Bangladesh to raise import tariffs
on billets helping shipbreakers maintain competition with the Chinese surpluses.
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laborers board the vessel to remove loose objects, including ropes, cords, toilets, sinks, picture
frames, pots and pans, in addition to electrical equipment, tools, and furniture. While these items
are being removed, laborers known as ‘cuttermen’ enter the interior of the hull, and with handheld
torches begin to cut through the vessel. When a section of the ship is severed completely it freefalls into the tidal zone. At this stage of cutting the size of these sections are enormous, comprising
of a cross section of the vessel’s body or the bridge itself. During low tide dozens of workers walk
barefoot through the silted and muddy tidal area carrying over their shoulder heavy cables that
they attach to fragments broken off from the ship’s body. Laborers on the beach engage land-based
winches to drag the pieces closer to the shore. Once on shore another group of cuttermen break
them down into smaller more manageable pieces of steel scrap and flat plates of steel. In the past,
the plates were moved by workers known as loaders but today, more often than not they are moved
by magnets onto trucks for transport to local manual rerolling mills.13 The rerolling mills will
transform the steel and scrap pieces into rebars and billets and the material will be stored or sold
to construction companies across Bangladesh, embedding fragments of the maritime economy into
the built landscape.
After having been in Chittagong three weeks before my boat ride, embedded in the daily
routine of working with a local activist, the yards felt distant, but this boat ride reminded me how
I came to my project and why I was there. The question I have been preoccupied with for my
dissertation is how shipbreaking was produced in Bangladesh. As my research developed, this
general question necessitated a more specific set of questions and concerns. The first question was
historical and geographical as it asked, what was the origin of this market in Chittagong, or, how
did the shipbreaking market emerge in this place and why? A second question animating the
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Chapter Four will review some of these processes again in the context of regulatory pressures.
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research pivoted away from the academic literature and the shipbreaking beaches to investigate
the economic conditions under which the global shipping sector has come to depend on a ship
demolition market. This secondary question orientated my research around considerations of the
ship as a form of fixed capital, and therefore, encouraged me to expand on understanding the
circulation of capital in and through the shipping sector. As with any market there are no invisible
hands, and so a third set of questions related to how, where, and who worked this global market.
The emphasis here was to denaturalize this market by making its parts more visible through the
demystification of the actors, devices, and spaces that make it up. A final set of questions was
situated around the new regulatory frameworks aimed at mitigating environmental and labor issues
that had arisen as the industry evolved. Here I ask what work the regulations are doing and for
whom. Ultimately, this dissertation examines a set of interconnected forces at work that reveal
how shipbreaking developed and continues to be developed in Chittagong. It proceeds by
interrogating certain moments of conjuncture that offer insight into how this place became a viable
and productive location for the large-scale dismantling of ocean-going vessels. In so doing, a
broader set of concerns emerged: how global economic processes are dependent on smooth
circulations of capital into and through the shipping sector, and, at times of economic crisis, how
the sector solves certain barriers to accumulation through the production of new forms and
practices of exploitation, understood through the process and market that break up ships on
beaches.
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Image 13: Young man forming rectangular shapes from rebars
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Image 14: Moving rebars with KSRM (Kabir Steel Rerolling Mill) shop in background
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Image 15: Rebar and concrete residential development in Chandgaon thana
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Reflection on methodology
The general concern of this dissertation is to understand how the shipbreaking market was
produced, what continues to produce it, and what are the crises it is enduring and producing.
Specifically, how an intersection of particular historical-geographic conditions, global politicaleconomy, and social factors conditioned how this shipbreaking market could emerge and develop
in Chittagong by the 1980s. In a way, what I was interested in was the ability to formulate an
analysis able to grapple with the complexity of the early period of this productive activity and how,
with all the criticism of the negative effects the practice has had on labor and the environment, it
has continued to flourish and be sustained. When I began thinking about this broad question and
the way in which I would research it, the assumption I held was that most of the fieldwork and
data I needed to collect would come primarily from field research in Bangladesh; that various
social actors there would provide me with the knowledge and insights necessary to develop my
research concerns. In fact, what I learned during my exploratory fieldwork in Chittagong was that
to understand and locate shipbreaking in Bangladesh in its contemporary form it would be
necessary to understand the rise of the contemporary global demolition market in a more general
way: how the crisis of overaccumulation and overproduction conditioned the global shipping
sector, and in turn how the production of certain places and practices were necessitated in order
for the circulation of capital to continue apace. I also learned from agents in the field and from
available literature that stories related to the early days of shipbreaking were full of inconsistences
and that the ‘origin’ of this practice would also need to be critically addressed. In effect, to
understand and analyze the emergence of the shipbreaking market in Chittagong I would need to
move away from Chittagong at times and even away from shipbreaking.
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Gillian Hart notes that conjunctural analysis operates as a way to bring “key forces at play
in…other regions of the world into the same frame of analysis, as connected yet distinctively
different nodes in globally interconnected historical geographies—and as sites in the production
of global processes in specific spatio-historical conjunctures, rather than as just recipients of them”
(2018: 373). Following this relational method, I will spend less attention on the processes produced
by shipbreaking and more attention on the processes that produced it. My research was rooted in
an understanding of shipbreaking as driven by an interconnected set of processes put into action
by actors operating across scales and in different financial, maritime, and regulatory centers of the
world, as well as locations where these actors make decisions that play out in the particular places
that characterize the everyday places of the shipbreaking market, including, anchorage areas that
function as oceanic warehouses, second-hand shops that line the N1 highway, the coastal villages
where laborers live, and the shipbreaking yards themselves.
My fieldwork was organized around a broad set of concerns. These concerns led me to a
number of field locations where I was able to collect data from archives and actors who were
engaged with different aspects of this market.14 My experiences are far from comprehensive. The
more people I talked to, the more I realized that an exhaustive study reliant on semi-structured
interviews, archives, and participant observation was impossible. The specificity of how this global
market works and how it conditions domestic markets is full of specific relationships, exclusive
dealings, and propriety information, all being constantly transformed by the logics driving the
circulation of capital towards exponential accumulation. Many of the people involved with this
market were, for practical and political reasons, inaccessible and much of this inaccessibility was
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This dissertation drew on semi-structured interviews, participant observation, archival research, and visual
ethnography. I conducted field research in Chittagong, Dubai, Singapore, London, Brussels, New York, and Geneva
with support from the American Institute of Bangladesh Studies, Institute of Human Geography Grant Program, the
Advanced Research Collaborative, and Doctoral Student Research Grants, CUNY.
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prevalent within the domestic sphere of Bangladesh. This presented me with a methodological
challenge: how the lack of access to certain actors and data sets would challenge my analysis and
writing, and at the same time how to remain confident about the data I did collect. This was one
of the more dauting tasks during my writing process. If my data was limited, what could I translate
from the particular into a more general set of claims, and what validity could I claim if all the
voices were not present? Challenges like these were exacerbated by the particular time I entered
into the field. It was a charged moment for most stakeholders when I began my research in 2013.
After decades of activism around the toxic and hazardous labor and environmental conditions, a
turning point came in 2009 when the first ever international convention specific to ship recycling
was adopted by member states of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Though not
ratified when I conducted my field research, it had a tremendous impact on what stakeholders
discussed with me and how they framed it. This context required me to be more sensitive and
aware of the questions I posed and issues I raised. Posturing became prominent when different
stakeholders described their relationship with the “greening” of the industry. Ultimately, these
research contexts and challenges influenced what I could write, and directed the content and
framework for each chapter.
Most of the literature available on shipbreaking published by NGOs, IGOs, and journalists,
focuses on highlighting the working conditions at the shipbreaking yards and the toxic labor
conditions created from the materials that seep into the bodies of laborers, and also the soil and
water, affecting the environment, all from the process of breaking ships. Publications from the
more active international NGOs working on these issues include: Annual Reports, Quarterly
Updates, and Annual Lists of ships sold for scrap, Position and Briefing Papers, as well as in-depth
investigative reports on related topics from organizations such as the NGO Shipbreaking Platform,
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the Institute for Global Labor and Human Rights, IndustriALL, the International Federation for
Human Rights and, early on from Greenpeace.15 NGO collaborations have produced some of the
most comprehensive reports on labor conditions since the early 2000s (e.g., FIDH, 2002; YPSA,
2005; Dao, 2008; NGO Shipbreaking Platform, 2015; Kernaghan, 2015; IndustriALL, 2015; NGO
Shipbreaking Platform, 2019). Publications from IGOs such as the International Labor
Organization (ILO), Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Convention (BRS), and the World Bank,
along with other sponsored reports from individual member states, range in tone and focus, but
always include sections on labor and the environmental conditions (e.g., Rahman and Ullah, 1999;
Andersen, 2001; Bailey, 2000; Sarraf et al., 2010). Investigative journalism has focused on human
interest stories (e.g., Cohn and Englund, 1998; Langweische, 2000; Buerk, 2006; Gwin, 2014;
Vidal, 2017). The earliest scholarly publication I could trace on shipbreaking in Bangladesh was
a short piece on soil pollution as a direct outcome of shipbreaking in Sitakunda (Hossain and Islam,
1986). The literature on shipbreaking in Bangladesh through the 1990s is surprisingly limited; it
doesn’t begin to pick up until the late 1990s and early 2000s. The focus at that time was primarily
on how scrap ships are a form of waste and thus should be regulated under the Basel Convention.
Other work focused on tracking specific movements of scrap ships to shipbreaking yards in South
Asia (Pelsy, 2008; Moen, 2008; Hossain et al., 2008; Demaria, 2010; Gregson et al., 2010b).
In this dissertation, discussions related to labor at the yards and the laborers more generally
are dependent on the published works of NGOs and IGOs who had exceptional access to the
villages where shipbreakers live, and to the yards where they work, along with occasional
15

There is an extensive series of publications that the NGO Shipbreaking Platform has published. Since 2009, they
have released Annual Reports. Since 2012, they have published the most comprehensive list of ships scrapped globally
that is publicly accessible in the Annual List of Ships Scrapped. Every quarter since April 2014 they have published
overviews of the market with a special mention of shipbreaking related topics in a series of Quarterly Reports, while
press releases focus on specific and important stories on shipbreaking related topics that include accidents (June 27,
2016; October 19, 2018; February 18, 2019; May 15, 2019) and financial and regulatory stories (January 20, 2019;
March 20, 2019; June 20, 2018).
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interventions collected from my own fieldwork. I would like to acknowledge that discussions of
labor are not as prevalent in the dissertation as I would have liked, but this does not mean it was
not one of the project’s primary motivations. The exploitation of labor in this industry is one of
the worst forms of labor exploitation in the world. The levels of danger and bodily risk
shipbreakers are exposed to is hard to imagine, and the slow violence inflicted upon workers
through their long-term exposure to toxic chemicals during a workday is remarkable and
necessitates longitudinal studies by research teams dedicated to understanding these effects over a
different time and spatial scale than was possible for me. With the limited access I had to the yards,
mostly due to the political climate at the time I began my research, and the threat of job loss or
bodily harm from the employers if laborers discussed anything with activists and journalists, made
me realize that this type of research was out of my reach. That said, the encounters I did have with
shipbreaking laborers in Bangladesh—including meeting a group of male teenagers who were
recruited from shipbreaking yards by a local activist, in order to be retrained at a local training
center and to apply their skills to less risky jobs; the father whom I met in his home, who had been
working as a shipbreaker for 14 years in the hope that his young son would not need to; the two
brothers who left shipbreaking after seeing their friend fall to his death; and the young teen whose
eyes I met with when leaving one of the shipbreaking yards office after I watched a ship being
beached—remained at the forefront of my mind during my writing process and continue to offer a
reminder of why I took on this work, and who has the most at stake in the system of global capital.

Organization of chapters and content
Chapter One, “The Imperatives of Demystifying the ‘Origin’ of Shipbreaking in
Bangladesh” addresses how the wreck and scrapping of the Clan Alpine can be used to deepen an
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understanding of the conditions under which the shipbreaking market emerged in Bangladesh.
Pivoting from this concern this chapter offers a historical-geographic analysis of how Chittagong
became entrenched in a British imperial maritime economy and transnational trade network by
foregrounding the development and modernization of the Port of Chittagong. Part I disentangles
the story of the Clan Alpine, a ship owned by the Clan Line Steamers Company that was wrecked
in a storm then scrapped in-situ in the early 1960s. The ship is imbued with mythical status by
stakeholders who continue to use it as the way to describe the emergence of shipbreaking in
Bangladesh. The chapter reveals the story of the ship before and after it was wrecked in the coastal
area of the Chittagong District. Part II employs the concept of an “imperial port city” as a way to
introduce the modernization of this historic port city, describing how it became a place
characterized by its maritime activities in the early part of the twentieth century. I appropriate
“shipping nexus” as a concept to think through the intersection of economic, political, and social
actors that helped to produce the foundations on which a modern maritime Chittagong could
develop. Shipping nexus was coined by Canadian historian Robert Kubicek to describe a network
of economic actors during the nineteenth century that helped to build a “new imperialism” that
became “crucial to the assemblage and allocation of finance capital and application of technical
innovation” during a period of economic expansion (2004: 109). The maritime entrenchment of
Chittagong was undergirded by technical transformations—administration, logistics, and
infrastructure—in its surrounding land- and sea-scapes. Laying this foundation enabled the modern
maritime development of Chittagong. During this period the beginning of Chittagong’s
relationship to a transnational trade network was established and would later provide the maritime
technology for a shipbreaking market to also develop.
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Essential to developing the argument above, the methods used to collect data included
archival research, semi-structured interviews, and textual analysis of secondary and primary
documents. I began with cross-referencing secondary materials and when inconsistencies about
the Clan Alpine and its history began to emerge, I sought clarification through semi-structured
interviews with senior shipping agents operating today in the Bangladesh shipbreaking market.
When these meetings offered further slippages, additional research on the particularities of the ship
and its story in question became necessary. I found important reportage in the Indian Englishlanguage newspapers and first-hand accounts of the Clan Alpine’s beaching. Furthermore, I
traveled to London to visit one of the world’s most comprehensive archives on ocean-going
vessels, Lloyd’s Register Foundation Heritage and Education Centre (LRF HEC). With the help
of a savvy archivist, I was able to verify many of the inconsistencies, and included much of what
I learned about the details of the ship, the storm, and its wreckage in the chapter. In this process,
the Clan Alpine emerged as a window into a particular past that enabled connections to be made
between a period of time in British imperial maritime history when the Port of Chittagong was
developed to satisfy the needs of the British trade economy. I was fortunate to stumble onto a
critical series of books that enabled me to ground the content of this chapter firmly in the
production of space with the Records of the Commissioners of the Port of Chittagong Volumes 1
– 14 and Khan’s summary of the port records published in The History of the Port of Chittagong.
Chapter Two, “Capital Circulation and Crises in the Shipping Markets” considers the
emergence and growth of the commercial shipbreaking market in Bangladesh through a broader
analysis of the circulation of capital into and through the shipping sector. Part I positions the
research in contrast to the views of orthodox economists who see overproduction as a symptom of
supply and demand imbalance. I make my argument by disentangling three linked concepts: (1)
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the ship as a form of fixed capital and the role of credit in fixed capital formation; (2) how value
is produced in the shipping sector; and (3) the devaluation of fixed capital. This framework adds
nuance to the analysis of how the shipping sector helped to resolve the “capital surplus absorption
problem”16 that became apparent in global markets by the 1960s, and how, in periods of economic
downturns, shipbreaking developed as an important strategy to help resolve the crisis of oceanic
overproduction and trade. Part II focuses on the implications of the slowed movement and
circulation of fictitious capital into the sector and how this opened up the need for new forms of
financing that helped lay the foundation for a new form and scale of shipbreaking activities by the
early 1990s, the period that laid the groundwork for a sectoral shift to South Asia. Part III draws
out the context under which the shift from Taiwan to Bangladesh was set in motion, and how
developments in ship financing responded to economic crises and insured the continued necessity
of a global demolition market and domestic shipbreaking in Bangladesh. Relying substantially on
empirical data on shipping markets alongside market reports and data collected from fieldwork,
this chapter tracks how agents moved around barriers to capital accumulation starting in the 1970s,
changing the scale of the sector, and established new rounds of accumulation and subsequent
exploitation, as evidenced in new locations and a new scale of shipbreaking.
The research and claims presented in this chapter relied heavily on publicly accessible ship
demolition data housed in the LRF HEC archive, specifically the Casualty Returns published by
Lloyd’s Register and the World’s Casualty Statistics by Fairplay between 1890 to 2010. Two other
publications critical to this chapter were The Review of Maritime Transport published by the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and Maritime Transport

16

Harvey’s “capital surplus absorption problem” is when capitalists, who produce surpluses in the form of profit, are
“forced by competition to recapitalize and reinvest a part of that surplus in expansion. This requires that new profitable
outlets be found” (Harvey, 2010: 26).
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published by the Organization for Economic Development (OECD). Ship brokerage firm reports
helped to fill gaps related to freight rates in the 1950s, while popular magazines and newspapers
offered details on the technological advancements in shipbuilding and on specific ships. Industry
publications were also one of the most important sources for the state of the domestic ship
scrapping markets, to track the conversations related to the economics of these markets.
Contributing to a ‘critical geography of ships’ depends on understanding the way in which
the global demolition market works, therefore, Chapter Three takes seriously the necessity to defetishize this market. As noted in recent scholarship, markets are not things; rather they are formed
by a fluid set of interactions by actors who are constrained by “rules,” logics of the market, and
the governmental regulations that determine how capital flows. These interactions are inherently
spatial since at their core is the movement of commodities for exchange (Cahill, 2019: 3). Chapter
Three, “The Actors, Devices, Spaces of the Global Demolition and Shipbreaking Market,”
describes the workings of the market through the specific roles of actors, and the devices e.g.
financial mechanisms, and the spaces they use/produce. Drawing out some of the more important
interconnections between stakeholders offers a way to address a basic set of questions: who works
the global demolition and Bangladesh based shipbreaking market (the stakeholders), where does
it work (littoral zones, port cities and transshipments hubs, delimitated and non-delimitated oceanspaces, global financial centers, small island nations), and what allows it to work (financial
mechanisms, insurance and reinsurance, classifications societies, flags of convenience). This
chapter was based primarily on a series of semi-structured interviews in New York, Dubai,
London, Singapore, and Chittagong with ship brokers, cash buyers, ship registries, shipbreakers,
captains, environmental and labor activists, insurance and financial agents, ship association
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representatives, and representatives working on ship recycling initiatives at the International
Maritime Organization.
Chapter Four, “Concrete Futures,” continues the boat ride that opened this introduction to
provide a full first-hand account of the landscape of Chittagong’s shipbreaking yards, first by sea,
then through an analysis of three shipbreaking yards I visited between 2014-2016. By doing so, I
orient shipbreaking in its domestic context in Chittagong, introducing the practice and process of
breaking ships on the beach, its effect on the littoral area, labor and the environment, and critically
consider how the domestic shipbreaking yards are developing unevenly under international
pressures. Chapter Four continues to draw out the spatial history begun in Chapter One,
emphasizing how the maritime landscape was developed, under what context, and by and for
whom does it benefit. To do this, Chapter Four brings into conversation the tensions between the
not yet ratified Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound
Recycling of Ships, the EU Ship Recycling Regulation, and the shipbreaking yard owners, to argue
that they contribute in a multitude of ways to the long-term uneven development within domestic
shipbreaking yards and between domestic shipbreaking markets. Applying the theory of uneven
development to understand how improvements made and not made at individual shipbreaking
yards reveal how the character of these particular spaces are changing in light of regulatory and
industry pressures, and thus, how they may operate in the future as a way to encourage or
discourage the circulation of capital and its reproduction. As Smith notes “the tendency toward
equalization emerges from the necessity for economic expansion in capitalist society” (1996:74).
Differentiation, on the other hand, emerged in the yards where owners do not make the
“improvements”. The improvements are unevenly implemented, and it is too soon to identify the
implications related to the shipbreaker’s market position, or even if these improvements have led
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to safer labor and environmental conditions. In this last chapter we begin to see the contours of a
regulatory process, imposed from a hierarchical arrangement of member states and shipping
stakeholders that have the power to exacerbate already uneven social, economic, and political
dynamics in Bangladesh’s shipbreaking yards and between the shipbreaking yards of Bangladesh
and other domestic markets.
There are a few thematic threads that become apparent in these chapters, which will be
addressed in the Conclusion. The first is a reflection on crises of overaccumulation, as these
chapters speak to the ways in which stakeholders of capital find ways to move around barriers of
accumulation and in the process produce new spaces [and the ways shipping and shipbreaking are
a means of dealing with capital (over) accumulation, etc.]. Another theme, explicit in some areas
and implicit in others, is how the effects of financialization on the shipping sector condition new
forms of labor exploitation through an expanded use of letters of credit (LC) and debt-financing
for new ships. Yet another theme is identified in the ways in which the production of infrastructure
space in Chittagong set the pace for its integration into particular forms of development, beginning
with the British and their construction of revetments, access roads, navigation channels, and
concluding with the European Commission and member states of the IMO, who through their new
regulations influenced the construction of a “concrete future” as seen in the construction of
impermeable floors, drainage canals, bilge water tanks and the implementation of a large scale
multisector treatment center for wastes. Chittagong, its places, and people continue to be
conditioned in and responsive to a system determined by a set of logics determined by the multiscaled actors of global capital.
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CHAPTER ONE
The Imperatives of Demystifying the ‘Origin’ of
Shipbreaking in Chittagong
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Introduction
During the summer months in the Chandgaon section of Chittagong, before the sun
becomes too hot and the humidity sets in, a variety of sounds, mostly melodic, make their
appearance. They emanate from the neighborhood and streets of modern city life. The early
morning call to prayer sung out from the local mosque competes for air space with gray bellied
crows and other tropical birds, while children talk and giggle as they walk to school. The city’s
diverse forms of transportation wake-up residents over the course of the morning, the rattling of
CNGs, rickshaw bells, bright punchy horns coming from cars, and engines of motorbikes and
trucks vie for air space on the residential side streets. Other layers of sound originate from various
types of vendors who, moving slowly and methodically, stop in front of each multi-storied
residence entrance with their carts selling a variety of perishable and non-perishable goods calling
out: ta-me-to, a-lu, kar-al-la (tomato, potato, bittermellon), di-ma, di-ma (eggs-eggs), ru-i-mas
(fish) (Image 17-18). Carts piled high with jackfruit and household items ranging from pots and
pans to colanders and towels also pass by. Walking at a faster pace, a young man sings out morgi-mor-gi-mor-gi (chicken-chicken-chicken), carrying five in each hand by their feet. Twelve
tracks could barely capture the morning sounds in Chandgaon. My second-floor window looked
out over one of the residential streets and this symphony of sounds wafted in each day.
I first arrived in Chittagong in June 2014 during the early days of monsoon season. It was
hot and very humid, but life was still a buzz. I learned quickly about the frequent blackouts during
the hot monsoon months. The absence of electricity powering the fans, air conditioning units, and
lighting had a slowing-down effect on the activities of everyday life. From my residence the
shipbreaking beaches that had introduced me to this vibrant and historical port city felt very far
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away, but, as I soon learned, shipbreaking was in fact embedded in the fabric of the built
environment and everyday life in the port city of Chittagong, Bangladesh.
The “maritime” can be observed from the air before one lands in Chittagong City. When I
arrived at the Shah Amanat International Airport in Patenga, it was early evening and the landscape
was flooded with late afternoon sunlight casting the entire landscape in an ochre colored haze
(Image 19). As the Karanfuli River came into view, dozens of ships could be seen anchored upriver
from its mouth. Upon leaving the airport my car drove along Airport Road, a road closely
paralleling the river. There was a strong smell of oil as we passed tankers and natural gas carriers
that were anchored at individual berths along the riverbank. These ships unloaded the nation’s
energy through the night. Small piers jutted out into the river and were often surrounded with
sampans, the “taxis” of the Karnafuli River (Image 20). The river is the obvious place to see, hear,
and smell the maritime activities of Chittagong, but the maritime transcends the river and is
embedded in the city streets, office buildings, infrastructure, and visual culture of the city.
Moving through the landscape in Chittagong City an observer will see nuances of the
maritime world. An impressive infrastructure project begun in 2015 with the intention of reducing
traffic congestion in central Chittagong is the Akhtaruzzaman Chowdhury flyover that spans 5.2
km through the city. Workers can be seen using brightly painted ladders that have been bought
from second-hand shops after being recycled from scrap ships and refurbished, made into new
commodities. These ladders are used by those working on the construction of the flyover (Image
21). The large steel rerolling mills, located along the N1 highway, are in a concentrated area in the
textile district where “Garden Packed Finlay Tea” advertisements can be spotted taking up wall
space on street corners. Rebars are embedded in all things concrete in Chittagong and the lower
storied buildings built in the past three decades most likely used rebars that came from the steel
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Image 16: Potato seller in Chandgaon
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Image 17: Egg seller in Chandgaon
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Image 18: View of Karnafuli River with anchored ships
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Image 19: Local river boat with regional bulk carriers anchored in the Karnafuli River
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Image 20: Akhtaruzzaman Chodhury Flyover with repurposed ladders
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recycled from scrapped ships. The rebars can also be seen sticking out of unfinished bridges and
sidewalks throughout the city. The neighborhood known as Agrabad has a high concentration of
ship related firms. Other areas of the city are home to labor and environmental activists struggling
for better working conditions for garment and port workers and shipbreakers. Traversing the city,
if one looks closely enough you can observe young men, 15-17 years old, working as mechanics
and informal electricians, many of which earn their living from the skills they picked up as
shipbreakers. In addition to the implicit references to the maritime, there are the explicit references
too, such as Patenga Lighthouse, Port Link Road, and Chittagong Customs House signs.
Everywhere you go in Chittagong you are confronted with its maritime past, present, and future:
the obvious and hidden markings of a port city embedded in the social, cultural, political, and
economic fabric of daily life.
My fieldwork in Chittagong was in part motivated by a set of research questions concerned
with understanding the emergence of shipbreaking. When mentioned in the shipbreaking literature,
the industry’s history was reduced to a few lines about a story of one ship and one storm. The same
story has been circulated in short documentaries, popular news, NGO and academic literature, as
well as in IGO reports. In each instance the same short listing of bibliographic sources was used
(FIDH, 2002; YPSA, 2005; Buerk, 2006). In Chittagong, historical questions foregrounded the
meetings I had with stakeholders in the shipbreaking industry. These questions were punctuated
with topics that ranged from environmental impacts of shipbreaking, labor, secondary and steel
markets, and national and international regulatory pressures. Of all the topics I covered, only one
story overlapped between cash buyers, shipping agents, academics, beaching captains and labor
activists: the story of how a shipwreck “jumpstarted” the local industry sometime in the early
1960s and from there the shipbreaking market in Chittagong grew.
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However, at each telling the inconsistencies grew. These slippages included: the year of
the storm, the name of the owner, the flag of registration, the origin of the vessel, whether it was
an older or newer ship, what happened after the shipwreck, and even the name of the vessel.
Collectively the story shared was that sometime between 1960-1965 a Greek owned and Greek
flagged ship, the MD Alpine, was caught in a cyclone while anchored off the coast of Chittagong.
The strength of the storm forced the ship to run aground. The vessel, unable to be re-floated, was
eventually purchased for scrap and broken up in-situ. The reasons behind the ship’s anchorage in
Chittagong’s waters was unclear, and what happened after it ran aground was explained vaguely,
at best. The MD Alpine was circulated as an origin story for what would become one of
Bangladesh’s most important productive activities, an industry that added to the country’s GDP
and, in the early days of the market, was promoted as a job creator by local and global stakeholders,
and government officials. Yet any further details of this scrap ship were unknown. It was within
the slippages and inconsistencies surrounding the ship’s details that new questions of the market’s
emergence began to preoccupy my interests. How did one of the most important shipbreaking
markets in the world develop from this single event? What was the story of this ship, and how did
it “jumpstart” shipbreaking? To answer these questions the only option available to me was to
track down the sources that would help to clarify some of the details of this ship.
I sought to learn about the circumstances of the MD Alpine at the archive of Lloyd’s
Register Foundation Heritage and Education Centre (LRF HEC) (Image 22).17 The LRF HEC in
the City of London is housed in the Lloyd’s Register headquarters. The LRF library was founded
in 1852 by naval architect Augustin Bullock Creuze, who was also one of the Register’s principal
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Vital in supporting this research was the Information Officers Anne Cowne and Victoria Culkin at the LRF HEC,
who helped me identify the real name and character (owner and flag) of this ship. The MD Alpine, was in fact the Clan
Alpine, a British owned and British flagged cargo ship.
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marine surveyors (Image 23). The LRF HEC holds an extensive collection of marine engineering,
science, and maritime history publications and collections. Lloyd’s Register is most recognized for
their historical data collected and published on all things related to ships and their crews. The two
publications in the repository foundational for this research were the Lloyd’s Register of Ships18
and the Casualty Returns (Image 24-25). 19 The LRF HEC turned out to be of paramount
significance for understanding the relationship between the wrecked ship and the emergence of
shipbreaking in Chittagong. Through archival documents a different origin story emerged. This
story explicitly references the ways in which Chittagong’s port and maritime activities was
integrated into larger scaled patterns of trade during the British Imperial period. It is the history of
this particular ship that helps to complicate accepted understandings of why, how, and when
Chittagong became a significant location for an evolving global maritime economy, an economy
that would come to depend on Chittagong decades later, when access to a shipbreaking market
became vital to economic growth within the shipping sector.
Amitav Ghosh notes in The Great Derangement, “a ‘setting’ is what allows most stories to
unfold; its relation to the action is as close as that of a stage to a play,” and that it develops a “sense
of place.” It is through the choices of what to bring into the foreground that allows other aspects
of the landscape to recede, and it is on this foundation that a narrative can be carried (2016:59-61).
The reflections Ghosh offers us on form and content have been particularly useful in thinking about
how the inquiry and questions I set out to explore, help guide what stories need to be demystified.
They also support the interrogation of how the shipbreaking market in Bangladesh was produced,
and then direct how to tell that story. It is in the details of two stories that emerged from my archival
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The Lloyd’s Register of Ships is an index of all active ocean-going vessels, published between 1764-1766, 17681771, and annually since 1775 (Boisson, 1994).
19
In 1890 Lloyds Register began publishing a series called the Wreck Books (1891-1969) where data on all oceangoing ships lost was compiled. By 1970, the Wreck Books had become the Casualty Returns.
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Image 21: View of Wreck Books
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Image 22: Wreck Books 1963-1969
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research that tell a particular story of the place known as Chittagong and the maritime context
entwined with this place that directs attention to a relationship between a ship, the MD Alpine and
the making of Chittagong’s shipbreaking market. Ann Laura Stoler notes the challenge for scholars
committed to a politics of change is to “focus on the more protracted imperial processes that
saturate the subsoil of people’s lives and persist, sometimes subjacently, over a longer duree”
(2013:5). Pivoting from the wreckage of the MD Alpine whose legacy did “saturate the subsoil”,
literally and mythically, an opportunity emerged to disentangle a particular historical geography,
one that deepens the relationship between this ship, its story, and how it relates to the development
of shipbreaking in Chittagong, Bangladesh. Excavating the material history of the MD Alpine
uncovered an unexpected “history of the present” in the port city of Chittagong, how earlier
processes of capital expansion (equalization) offer a way to understand contemporary
manifestations of the development processes that occur in Chittagong today, as they interconnect
maritime transformations to the expansion of the national economy and global economic
processes. The Clan Alpine, the story of the Clan Line and its relationship to new markets, and
British Imperial interests in southeastern India, offer a chance to foreground the analysis of how a
maritime Chittagong, and later Bangladesh was integrated into the reproductive logic of global
capital (explored in Chapter Two).
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Part I introduces the reader to the ship, the
shipwreck, and the storm drawing on news reports and first-hand accounts of what happened on
the MD Alpine’s fateful day. Clarifying some of the details in this story help alter its relationship
to the emergence of the contemporary shipbreaking market. These corrections are pulled into Part
II when the concept of a “port city” and “shipping nexus” are used to help make sense of the
histories behind the wreck of the MD Alpine. Part III introduces the economic motivations for state
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and non-state actors that drove the development of a port-rail nexus as particular to the region.
This nexus becomes the foundation for the expansion and subsequent equalization of the port
economy, a process that was dependent on a new and expanded built environment able to service
the developing trades, the administrative formalization of the port, and invited the arrival of British
maritime intelligence (Lloyd’s Agents, whose role was to track ships). This newly developing
maritime landscape led to a deeper integration of the Port of Chittagong and its hinterland into
British imperial patterns of trade. I argue in the next pages, it was this period in Chittagong’s
history that maritime and imperial interests laid the foundation on which further uneven maritime
histories could stand. In short, by delinking the Clan Alpine from its legendary status as the
forbearer of the contemporary shipbreaking industry in Chittagong, the material histories the Clan
Alpine was embedded within reveal the longer duree of the uneven integration of Chittagong into
a first British, and later global, maritime economy.

Part I
A ship, a storm, and a wreck
On November 2, 1960 the front-page headline of The Statesman read: “Chittagong Worst
hit by storm—Dockside & Airport Submerged—2 Steamers Run Aground.”20 Five days of front
page news coverage followed the storm whose eye had struck just north of the port city of
Chittagong on October 31, 1960. A Chittagong District senior official surveyed the area and told a
reporter that Chittagong bore the brunt of the storm. A cyclonic storm surge submerged the
waterfront and airport under six feet of water, destroying 1,000 houses at the Railway Colony,21
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The Statesman is an Indian English-language daily newspaper. It was established in 1875 and has been one of India’s
leading daily papers (Britannica, 2018).
21
This was an area in Chittagong City where “British-Indian” style housing for railway personnel was developed (Van
Schendel, 2015).
54

while 25-30 people died in Sitakunda, a coastal town 20 km north of Chittagong City. He also
reported that mail service was temporarily suspended, telecommunications cut off, and there was
a train derailment outside of Chittagong (The Statesman, 1960a). Lieutenant General Azam Khan,
formerly East Pakistan’s Governor, was in charge of early relief efforts and carried out a
reconnaissance mission of the affected areas by helicopter. Other top officials were tasked to make
“on-the-spot” surveys
of the storm damage
(The

Statesman,

1960a). On November
4,

The

headline

Statesman
read,

“Chittagong death toll
Figure 2: “Heavy Toll In cyclone feared” (Source: The Statesmen, 1960b).

now put at 4,000.” There

continued to be no water supply, electricity was still cut off, roads remained blocked, and as
reported, the scene on the ground was “utter devastation” (The Statesman, 1960c). Officials
indicated that as they approached the port near the Badarkhali Channel, they observed “many
bodies floating in the sea” (The Statesman, 1960b). The official’s tour also reported that nine cranes
had crashed onto storage sheds at the port, rendering it and nearby industrial areas unusable, while
the air reconnaissance confirmed: 6,500 shattered houses, floating carcasses of animals visible in
the flooded areas, and sixteen vessels had run aground or were damaged due to the storm tide. Two
of these were large cargo vessels owned and operated by the Clan Line Association Steamers, a
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Glasgow based shipping company. One was a 9,000 gt general cargo carrier named the Clan Alpine
(The Statesman, 1960c).22

Sea Breezes remembers the Clan Alpine
Searching for the MD Alpine at LRF HEC initially posed challenges. Upon numerous
searches the MD Alpine did not appear in any of the aforementioned publications. It was one of
the archivists that found that the MD Alpine was misnamed, and the ship was in fact the Clan
Alpine. Once this clarification was made, we were able to identify sources that referred to the ship’s
fateful last voyage. In a February 1998 copy of Sea Breezes: The Magazine of Ships and Sea,23 a
first-hand account of the final voyage of the Clan Alpine was presented in the following article,
“The ‘Clan Alpine’ Rice Paddy Incident”, written by Captain Andy Logan. Logan was 24 years
old at the time of the wreck and the Clan Alpine’s 2nd Mate. Logan’s account along with another
first-hand account written by John Morris (the Clan Alpine’s 3rd Engineer) helps narrate the story
of this ship, the storm, its wreckage, and what happened after.
The last voyage of the Clan Alpine began on September 16, 1960. After picking up crew
from King George V dock in Glasgow, the ship traveled south to Vittoria Dock in Birkenhead,
located on the River Mersey across from Liverpool. The Clan Alpine’s route was to travel through
the Suez Canal, with stops at the following ports: Assab, Djibouti, Aden, Bombay, Cochin,
Tuticorin, and a final port of discharge across the Bay of Bengal at Chittagong. The crew included
officers and “’59 pleasant lascar’ crew returning to their homes in the Chittagong area after 18
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Finding the MD Alpine was difficult in the Lloyd’s Archive. With the help of the Archivist, we were able to identify
the correct name of the ship: Clan Alpine.
23
Sea Breezes is a small pamphlet published since 1919 on the Isle of Man.
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months working onboard Clan ships” (Logan, 1998).24 The vessel was due to arrive to the Port of
Chittagong on October 31, 1960.
The appointment letter Logan received from the Clan Line stated that “the trip was to be
with full general cargo for India and East Pakistan then leave to be scrapped at a location to be
determined later” (1998). Logan made specific reference in the article to the ship’s obsolescence,
noting that the “navigation equipment [on board] was rudimentary even by the standards of the
time” (100). The Clan Alpine was too slow for the increasingly competitive liner trades with India,
Ceylon, Pakistan, South and East Africa, and Australia (Morris, 1998). Once an efficient and
modern design, by 1959 the vessel had become obsolete in its design and experienced a loss of
value.25 When the Clan Alpine arrived in Bombay, the crew received new orders: instead of the
final destination in Chittagong, they would take a final cargo to Vizaghpatnam or Rangoon
(modern day Yangon). The freight rate of this trade was expected to cover the final voyage to
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It was not uncommon for British shipping lines to employ South Asian “lascar” laborers. In a strict nautical context,
lascar is a European term possibly dating to the Portuguese who used it to mean “crew”. The Persian meaning of
lashkar is “militia” or “member of militia”. The term translates in Hindi as “poor-soldiers”, while lascar has reemerged
in Bengali to mean “sailor” (Ghosh, 2008:506). The employment of lascars, as low paid sailors, has been the practice
of British shipowners as a way to reduce their labor costs, while also utilizing their maritime skills. As R.G.W. Prescott
noted, “lascars were recruited by British ships plying between UK ports and India because of their ready supply of
experienced seamen resulting from the decline of native coasting trades under the onslaught of competition from
colonial shipping interests” (Prescott, 1992: 199). Ravi Ahuja also reminds us that the use of lascar labor made up
part of the “transcontinental regime of labor circulation” and that it became ubiquitous during the period of political
and economic imperialism and the expansion of nineteenth century shipping in and beyond the Indian Ocean (Behal
and van der Linden 2006: 111). This labor pattern did not go away after the end of the colonial regime, lascars made
up a quarter of labor on British merchant ships into the 1960s (111). The 3rd Engineer on the Clan Alpine, John Morris,
tells of how intimate and dependent the Clan Line was on lascar labor when he noted that the Clan Line maintained a
boarding house in Glasgow for their pool of lascars (Morris, 1998). Lascar passed out of use in India in the 1920s
however it continued to be used into the 1970s by British seamen (Balachandran, 2007:189).
25
The concept of devaluation is discussed in detail in Chapter Two. There had been a recession in the US economy in
1959 that had an impact on the shipping sector, this was significant for the Clan Alpine since it had been built in 1942
as a war time cargo ship and sold as a second-hand vessel in 1947 to the Clan Line who used it for trade during the
post-war boom. When the economic recession took hold in 1956 then again in 1959, the Clan Alpine became obsolete
and the intentions of the owners were to sell the ship for scrap recuperating some of the value that remained embedded
within its structure.
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Onomichi, Japan, where the vessel had been arranged by the London office of the Clan Line to be
scrapped.26
The Clan Alpine arrived at Chittagong’s anchorage area in good weather at the scheduled
time on October 31, 1960 and because of port traffic had been told to anchor to await a berth.
Logan noted that shortly after anchoring, the vessel’s Radio Officer received a warning from
Chittagong Radio that a cyclone was approaching from the south. Since the ship was anchored east
of the cyclone’s anticipated path, there had been less need for alarm. Reliant on tracking the
weather from their anchored position, they watched the rising seas and measured air pressure with
the barometer on board and as it started to drop concern and alarm set in among those seamen who
were monitoring the
storm.
Logan had been on
watch duty from noon
to 1600, he noted that
by 1430 the winds had
picked up and he began
to

think

the

storm

might have changed
Figure 3: Path of Cyclone on October 30, 1960 (Dunn, 1962).
26

course.

Logan

was

This new directive reveals a couple of things for us: first, and unlike most of the scrap deals today, the Clan Line as
standard practice of the day, was responsible for the costs of getting the ship to the scrap yard. This reveals the use of
a shipbroker that arranged the deal rather than a cash buyer who negotiates deals for shipowners today. Second, is that
the Clan Line did intend to sell the ship for scrap prior to its departure from Birkenhead. This relates to the third point,
that a shipowner when the intention is to sell a scrap ship, may decide to do a final trade to move the vessel closer to
the final destination, the scrap yard, thus reducing the operating costs of that vessel. This turns out to be an economic
decision where geographic proximity becomes a primary concern. A final point reveals that Japanese scrap yards were
offering competitive scrap prices to lure shipowners to their new market. The scrap prices are reflected in the
demolition data at Lloyd’s Register published between 1958 and 1960.
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concerned that the Clan Alpine was in direct line with the path of the storm. He reported his
observations to the master who instructed him to prepare the deck and crew. By 1500, his
observations were confirmed by another message that had been received by radio that the
approaching storm had shifted course and was expected to be over Chittagong by midnight. Logan,
responsible for monitoring the ship’s anchor bearings, recorded the winds at a gale force of nine.27
By 1600, winds began to increase and by 1835, they measured 12 on the Beaufort scale, and had
changed direction moving SSW. At 1840 Logan noted that the vessel began to drag in a northerly
direction. The Clan Alpine had been fitted with a triple expansion steam engine allowing it to travel
up to 11.5 knots but was being pushed up the Sandwip Channel28 at 35 knots by the strength of the
storm. Logan noted, “the sea conditions were unmanageable, completely white, like a boiling
cauldron. The air was filled with foam and spray reducing visibility to almost zero. The ferocity
of the spray was incredible, almost like solid waves breaking over the vessel” (1998:104). By 1850
the eye of the storm had passed over the Clan Alpine. At 1925 the vessel came to a complete halt
with the crew assuming that it had touched bottom near the port.
Soon after the ship had run aground, Logan and the radio officer went to the deck and saw
what they thought were rocks coming through the surface of the water, but as the water started to
recede around the vessel, closer investigation revealed that what they thought were rocks were
actually the tops of palm trees. When the waters receded completely Logan called out from the
ships deck to a man waking close to the hull and recalled asking him when the tide would be high
again. The man yelled up and said that “it is not water that surrounds the vessel, the vessel is in a
rice paddy.” The Clan Alpine had ridden a 35’ storm wave inland. The next morning Logan located
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According to National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), a gale force of nine means 41-47 knots with
waves at sea upwards to 23-34’.
28
The Sandwip Channel is located between Meghna River and the Chittagong coast on the Bay of Bengal.
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the vessel with his compass, noting that the ship’s location was at Sonachara Beach, 11 miles NNW
of Chittagong and 11 miles north from the entrance to the Karnafuli River. Logan wrote that “the
vessel had dragged eight miles up the Sandwip Channel.” The Captain notified the head offices in
London that the vessel was driven ashore and that there were no casualties. In the Sea Breezes
article, Logan recounted a walk he took a few days after the grounding of the vessel. With his
sextant he noted the distance to the sea was a half-mile away, and the waters deep enough to refloat the vessel were three miles away. Having been stranded in a rice patty, the Clan Alpine would
not make it to Onomichi, nor would it turn on its engines ever again.
Most of the challenges faced by the crew of the Clan Alpine were logistical. The fresh
supplies that would have carried the vessel and crew onto Japan, such as fresh water for firefighting
or bathing had run out, while the ship’s generators had to be shut down during the day, making the
conditions on board challenging due to the heat and humidity of the late monsoon season. The
crew had been granted honorary members of the Chittagong Club and used the club facilities while
they awaited the ship surveyors “notice of orders” from the London office. The Clan Alpine had
been carrying over 2,000 tons of cargo to be discharged in Chittagong; to preserve its value, the
cargo needed to be unloaded. A makeshift road had to be constructed through the coastal mangrove
jungle and paddy field to move the cargo to the region’s main road (today the N-1 Highway). The
ship’s winches were used to unload the cargo over the side of the vessel, to stable ground, and onto
trucks that moved it to a secure area. This process, conducted by the lascar crew was completed
on January 4, 1961.
Captain Harris and his 2nd Mate Andy Logan had been requested at the London office of
the chief marine superintendent to deliver a full report. The Report led to the ship insurer deeming
the vessel a “constructive total loss” (CTL). The Clan Alpine had been previously earmarked for
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scrap, the insurance claim paid to the Clan Line Steamers Association, the owners, was for a
commissioned vessel and thus higher than they would have received from the Japanese
shipbreakers in 1960. On March 17, 1961, almost four months after its beaching, and the insurance
payout, The Times reported that the Clan Alpine had been sold to a Pakistani firm for £50,000 and
it “would be broken up and round iron bars manufactured out of its scrap” (The Times, 1961). Four
miles from its original anchorage the Clan Alpine, sitting in a paddy field, would be broken up insitu.
The Sea Breezes article and newspaper reports were revealing in a number of ways. Not
only did they offer a detailed account of the devastation created by the storm, they also explicitly
made reference to the maritime patterns the Clan Alpine was embedded in, the crews who operated
the vessel, where it came from, and where it was going. Embedded in this maritime history, the
“protracted imperial processes” become part of the story from which a nuanced narrative can
develop that links contemporary shipbreaking practices to its imperial maritime foundation. The
Clan Alpine was not new to Chittagong in 1960 nor were its owners, the Clan Line Steamers
Association. In fact, the relationship between the Clan Line and Chittagong extended back to the
British imperial period when British merchants looked to establish new cash crops and to expand
British export markets from the region of Eastern Bengal. A “shipping nexus” was produced that
laid an imperial veneer on top of this ancient port city, transforming it into an “imperial port city”,
one on par with other imperial South Asian ports active at this time, notably Kolkata.29 This period
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Iqbal notes that by the early nineteenth century, the decline of the textile industry and economic losses in the context
of the inflexibility of the Permanent Settlement regime, led the East India Company to experience financial losses,
which advanced a more eastward gaze towards Kolkata (2015). See a concise explanation explaining the backdrop of
this declining economic context in Arrighi’s The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of our Times
(2010: 163-179).
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laid the material foundation on which the maritime would become a central feature in the ways in
which Chittagong could develop throughout the twentieth century.

Part II
Bringing Chittagong online: “imperial port city”
Chittagong was an ancient port city that became an imperial port city under British
influence. Considered a frontier zone,30 eastern Bengal had come under the gaze of the British
government and a handful of British traders who fundamentally transformed the way Chittagong
would function for the British economy. The remnants of the imperial British port became the
foundation onto which the port economy was further developed under Pakistan control (19471971) when Chittagong was West Pakistan’s primary port connection in its eastern territory. This
continued significance enabled Chittagong after the 1971 Liberation War to become an engine for
Bangladesh’s economic growth. The implications of this development transformed the lives of
people and the spaces they occupy in this coastal region and beyond, at each step of the way.
In this section the dual concept of “imperial port city” and “shipping nexus” will anchor an
understanding of how the maritime functioned in this place, past and present. The next few pages
guide the rest of the chapter providing a framework to help think through the implications of the
port modernization processes that began under the British in the early 20th century. The Clan Alpine
functions here as a window into past and a bridge to the present. It helps us to complicate how the
story of this ship reveals a different kind of origin story for shipbreaking in Chittagong, one that is
more explicitly connected to the region’s colonial and imperial histories.
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The eastern and southeastern part of Bengal, where Chittagong and its “productive” hinterland lie was considered
by the colonial administration to be the “frontier” region (Ludden, 2011; Van Schendel, 2015). Chittagong had been
considered by imperialists as “Chittagong the loathsome” and “a penal station where the worst men in the Services
were sent” (Buchanan, 1992: 292).
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“Port city” and “shipping nexus”
The concept of a port city was conceptualized by the late maritime historian Frank Broeze,
as a port whose functions impact the economic, social, political and cultural life of a city (Broeze,
1989: 1-29). Broeze’s port city concept offers a chance to situate maritime related activities as
mutually constitutive with city life, while also extending the relationship to include places beyond
the city, the hinterland and foreland, and extends out to consider ocean-spaces, other ports, and
everyday lives produced through commodity exchange facilitated by trade. The interconnecting of
these places explains the “extent, pace, and manner of each port city’s specific development”
(Pearson, 2003:31). Tan further emphasizes that sea-based trading networks need to feature
prominently when considering the development of port cities, since the way port cities develop
over time depends on the trade networks developed on land and sea (2007:852). These are hardly
new concepts to us today and have been elaborated on in more recent years by Allan Sekula in
Fish Story (2002), and later, in his film with Noel Burch, The Forgotten Space (2010). In the
context of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement that entered into force on January 1, 1994,
Sekula uses the Images and text of Fish Story to direct attention to the sea and ways to consider
the transforming social relations produced by and through global trade. Sekula nuances this
relationship when he turns to a reflection offered in 1844 by Frederick Engles who noted the human
suffering made possible by the scale of ships anchored on the Thames. Engles bridges the
congestion, the soot and pollution of the river, produced by expanding trade, to the narrow alleys
of the London slums where people lived in impoverished and unhealthy conditions. The
development of the sea and the expansion of trade brought about by empire was reflected in the
transformation of urban space and urban life (2002:42). We could extend this reflection through
the whole of the nineteenth century and into the various imperial trading ports, by the way trade
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technologies, administration, and built infrastructure (on which these trade networks depended)
expanded maritime connections. Port cities function as ‘brides of the sea’ linking together foreand hinterland, minor and regional ports through coastal and sea shipping routes, and with other
ports through the ocean trades. These scaled and spatio-temporal relationships give rise to a
particular urban character dependent on the port city and its history (Reeves et al., 1989: 29-52).
It is the “particular maritime character” that becomes legible in Chittagong City, that reveals the
port and other maritime activities as a primary part of the city’s economic, political, and social
fabric.
As a way to conceptualize a particular type of city, “port city” can also be used as a method.
Referring to Asian ports in particular, the concept of port city is “an effective paradigm [to
understand] the relative position of Asia in the world” (Broeze, 1989: 4). While this could be
extended and applied to any port city—since these port cities are nodes embedded and mutually
constitutive of local, regional, interregional, and global networks—the concept allows us to make
specific connections across space and time to inform our understanding of what types of activities
may develop within, and are facilitated by, the port city.
One of main objectives of the British government in India was to transform a system of
ports throughout the subcontinent into modern engines of commercial interaction capable of
expanding export orientated trade, specifically with Britain and the West (Broeze, 1989: 210). This
success can be seen through the modernization of port cities along the eastern and western coastal
areas of India. The imperial port city surfaces when historical factors of its emergence are brought
to the fore. Broeze and Stoler are useful for thinking about the methodological processes to engage
in when we pull back the layers to understand how shipbreaking developed in Bangladesh. The
process of pulling back layers of history to identify a particularly important conjuncture offers a
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chance to see the contemporary landscape in a new way: to identify where the maritime legacies
of the imperial port city are still visible in the landscape today.
The imperial port city lends itself to the inclusion of a second concept, Kubicek’s “ship
nexus” (2004: 100-110). A ship nexus is a “complex network of shipping interests and linked
enterprises” (101). Kubicek employs the ship nexus as a way to describe the constellation of
stakeholders connected in any way to maritime activities, including for example marine architects,
commodity producers, financiers and shipowners as “an essential part of the ‘new imperialism”’
contributing to “pursuits of economic expansion, shaping state policy, and contributing to the
state’s power of coercion” (109). He argues that the concept of the shipping nexus needs to be
made more explicit, as a separate but integral element in British expansion, in considerations of
British imperial activity. This idea is particularly helpful for this discussion because, like the
concept of a port city, it grounds us in a particular place or places, during a particular period of
time. The “ship nexus” expands and extends ways to understand the development of maritime
Chittagong: how it became and imperial port city, and later, how it was able to become and stay
integrated into the global maritime economy.

A brief “long” history of Chittagong’s port
Though my concern in these pages is how this port city was transformed during the British
imperial period, it would be remiss not to briefly mention the historical and geographical
significance of Chittagong over centuries—if not millennia—as a critical trading node, an Asian
“port city” on the Indian Ocean. Its location connecting east and west sea trades, as well as linking
manufactures located in inland areas to the ocean trades via an extensive network reliant on the
rivers of the region, made Chittagong an important port for the region and beyond (Van Schendel,
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2015: 102; Suhrawardi, 2015: 59-82). Suhrawardi notes that for 9th c. Arab traders, Chittagong was
considered the “delta of the Ganges” and
that “inland water transport was the
backbone of internal trade in the region”
(2015: 59; 83).31 The rivers were not the
only way Chittagong was linked to
extensive

regional

and

continental

networks of trade. Connecting the Bay of
Bengal, the “Grand Trunk Road”32 began
in Chittagong’s littoral zone and ran via a
land-based route to the Khyber Pass, a
link that still exists today in a varied form
(Mia et al., 2015: 34; Schellinger and
Figure 4: Map of Bangladesh, “delta of the Ganges” (Source:
Dao, 2008).

Salkin, 1996: 187). While under Bengali
sultanate rule, Chittagong was a portal

onto the Indian Ocean and served as a principal port for Muslim pilgrims and for the export of
manufactured goods (Eaton, 1993: 235), such as textiles that included cotton and silk. These fine
textiles were made in inland weaving villages and traders used rivers to transport the materials to
urban markets where they could be sold for export (Van Schendel, 2009: 42).

31

To better understand the relationship between the economic and cultural significance and the river’s shifting patterns
see Eaton’s The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier (1993: 194-198); also Chapter Six in Iqbal’s The Bengal Delta:
Ecology, State and Social Change, 1840-1943 (2010). Sunil Amrith’s recent book, Unruly Waters: How Rains, Rivers,
Coasts and Seas Have Shaped Asian History, provides a wonderful explanation on how the direction of rivers impacted
economic social and political life in India (2018).
32
Stretching over a staggering distance of 2,500 kilometers, and built 2,500 years ago, the Grand Trunk Road, is one
of Asia’s oldest and longest roads linking the Indian Subcontinent to Central Asia (Afghanistan) connecting Kabul
through the Khyber pass in Peshawar to eventually meet the ocean in Chittagong (Bangladesh, 2018).
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In the early 16th century Portuguese merchants known as a “motley and uncoordinated
crew” of “renegades” who sought autonomy from their Goan-based viceroy, founded Chittagong
as a trading post (Eaton, 1993: 235; Van Schendel, 2009: 43). In efforts to raise more currency
for the local economy, the traders were invited by local rulers to build factories and set up the first
customs houses at the Port of Chittagong (Van Schendel, 2015: 103). The 16th century saw the
entrenchment of Chittagong into larger scaled patterns of regional trade, one river-borne and inland
and the other ocean-going connecting with ports in the eastern Indian Ocean firmly established
(101).
Van Schendel’s recent essay, “Spatial Moments: Chittagong in Four Scenes” reveals the
ebb and flow of Chittagong’s political, economic, and cultural significance at the local, regional,
and global scale (2015). Using the concept of “place”, Van Schendel empirically grounds placemaking processes in his historical and socio-spatial analysis of Chittagong over the centuries
(99).33 Applying the description of “thickening” and “thinning” of place as a way to frame an
historical analysis, and employing three frameworks to do so (territory, network, and scale), Van
Schendel isolates four periods in Chittagong’s modern history. He proposes that the “thickening”
of Chittagong took place during the early colonial period and was followed by a “thinning” period,
noting that the maritime networks that had sustained the region for centuries had collapsed after
the shift of the government of India from Bombay to Kolkata in 1757, and the subsequent
development of Kolkata as a commercial and economic hub (Van Schendel, 2015: 106). Valuable
cash crops—tea, opium, jute, and indigo—had been exported through Bengal’s new chief port, the
riverine Kolkata Port (Van Schendel, 2009: 65-66). This shift subordinated Chittagong’s outward
looking maritime position and relegated the port to handle the busy inland and coastal trades. Thus,
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Van Schendel borrows the concept of place from geographer Edward Casey. Place for Casey is “being created by
people: it is lived experience; it is the ways in which people use and imagine space” (2015: 99).
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the early 20th century was a period of re-imagining a new relationship between Chittagong, its
hinterland, and the British imperial maritime economy albeit in British fashion, as it was to become
a critical link between the newly established tea growing regions and the commodity markets of
Great Britain.
The contemporary shipbreaking industry in Chittagong reveals the workings of a market
that implicates stakeholders across space, time, and scale. This modern maritime foundation was
set in motion by the Government of India and a shipping nexus—managing-agencies and British
businessman—who collectively turned towards India’s eastern ‘frontier’ as a place to plant and
extract cash crops, mostly tea from the region of Assam, Sylhet, and eastern Bengal. As Iqbal notes,
“As jute of Eastern Bengal and tea from Assam were visible in the imperial bazaars, Chittagong
port began to catch up with Kolkata port. The spatial triangle of Dhaka, Assam, Chittagong made
more sense on account of some developments that were informed by the lure of moving further
east (Iqbal, 2015: 72). A rail-port relationship became a critical market conduit during this period
and pushed forward a profound transformation in the landscape, “thickening” the port city of
Chittagong once again as a ‘place’ by embedding it further into the British dominated seas, and
further into its own hinterland (Van Schendel, 2015: 106). It is to this process of expansion and
integration that we now turn.

Part III
Politicking the Rail-Port Context
On February 15, 1904, Viceroy Nathaniel Curzon traveled from Kolkata to Chittagong for
a ceremony that formally marked the completion of the Assam-Bengal Railway and its connection
with the Port of Chittagong. Curzon addressed an assembly made up of representatives from the
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Port Trust, the Chittagong Municipality, District Board, Chittagong Association, and various
religious and ethnic group representatives, including those from the Chittagong Hill Tracts. He
discussed educational initiatives that fostered the “native industries,” educational reforms and local
efforts towards the preservation of “Ancient Monuments,” and taxes. A large portion of this address
was dedicated to recognizing the significance and economic benefits of the Assam-Bengal
Railway, trade, and the future “prosperity of the Port” (Khan, 1990: 448- 454). Curzon emphasized
government support for future development of port facilities and related needs, committing
funding for revetment, dredging, the construction of wharves and warehouses. He concluded his
discussion on port related topics by stating the following, “I hope my announcements will pave
the way for the rise of Chittagong to what in my opinion is its natural destiny, viz., to be the
principal outlet of the trade of Eastern Bengal and Assam” (1990: 451-452).
Ships were central to the development of the rail, as was the argument for the development
of the port with ships able to meet the rail carts carrying tea, jute and other items at the jetties. It
had been acknowledged as far back as 1875 by the Chittagong Customs House, that the economic
prosperity of the Port of Chittagong was dependent on inland transit by water and land, i.e. river
and rail (Osmany, 1980: 201). By 1881 the commissioners of Dhaka and Chittagong, and the
Lieutenant Governor of Bengal expressed support for the rail-port link between the interior and
Chittagong, noting that developing the interior was dependent on rail, and the success of the
Assam-Bengal Railway was dependent on the mutual development and financially competitive
positioning of the Port of Chittagong.
In 1895, the first section of the Assam-Bengal Railway was completed. It linked a 93-mile
northern route between Chittagong and Comilla, and a 38-mile section connecting Laksham and
Chandpur. Ten years later the railway was extended inland 740 miles integrating Chittagong to the
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“frontier of imperial India” to areas that were previously only connected to Chittagong through a
river bound trade network
that extended back centuries
(Ludden, 2011). The new
transportation

network

marked the integration of the
tea, rice, and jute producing
regions of Assam and Sylhet
and eastern Bengal to the
British economy through new
ocean trades established by
British

merchants

and

shipping lines.
Figure 5: “Map of Assam-Bengal System of 1,152 route miles as it existed in
1929” (Source: Restoration & Archiving Trust, 2019).

The argument for port
enhancement was founded on

the premise of making Chittagong a viable alternative for trade in light of the new rail links laid
by the Assam-Bengal Railway. In a rare study of this history, historian Shireen Osmany analyzed
the relationship between the political-economic and geographic significance of Chittagong as an
alternative to Kolkata for exports. Osmany notes, “by 1903 the commercial significance of the
change [Kolkata to Chittagong] was beginning to be felt with greater magnitude” (1980: 149). The
effort made to shift the direction of trade away from Kolkata to Chittagong was political but also
profoundly economic (Osmany, 1980; Ludden, 2011; Van Schendel, 2015). By the late 19th c.,
there were two ports that served the tea gardens of Chittagong’s developing hinterland, Kolkata
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and Chittagong, with Kolkata dominating the export trade to Britain. Osmany notes that one of the
main arguments for the development of Chittagong was to reduce the mileage the tea had to travel
from plantation to a viable port for export by about 200 miles.34 The Railway became a crucial
variable in the transformation of the relationship between land and sea, hinterland and foreland,
located at the eastern ‘frontier’ (eastern Bengal and Assam), embedding the connection through a
maritime nexus of spatial inequality driven by cultivation, exploitation, extraction, and export.
This period laid the foundation for shipping and rail links to develop, one that would carve out a
new era and scale of development with the Port of Chittagong as a central feature.
During Curzon’s visit and speech in 1904, the Port Commissioners appealed to the Viceroy
that, “the further development of the port is essential to the prosperity of the railway, just as
completion of the railway…adds to the prosperity of the port” (Khan 1990:411). Their success was
mutually constituted. After 1905, the Government of India committed a portion of capital needed
for the modernization of the port while private capital was also significant. One of these private
investors was the Assam-Bengal Railway whose headquarters had been established in Chittagong
since 1892 (Khan, 1990). The Railway became an early stakeholder in the formation of
Chittagong’s shipping nexus, which aimed at integrating the tea producing regions with British
markets through the new imperial port dependent on new administrative and financial
arrangements, geographical connections, and a series of exclusive agreements between the
stakeholders that came to depend on the success of this maritime node. It is to one of these
stakeholders that we now turn.

34

One traveling with tea from Laksham to Kolkata would first travel to Chandpur by land (32 miles), then Chandpur
to Goalander by steamer (90 miles), then to Kolkata by land (152 miles), totaling 274 miles with two break bulks
(Osmany, 1980: 201). This was compared with traveling 79 miles by land to Chittagong from Laksham.
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The Shipowner
In 1873, Charles Cayzer, a future stakeholder in the development of the Chittagong
shipping nexus, traveled through the Suez Canal on his way back to Great Britain from Bombay
after having worked in the offices of the established managing-agent, William Nicol & Co.
Between 1838 and 1861 Nicol & Co grew to become the largest firm operating in Bombay. Their
role as a managing-agency was to connect the manufactures of Lancashire cotton to Indian
merchants. Nicol & Co. acted as ship managers, exporters, and owned and operated wharves and
warehouses at the Port of Bombay. They also published “Bombay trade reports” in the Glasgow
Herald (Hazareesingh, 2007). Stephanie Jones’s Merchants of the Raj provides a simple and
powerful introduction to the most prominent managing agencies during the British Raj. Jones notes
that managing-agencies “established their businesses in trading and agency work, handling such
imports as piece-goods and exports as indigo and grew to prominence on the backs of commodities
of tea, jute and coal…they helped to stimulate the creation of much of India’s economic
infrastructure managing shipping, railways and electricity companies” (Jones, 1992: 5). At Nicol
& Co., Cayzer developed his knowledge of shipping, stores, and trades. This experience helped
him realize the potential for a direct shipping route between Glasgow and Mersey in the UK and
Bombay in western India (Muir and Davies, 1978: 35-44).
Cayzer’s goal was to reduce the transportation costs of British manufacturers located in the
hinterlands of Glasgow and Liverpool who had been paying high rates for moving their goods by
rail to the ports (Muir and Davies, 1978: 108; Hazareesingh, 2007: 8). He launched a small fleet
of vessels that would service this nascent route; financial backers were critical to this plan.
Alexander Stephens, a Glasgow based shipbuilder made the initial capital arrangements to build
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Cayzer’s ships.35 After financial negotiations were completed, the Clan Alpine (not to be confused
with the 20th century Clan Alpine mentioned previously) and the Clan Fraser were built in 1878
(1978: 306) and Cayzer, Irvine & Co. was formed, headquartered in Glasgow.36 In 1878 the Clan
Alpine, a 2,000 gross ton cargo vessel fitted with a compound engine able to travel up to 9.5 knots
fully loaded, was launched on its maiden voyage, a 28-30 day journey through the Suez Canal to
its final destination, the Port of Bombay. The main cargoes the Clan Line transported on this new
route included “rough” trades—cotton, machinery, and rail equipment for the developing rail lines
that were laid to link Bombay’s hinterland to that of Britain.37

Building a port for British trade
Since 1861, John Muir had been the managing partner of one of the most prosperous
merchants in Glasgow. James Finlay, & Co., who also had offices in Bombay since 1862 and in
Kolkata since 1871 (Jones, 1992: 33). In 1878 Cayzer, Irvine & Co. had negotiated an exclusive
arrangement with Muir to export James Finlay & Co. cargo from Bombay. With this move, the
Cayzer firm became a stakeholder in the Bombay shipping nexus. Cayzer’s firm had established a
network of exclusive agents in every location the Clan ships traded: Glasgow, Liverpool, London,
Manchester, and now Bombay (Muir and Davies, 1978: 81). After much success with James Finlay
and Co. on the Bombay route and under a new arrangement with Muir, Cayzer expanded his route
to service Finlay, Muir & Co. in Kolkata.

35

At this time Stephens found his yard empty of orders in light of the 1870s economic depression so the orders were
welcomed.
36
Cayzer’s business partner was Alexander Irvine, a captain Cayzer had known and respected since his Bombay years.
Irvine unexpectedly died within the first year of the joint venture, but Cayzer kept the name (Muir and Davies, 1978:
63).
37
The freight markets had improved by the late 1870s, and by 1880 Cayzer was the managing owner of six Stephens
& Sons built vessels, all of which were producing profits on the Bombay trade (Hazareesingh, 2007: 8).
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Kolkata became the capital of the British Raj in 1857 and by 1881 it was a thriving political,
commercial, and cultural center. Ludden notes, “British India expanded in all directions from its
capital” (Ludden, 2011). Rail lines emanated inland from the coast to the hinterland, while steam
powered river boats traveled up the Hooghly River bringing cotton and railway materials to the
Ganges and traveled back down carrying piece-goods and tea, known as “fine” cargo. The year
1881 was also the same year Cayzer secured financing for ships from three of Muir’s colleagues
and a generous investment from Scottish banks (with a smaller percentage from London banks,
£720,000 combined). With this new financial arrangement, a new company was formed, the Clan
Line Association Steamers (Clan Line). Cayzer, Irvine & Co became an investor and the Clan
Line’s exclusive managing director. With bank and private capital, the Clan Line ordered four ships
from Stephens & Sons, in addition to eleven ships from five other Scottish builders (Muir and
Davies, 1978: 81-84).
In the early years of the twentieth century, Chittagong was increasingly being viewed as a
new strategic outlet for trade by new firms such as Muir’s Finlay branch, and Cayzer’s Clan Line,
and for serving the Viceroy’s military and imperial ambitions. 38 Osmany noted the Port of
Chittagong was ready to enter “the most significant period in [its] history since it had come under
British control” (1978: 154). It is on an economic imperial foundation that the Clan Line became
integrated into Chittagong’s landscape and contiguous ocean-spaces.
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The emphasis of this research does not prioritize the political and military contexts of the integration of Chittagong
and its national territorial implications. For this I would suggest these two articles, both of which succinctly lay out
the relationship between Indian Imperialism under Curzon and the annexation and territorial boundary making of the
new province of eastern Bengal and Assam, David Ludden’s “Spatial Inequality and National territory” (2011), and
Iftekhar Iqbal’s “The Space between Nation and Empire: The Making and Unmaking of Eastern Bengal and Assam
Province, 1905–1911” (2015).
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In 1884, a Commissioner of the Chittagong Division was designated to collect information
from ship masters, as well as local and European owned Chittagong-based businesses, regarding
the state of issues related to the port in its present condition. Concerns raised included the need for
a “metalled” road to be laid parallel to the Karnafuli River to accommodate the transportation of
cargo in wet conditions. The road would connect the anchored ships to the shipping agents offices
located in Double Moorings, a thana in Chittagong that borders the river for approximately two
miles and extends inland bounded by the Port
Connecting Road and the Dhaka Trunk Road, the
most southern extension of the Grand Trunk
Road.

Other

stakeholders

concerns
included:

expressed

by

uncompetitive

the
pilot

charges as compared with Kolkata, lack of access
to drinking water and health care facilities for the
ship crews, the inadequacy of available moorings
Figure 6: Double Mooring Thana (Source:
Banglapedia 2019c).

and lack of jetties, the need for a telegraphic office

to communicate with vessels at the mouth of the river, as well as the need to establish an organizing
group to oversee the administration and financing of the port (Khan, 1990: 16-25). It was in this
context that the Chittagong Port Commissioners Act of 1887 was created, and the management of
the port and port fund was transferred to the Port Commissioners in 1889 (Khan, 1990: 24).
Prior to 1889, the Government of India’s involvement in the activities and economy of the
Port of Chittagong was not equal to that of other ports under colonial governance like Bombay,
Kolkata, and Karachi. Under the Government of India these ports were allowed to raise revenues
for facility modernization though the structured imposition of port tariffs and landing dues, while
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Chittagong was not allowed to generate capital in the same way (Khan, 1990: 11).39 This inhibited
the potential growth and throughout the 1890s, Chittagong’s facilities for ocean-going vessels
remained substandard, making it difficult to increase vessel traffic and thus hard to raise revenues.
This started to change in 1889 when the Indian Port Act gave permission to the Port
Commissioners in Chittagong to charge port dues and mooring fees (47). The relationship
established between the port, the Assam-Bengal Railway and its stakeholders (that including
managing-agencies looking to do business out of Chittagong), became critical drivers in port
improvements at this moment. The Railway investors and owners understood that the success of
the rail was dependent on the access to foreign, primarily British, markets through the Port of
Chittagong. But efforts to integrate this connection would be incomplete without the
transformation of the port. This included the overall expansion of the waterway (the river) and
land-based infrastructure to service the deep-sea trade. Basically, without the “metalled” roads,
telegraphic communication capabilities, functioning lighthouses, designated traffic lanes, buoys,
dredging, and the construction of jetties, the risks were too great to utilize Chittagong as a viable
alternative. The concern was that the “fine” cargo (tea) would not be transported and transferred
to ships safely.
In 1892, the same year the Railway was incorporated, the Board of Commissioners had
received approval from the Government of India to construct the first jetty at Double Moorings
(44). In 1897 the Government of India approved the Railway’s proposal to finance, construct, and
operate a jetty in Double Moorings extending their rail-port connection. The jetty was completed
in 1899 and loaded its first ship with bales of jute. This first jetty was a culmination of a 17-year

39

Khan does not allude to why but only the circumstances of the unevenness when it came to economic activity the
port was allowed to engage in. In fact, he goes into greater detail about the many ways that Bombay, Calcutta and
Karachi “were being developed on modern lines despite their physical limitations which the port of Chittagong did
not suffer from” (1990: 11).
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process to modernize the Port of Chittagong, positioning it as the more competitive outlet to
Kolkata for the tea and jute trades emanating from its hinterland—a moment of ‘thickening’ or
equalization.
New tea regions in eastern Bengal grew throughout the 1890s and the areas previously
inaccessible as Sylhet and Assam had been, were slowly being integrated into a rail-port nexus
through Chittagong. Finlay, Muir & Co controlled over 70,000 acres of tea in the Assam and Sylhet
areas, and to ensure they would have access to the new trade (and to be able to influence the freight
rates on exports out of Chittagong) became involved with the port’s development. By 1901 Finlay,
Muir & Co had established an office in Chittagong as a link for transport of tea and coal exports
from Assam and Sylhet (Jones, 1992: 34). Already the exclusive shipper for Finlay, Muir & Co.
in Bombay and Calcutta, Muir made an offer to the Cayzer and the Clan Line for a seven-year
contract to ship out of Chittagong.40 In 1901 the Clan Line ships began a direct trade between
Chittagong and Britain when in July 1901 the Clan Menzies became the first Clan ship to call on
Chittagong and berth at the new Assam-Bengal Railway funded jetty and thus began the six-decade
long relationship the Clan Line would have with the Port of Chittagong, culminating the year after
the wreck of the Clan Alpine.
By 1901-1902 Chittagong’s port activity continued to include the inland and coastal trades
but was now able to claim a growing sea trade as well. The Clan Line was the only ocean-going
line contracted for tea transport and use of the new jetty and was responsible for exporting 15,128
tons of tea that year (Khan, 1990: 255). Eleven Clan Line vessels used Jetty No. 1 during the jute
and tea season and, based on the contracted arrangements with Finlay, Muir & Co., the Assam-

40

Cayzer was aware of the challenges of the newly developing Chittagong Port, such as the difficulties silting caused
ship captains entering, anchoring, and now soon to be berthing, at this river port along the Karnafuli River. He was
also aware that his ocean-liner service would be required to commit to a regular service in order to attract business
from Calcutta, and that both these conditions could challenge the profits of the company.
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Bengal Railway anticipated the Clan Line vessels would continue to occupy Jetty 1 for 14 days
per month. With only one jetty constructed and used exclusively by one shipping line, there was
pressure by the Assam-Bengal Railway to develop more capacity for the growing tea trade. In
response, the Government of Bengal sanctioned the construction of new sheds that were aimed at
facilitating the preparation of cargo for loading. These sheds were also used for unloading cargo
and thus the productivity anticipated was not realized until the construction of a second jetty. The
Assam-Bengal Railway appealed to the government to construct a second jetty, and in 1902, under
pressure, they authorized the construction of Jetty No. 2 to be financed by the state railway fund
and transferred to the Assam-Bengal Railway in 1903 upon its completion (Khan, 1990: 255-256).
Growth in trade from the Assam-Bengal Railway/Port of Chittagong corridor connection, between
1901-1904 was strong. In 1902 the combined tea and jute exports were 43,000 tons, a figure that
almost doubled the following year to 80,000 tons (262). The sentiment expressed by the Railway
was summed up by their engineer in 1902, “the need for a second berth was commercial…the
accommodation for shipping must be kept not only on level with, but well ahead of, the demand
for it, if the trade [was to be brought into] or maintained in a state of healthy growth” (256). As in
other development projects, speculation in long-term growth was fundamental to the ideology
driving the development of the port. And so, by 1903 Jetty No. 3 was constructed and became
operational in 1904, when it too was transferred to the Assam-Bengal Railway.
Prior to the construction of permanent jetties, the process of moving cargo in and out of the
Port of Chittagong was a challenge due to the physical geography of the Karnafuli River. Ships
anchored in midstream loaded and unloaded their cargo onto smaller boats, before moving the
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cargo

to

the

shoreline.

The

combination of silting and erosion
created unstable conditions for the
desired

port

economy

(72).

Dredging the river, cleaning silt in
front of the newly constructed
jetties, building revetments and
training walls became a permanent
part of the modernization process in
relation to port creation. But these
Figure 7: The division of the province of Bengal in 1905 (Source: Van
Schendel, 2009).

conditions had not been unknown to
the Port Commissioners or the

Railway.41
As Osmany alludes, anticipation of a vast expansion of trade from Chittagong’s hinterland
came in the wake of the “the Partition of Bengal.”42 It was after 1911 that the Port of Chittagong

41

In 1894, a study of the river revealed that erosion of the river bank had helped to produce inner and outer sand bars
at the mouth of the river. The study suggested it was fundamental to stabilize a 4-mile area between Double Moorings
and Gupta Point with a revetment prior to dredging the sand bars, otherwise they would continue to be made through
the erosion process. Silt deposits came from inland areas, and the ebb and flow of the Bay’s tides all combined to
produce a complex intersection of coastal conditions necessary to control for the anticipated and developing trade
patterns the shipping nexus was producing. The Assam-Bengal Railway laid their tracks into Double Mooring on the
north side of the river, the stabilization of earth was a necessity in relation to any jetty, shed, or facility proposed along
the shore and especially critical to support the dredging necessary for the berthing of the largest Clan ships.
42
‘The partition of Bengal’ (1905-1911), established under Viceroy Curzon, created a new province of Eastern Bengal
and Assam. The partition was both political and economic, and as Ludden notes, it began a long history of territorial
politics that can be tracked through the twentieth century in the boarder wars and efforts for political autonomy in the
region. He notes that these early bounded territories also reflect the context of increasing inequality at the regional
and national scales, and a spatial politics that laid Assam outside “superior Bengal” making Assam a margin under
Indian national space, while Calcutta its imperial capital. During this partition, Chittagong became the economic
engine of the new Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam due to its ocean connections, a characteristic that would
only develop after 1911 (Ludden, 2011).
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became the primary port for export in tea and jute.43 Early contracts guaranteed the Clan Line
berthing access as long as they maintained regular and direct service between London and
Chittagong (Khan, 1990: 287). The scale and presence of the Clan Line during this period
dominated trade. Port data from 1908-1909 reveals that during the jute season, two of the jetties
were occupied by the Clan Line, and between April 1908 and March 1909, of the 39 ocean going
vessels that berthed at Chittagong’s three jetties, 29 were Clan Line vessel and 18 of them berthed
at Jetty No. 2, which was the only jetty at that time that offered the railway controlled tea storage
sheds (296). The Clan Line maintained this trade monopoly into the twentieth century, limiting
competition through exclusive arrangements with the Railway and tea planters. Thus, this shipping
nexus established patterns of trade and oceanic connections that lasted for decades. These same
patterns brought the Clan Alpine to Chittagong in 1961.
New government support and encouragement to “build” the Port of Chittagong also came
during the partition period between 1905-1911. As jetties and warehouses were built, the Karnafuli

Figure 8: Position of Jetties and sheds along the Karnafuli (Source: Khan, 1990).
43

An example is that the Assam Company used Chittagong exclusively after 1904 (Antrobus, 1957:191).
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River and its entrance underwent its own transformation. Shipping lanes were drawn and dredged
that formalized navigational channels, the natural build-up of silt at the mouth of the river was
controlled by stopping the erosion upstream, and dredging became a constant process with the
arrival of the Port’s own government funded dredger, the Gekko (1900) and later the Patunga
(1926). The transformation of the built environment was laid out by surveyors through an extensive
series of studies on various conditions of the river including, river erosion along the river bank,
“triangulation survey” of the mouth of the Karnafuli River, contour surveys of sand bars, recording
tidal observations, and a yearlong river survey completed in 1908 (Khan 1990: 201-213). As the
river depths continued to be measured, and dredging continued apace, the government continued
to sanction construction projects based on new and developing port proposals and plans into the
early 1940s (the seventh and final jetty was completed in 1942).
The transformations in the landscape and river were accompanied by a formal coordination
of administrative activities approved by the Government of India. The administrative functions
were often proposed by the Assam-Bengal Railway and shipowners like the Clan Line, while the
Port Commissioners became the formal organization of the political and commercial interests
(Khan, 1990: 413; Osmany, 1978; Osmany, 1980). 44 The shipping and railway were from the
beginning integral to how the port developed and for whom it would benefit, primarily the
stakeholders connected to the tea planting regions of Chittagong’s hinterland, the rail connecting
it to the port, and the shipping companies that moved the commodities to their primary market in
the United Kingdom.
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Another example of the Commissioner’s administrative duties included the arrangement of piloting in and out of
the port and river. Demands were placed on the Commissioners by shipping companies and merchants like the Clan
Line and Finlay, Muir & Co., who made certain in 1901 that Clan Line vessels were piloted exclusively by “European
pilots,” in or near the Karnafuli River, a practice that began to change by the 1920s (Khan, 1990).
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Maritime Intelligence in Chittagong
The establishment of a maritime intelligence network, one that linked British controlled
ports around the empire to a central nervous system in the London offices, acknowledges, beyond
finance and trade, another level of integration for the Port of Chittagong. The maritime intelligence
network was certainly not new, informally it could be traced back to the late 1600s when
commercial and shipping information was shared in “Lloyd’s News,” and by 1726 when the
printed and published form became “Lloyd’s List.” But it was 1770 that demarcates the creation
of an official Society, made up of ship brokers and underwriters who secured “Lloyd’s List” as
their own publication where maritime intelligence was provided for marine insurers and
underwriters. By 1811 Lloyd’s had established the “Agency System,” and appointed the first
twenty Lloyd’s Agents. This system was described as “an unsurpassable intelligence system,” one
that relied on the maritime intelligence shared by its agents, and one that shadowed the expansion
of seaborne trade and thus marine insurance, as noted in a 1928 tome on the History of Lloyd’s
(Wright and Fayle, 1881: 285).
As shipping grew, and new shipping nexuses forged, spaces of maritime intelligence
became necessary. The marine intelligence collected by Lloyd’s Agents expanded when Lloyd’s
became a corporation in 1871 by a Parliamentary Act. The Act specified three objects of Lloyd’s,
whereby the third is important to include here: “the collection, publication and diffusion of
intelligence and information with respect to shipping,” furthermore to “aid in or undertake the
discovery, recovered, protection, and restoration or other disposal of property wrecked, sunk, lost
or abandoned, or found or recovered in, on or beneath the sea or on the shore, at home or abroad,”
and importantly, “to incorporate into itself any other society, association or corporation instituted
for purposes connected with shipping or marine insurance” (Brooks, 1921: 340; Wright and Fayle,
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1881: 461). In other words, it became part of Lloyd’s primary role as a marine insurer to collect
maritime intelligence for the sole purpose of protecting their client’s risks. By 1880 Lloyd’s had
established 605 agencies and 403 sub-agencies while the number of agencies and sub-agencies
grew to 1500 by 1928 (Wright and Fayle, 1881:383).
It is with this intelligence context in mind that a letter (No. 578) sent to the Chittagong
District Commissioner from the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, regarding the collection
of maritime intelligence at the Port of Chittagong and its environs in 1905, carries with it a salient
message. In the letter, the Government of India instructed the Government of Bengal to inform the
Commissioners of Chittagong of a new system of marine intelligence collection. It stated that the
Committee of Lloyd’s desired the Government of India to make arrangements for the collection of
marine information, to “instruct Collectors of maritime districts and the Port Officer of Chittagong
to communicate by telegraph to the nearest Lloyd’s Agent any information which they may receive
regarding casualties to vessels other than native craft” (75). This is a significant directive in relation
to the development of the Port of Chittagong and makes explicit the importance of the ocean-going
trades through its port, while it also anticipated continued growth. 45 It also reveals how the
government was integrating a rapidly expanding and newly modern maritime Chittagong into an
Agency’s communication infrastructure. All the more significant is the date, 1905, which aligns
with the Clan Line’s commitment to the region through trade, and Curzon’s creation of a new
province. It was at this moment the Port of Chittagong was integrated into a global maritime
intelligence system that reflected a new British imperial space, one able to service the transforming
needs of the global maritime economy of the future.

45

The only ports Lloyd’s Agents established offices in were those areas with heavy ship traffic or anticipated traffic,
this meant that the intelligence offices were set up based on financial speculation; speculation in the sense that traffic
was anticipated rather than established.
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Exclusive agents located in strategic locations for firms have become a vital way to conduct
business in ‘distant’ places. The geography of the global maritime firm will come up again in great
detail when the global demolition market is explored in Chapter Three. The relationships
established by Lloyd’s in Chittagong in 1905 continued to feed the Lloyd’s shipping intelligence
network throughout the twentieth century, as data on ships became increasingly necessary for the
functioning of a global marine insurance market and market analysis in a trade economy prone to
crisis (as discussed in Chapter Two). At this time, the information retrieved by the Lloyd’s Agents
was channeled back into Lloyd’s List, it was also shared with Lloyd’s Register, the classification
society who in their own series of publications (Wreck Books, Broken Up and Statistical Returns)
compiled intelligence on the demise of ships.
When the Clan Alpine ran aground in 1960, the data in the Casualty Returns listed the
agents who reported the shipwreck as “LL” (Lloyd’s Agents), “Chit” (Chittagong local officials)
and “Own” (owners of the vessel). As in 1905, Lloyd’s Agents based in Chittagong in 1960 were
part of the evolving world-wide network whose history extended back to 1811. The agents became
part of a shipping nexus in Chittagong that continues to reveal its significance as a vital port. Today
Lloyd’s Agents are located in the Finlay House in the commercial district of Agrabad. They provide
Lloyd’s of London (insurance agency) with the maritime intelligence necessary for insurance
claims and Lloyd’s Register (classification society) with the data published in the Casualty Books,
Broken Up, and Statistical Returns, all of which have become important sources of information
for ship brokerage firms, cash buyers, declaration agents, and shipowners alike. The data collected
in these publications, much of which today is now proprietary (only accessible through expensive
memberships), helps inform stakeholders in the global demolition market when they should sell a
ship for scrap. Stakeholders have come to rely on this data to help them navigate the rough waters
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of the global maritime economy. The type of data collected refers specifically to activities
occurring in a maritime location, at a particular moment in time, and thus the data speaks volumes
about how a particular port functions in the global maritime economy at any given period of time.

Conclusion
The LRF HEC repository has been collecting and publishing data on the scrap market, or
ships sold to be “broken up”, since the 1890s. When I arrived at the archive, I anticipated finding
a growing list of ships scrapped in Chittagong in the years after 1960 as the stakeholders I talked
to and the literature I found suggested. What the data revealed instead was a two-decade gap
between the Clan Alpine and the first ships sold commercially to a Chittagong based shipbreaker.
In 1981 five ships were recorded as being broken up along the Chittagong coast in what would
come to be the actual beginning of the shipbreaking market in Chittagong. It took three decades
from those first five ships for Chittagong to become one of the world’s most important
shipbreaking markets. A lot would have to happen nationally and globally before the
“jumpstarting” of this market would come to take place, as Chapter Two details. However, what
the story of the Clan Alpine did allow was to trace a different kind of origin story, when the Port
of Chittagong was incorporated into an evolving imperial maritime infrastructure, one that sought
to transform a ‘frontier zone’ into a rational and efficient economic node: the Port of Chittagong
has been maintained as a vital port in Bangladesh and the world. The port city of Chittagong
thickened and thinned throughout the 20th century as new shipping nexus’s continued to be
established, transporting the traditional trades mentioned above, while becoming a leader in the
global export of ready-made garments. The shipbreaking market was part of this maritime
evolution and knowing the history of the Clan Alpine draws attention to a significant moment in
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Chittagong’s history when the foundation was laid for a particular type of maritime integration.
The development of this port conditioned how maritime related industries and corporations could
interact with the wider world into the future. The CPA is a critical conduit of the shipbreaking
market. They determine if a scrap ship is allowed to enter territorial waters. They also control when
each ship is allowed to be beached. This chapter laid out a very specific maritime history in
Chittagong, Bangladesh in order to reveal some of the ways the region has been transformed by
these evolving sets of maritime interconnections, while also revealing how Chittagong’s maritime
activities have helped to transform them. The next chapter explicates Chittagong’s entanglement
with the global demolition market, diagramming how the local shipbreaking market developed
much later and was subject to forces far greater than a cyclone and a stranded vessel. The broader
view of the Clan Alpine presented in the previous pages helped to motivate a new set of questions,
namely if the Clan Alpine can be delinked from the story surrounding the emergence of a
contemporary shipbreaking industry in Chittagong, when did Chittagong come to function as a
place for selling scrap ships? What were the factors of this market’s emergence, and for whom
does this market benefit? These questions will be taken up in the following chapter where the
conditions that produced the necessity for large scale shipbreaking are interrogated, asking
specifically, how Chittagong came to factor into new circulations of global maritime capital.
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Image 23: Patenga Road with revetment and view of Karnafuli River’s mouth
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CHAPTER TWO
Capital Circulation and Crises in Shipping Markets
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Introduction
On September 1, 2016, Bloomberg News published “Stranded on the High Seas—An
Update on Hanjin’s Fleet”. The article included a map of the world with red diamonds representing
the 85 chartered and owned vessels that became stranded around the world when Hanjin’s assets
were frozen by the South Korean Courts in light of a failed debt-finance restructuring plan that led
to the company’s filing for bankruptcy protection. Depending on the vessel’s circumstances, they
were either detained, arrested46 by the port state, or prohibited from unloading or loading their
cumulative $14 billion worth of cargo. The 85 vessels, located at 50 ports in 26 countries not only
revealed the spatiality of a failed shipping company but also a deeply indebted shipping sector,
while also anticipating the complex legal geography of what was to come (Park, 2016). At the time
of this global stoppage, Hanjin Shipping was the largest South Korean container operator,
commanding over 640,000 twenty equivalent units (TEUs), or 3 percent of the global tonnage in
2015, making it the ninth largest shipping company in the world (Ship Technology, 2015)
In 2015, global shipments expanded 2.1 percent, revealing the slowest year for
international trade since the “Great Trade Collapse” and while the tanker trade experienced
positive growth, the dry bulk freight market plunged to rates below that of 2008. The demand for
container trade steadily declined as well from 5 percent growth in 2014 down to 2 percent in 2015
(UNCTAD, 2015: 52). By early 2016, Hanjin Shipping reported net losses for four consecutive
years since 2011 and a $5.9 billion debt burden with a debt-to-income ratio of 850 percent (Nam,
2016). Hanjin’s primary shareholder and creditor, the Korea Development Bank (KDB) started
pressuring Hanjin to give up management control and enter into a debt-restructuring plan as a way
to avoid bankruptcy or a possible merger with Hyundai Merchant Marine, a competing South
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The arrest of a ship refers to a legal detention of a vessel by the order of a Court within the territorial waters to
secure a maritime claim.
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Korean shipping company. By August 2016, Hanjin had reported continued losses in the amount
of $433 million—KDB ultimately rejected the debt-restructuring plan stating that the cash
injections Hanjin raised (in the amount of $446.5 million) were not sufficient to solve the
company’s liquidity issues (Zeng, 2016). KDB went ahead and pulled their funding support on
August 29, 2016 leaving Hanjin ships stranded all over the world, pushing the company one step
closer to bankruptcy. This led some in the shipping sector to refer to the Hanjin collapse as the
“Lehman Brothers moment for shipping” (Park and Salamat, 2016).
There were many implications for laborers and the environment that came from this crisis.
The following story, an arrested ship that was sold for scrap to a shipbreaker in Chittagong,
illustrates some of these implications. The Hanjin Rome was a container ship with a 5,302 TEU
carrying capacity. It was one of the 63 “chartered-in” vessels Hanjin Shipping chartered for trade
from the German ship owning group Rickmers Holding.47 On August 29, 2016, the vessel had
been anchored off the coast of Singapore in an area called Eastern Working Anchorage. The day
after KDB pulled their financial support from Hanjin, Rickmers filled a civil claim with the
Singapore High Courts for unpaid charter fees in the amount of $2.4 million. Hanjin Rome was
arrested on August 30. The vessel remained anchored in Eastern Working Anchorage for three
months when on December 29, the Admiralty Court of Singapore put the Hanjin Rome up for sale
to the “highest bidder” (NGO Shipbreaking Platform, 2017). On March 1, 2017, the Supreme
Court of Singapore stated that the vessel had been sold to an unidentified buyer. On March 2, the
Hanjin Rome left Singapore’s anchorage area with Bangladesh as its declared destination. Eight
days later, on March 10, it arrived into Bangladesh waters and was boarded for inspection by a
surveyor from the Chittagong Port Authority. By March 15, it was beached at the Jamuna
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In May 2017, the 175-year-old ship owning and ship brokering company, Rickmers Holding succumbed to
bankruptcy.
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Shipbreaking yard in Sitakunda, upazila in the Chittagong District of Bangladesh. Approximately
two months later on May 8, the NGO Shipbreaking Platform reported that a 26-year old
shipbreaking laborer, Shahinoor, fell from a great height while cutting through the Hanjin Rome’s
hull, becoming another casualty of the shipbreaking industry. In the first five months of 2017, six
workers lost their lives breaking up ships in Chittagong. The relationship between the most recent
shipping crisis, the devalued ships the crisis produced, and fatal accidents from breaking ships,
was made explicit when the Founding Director of the NGO Platform stated in an interview with
the industry publication Maritime Executive, “the deaths on the beaches have…been a direct
consequence from the bankruptcy cases” (2017a). Hanjin Shipping was declared bankrupt on
February 17, 2017. The year-long saga of their demise revealed the continued depressed economic
conditions of global seaborne trade years after the global economic crisis, the amount of debt
shipping companies held, bank exposure, the power of the creditors, and crucially, it reveals the
deadly stakes in which capitalism overcomes barriers of its own making.

Contours of a shipping crisis
Since the mid-1960s, the shipping sector has been characterized by periods of extreme
economic growth and equally impressive periods of contraction. Maritime economists, analysts,
and brokers commonly refer to this as a “shipping cycle” (Stopford, 2009: 169-171; Tenold, 2006;
Stopford, 2015). For these analysts, shipping cycles represent the fluctuation between supply and
demand. When supply begins to outweigh demand, an imbalance, or ‘disequilibrium’, appears; if
the condition worsens, the shipping cycle moves into a ‘trough’, the most depressed period of the
cycle. The 2008 global economic crisis provides us with a dramatic and recent example of these
extreme fluctuations. Maritime economist Martin Stopford has identified 11 shipping cycles since
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1965. These have increased in scale over time, with six serious enough to be called a ‘crisis’
(2015).48 Shipping crises are “associated with long periods of abnormally low economic activity
[‘reduced demand for tonnage and shorter average distances of trade’]; unusually high
unemployment [‘under-utilized fleet characterized by overcapacity and higher lay-up rates’]; and
falling prices [‘lower freight rates received’]” (Tenold, 2006: 10). When freight rates drop as low
as the operating costs of the least efficient vessels, a shipowner may choose to lay up their ships.49
The temporary removal of surplus from active trading is expected to have a positive enough impact
on pushing up freight rates, delaying the devaluation of the ship; or, in times of deeper crisis, the
ships may be sold on the global demolition market at their scrap value. Scrapping permanently
removes the overcapacity from trading and is a strategy employed when a ship’s value reaches
“distress’ levels” (Stopford, 2009: 98). This chapter presents an analysis of how scrapping ships
became an increasingly important strategy used to resolve the overproduction of capacity in the
context of economic crisis (falling rates of profit) since the mid-1970s. It also reveals how the
expanding scale of devaluation helped condition new shipbreaking markets and entirely new ways
of scrapping vessels by the 1980s.
To understand how Bangladesh became a primary shipbreaking location for the shipping
sector by the 1990s, it is useful to demystify the analysis provided by orthodox maritime
economists that tend to focus on the supply and demand dynamic as the analytical framework that
undergirds the “disequilibrium,” or the conditions that produce overproduction and devaluation.

48

Crisis is identified by shipping economists as “the number of actors affected; depth is a measure of the seriousness
of the conditions; while length denotes the time elapsed before the recovery” (Tenold, 2000: 18).
49
A ship “lay up” is when ships are taken out of service temporarily. In the short term it is a “hot lay-up”, in the longer
term in is a “cold lay-up.” Laying up ships is common when there is a reduction of employment (trade for the vessel).
Lay ups are not factored into the active fleet since they are considered part of the fleet surplus. As UNCTAD notes,
active vessels are the world fleet minus surplus vessels, while surplus tonnage is defined as tonnage that is not fully
utilized owing to slow steaming or lay-up status, or because it is lying idle for other reasons (2001:42).
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Instead this chapter embeds the emergence of the shipbreaking market in Bangladesh in an analysis
of capital circulation in and through the transport sector and the implications this circulation has
for the production of value and devaluation. It does so by initially bringing into conversation the
transformative relationship that took place between the finance and shipping sectors in the late
1960s to early 1970s, and again in the late 1980s to early 1990s. This analysis allows us to track
the emergence and development of the Bangladesh shipbreaking market as secondary becoming
primary market for devalued vessels by the early 1990s. To pursue this analysis, we must first
disentangle three linked concepts: (1) the ship as a form of fixed capital and the role of credit in
fixed capital formation; (2) how value is produced in the shipping sector; and (3) the devaluation
of fixed capital. This theoretical framework adds nuance to the analysis of how the shipping sector
helped to resolve the “capital surplus absorption problem” 50 that became apparent in capital
markets by the 1960s, and how shipbreaking in Bangladesh came to be a strategy used to help
resolve the subsequent crises of the shipping sector. Revealed in this analysis is that the build-up
of capacity and production of a world fleet, much of it which became devalued between the 1970s
and 1980s, was produced by the necessity of capital to remain in motion in order to resolve its
crises tendencies (Brenner, 2006; Harvey, 2010; Mann, 2013).
This chapter is divided into three parts. Part I presents a political-economic analysis of the
expansion of surplus tonnage from the late 1960s to 1973. It focuses on the tanker, which was
exceptional in this period, both for the amount of tonnage ordered and the amount of tonnage
scrapped. During this period, debt-financing was extended into the shipping sector at an
unprecedented scale which was seen as a market to absorb the accumulated surplus capital that
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Harvey’s “capital surplus absorption problem” is when capitalists, who produce surpluses in the form of profit, are
“forced by competition to recapitalize and reinvest a part of that surplus in expansion. This requires that new profitable
outlets be found” (Harvey, 2010: 26).
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built up from Euro- and petro-dollars. The argument presented here draws on the discussion of
fixed capital and devaluation. Part II focuses on the implications of the slowed movement and
circulation of fictitious capital into the shipping sector and how this opened up the need for new
forms of financing that helped lay the foundation for a new form and scale of shipbreaking
activities by the early 1990s. Part III tracks the continued relationship between fixed capital
formation, capital circulation, and devaluation through an analysis of the increasingly
interconnected relationship between the global shipping sector and shipbreaking markets leading
up to the prominence of Bangladesh’s shipbreaking market. As is revealed, economic expansion
and contraction in the shipping sector was undergirded by intensified competition and the
increasingly financialized shipping markets since the early 1960s. This helped to produce new
geographies of capital accumulation and oceanic overproduction.

Ships: Fixed capital
Harvey expounds on the concept of fixed capital through Marx’s analysis of technological
changes associated with ‘deep perturbations’ in the laws of motion that capitalism rests on, while
he affords priority to the “instruments of labor—machinery in particular—as major weapons in the
fight to preserve the accumulation of capital” (Harvey, 2006: 204). He notes that “fixed capital is
not a thing but a process of circulation of capital through the use of material objects, such as
machines” (205), and that only instruments used to facilitate surplus value can be classed as fixed
capital. Fixed capital are the machines “enclosed” within the production process or that portion of
the built environment that acts as the material conditions for which production depends (Harvey,
1978: 113). Ships operate in the transport sector as fixed capital in both respects: they sell a type
of movement as their commodity—the valorization of commodity capital is dependent on this
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movement—while they also operate as part of the “built environment for production” (106).51
Harvey stresses that “fixed capital in the built environment is immobile in space” and that it
depends on mobile forms (airplanes, trains, and ships) to be valorized (2013: 123). The proposal
here is to extend analyses of fixed capital to consider its mobile forms. Ships, as part of the
transportation sector, are only part of the production process when they are on the move. How do
ships, as forms of fixed capital in the transport sector, help to produce value and surplus value, and
what are the implications when ships slow down or even stop moving, or when they no longer
function as fixed capital? Addressing these questions in more detail will help us understand how
and why the shipping sector produces certain material conditions at particular moments that are
dependent on the conditions under which capital circulates and crisis occurs.

Ships: Value Production
The transportation sector has unusual characteristics: it forms “on one hand an independent
branch of production and hence a particular sphere for the investment of productive capital, and
on the other hand it is distinguished by its appearance as the continuation of a production process
within the circulation process and for the circulation process” (Marx, 1978: 229). The commodity
the transport sector produces is a “change of location”. Since realizing the use-value of things is
dependent on their being consumed, and since consumption depends on changing the location of
the commodity, a portion of capital is transferred to the commodity as it is moved. In this process,
value is added to the commodity, to the sector and to the entire circuit of capital (Harvey, 2013:
107). In order to repeat this process on an expanding scale, some part of the surplus capital received
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Geographers have examined the built environment of capital accumulation in the context of urban development and
large-scale infrastructure projects including rail and shipping; the ship itself has not been considered in this context
(Christophers, 2011; Harvey, 1978; Kutz, 2016).
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for the ‘change of location’ must be reinvested into the means of production, including fixed capital
and labor. Harvey notes, “the vast infrastructure that constitutes the built environment is a
necessary precondition for capitalist production, circulation and accumulation to proceed at an
expanding rate of growth” (2010: 86). Reinvestments change the scale of capital to be turned over,
and thus surplus value is produced both within the transport sector and for the circuit of capital.
This chapter draws attention to reinvestments made by shipowners who attempt to remain
competitive through ordering more efficient machines (i.e. fuel-efficient and larger-capacity
ships). The motivation to expand through reinvestment to protect their market share, avoid
becoming uncompetitive, or being driven out of business is referred to as the “coercive laws of
competition” (43).
In the early to mid-1960s, efforts to maintain competitiveness led shipowners to search for
value-added strategies to counter fluctuating freight rates and an increasingly capital-intensive
industry. This had profound implications for the entire shipping sector. Strategies employed
included an increased use of ‘flags of convenience’ (FOCs), which reduced costs and avoided
regulations (Carlisle, 1982; Barton, 1999; DeSombre, 2006); advancements in mechanization that
reduced labor needs (Levinson, 2006; Rodrigue and Notteboom, 2009); and new logistics systems
used to make supply-chains more efficient (Cowen, 2014; Danyluk, 2018). There was also an
increase in shipping mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers throughout the 1960s Chida and Davies,
1992: 135). These strategies reduced overall operating costs and sped up movement. As Deborah
Cowen has noted: “the process of circulation can dramatically impact the extent and degree of
accumulation possible...the particular speed with which that capital throws off its commodity-form
and assumes that of money, plays a vital role in the process of accumulation” (2014: 101).
Undergirding the desire for faster movement is the need to speed up the turnover time of capital
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through the “annihilation of space by time” (Marx, 1973: 524). Transport sector capitalists in
particular have an incessant drive to reduce the friction of distance to earn higher profits (more
surplus value) on the capital they advance (Harvey, 2013: 296).52 The shipping sector is vital in
this process, due to its capacity to ‘speed up’ the turnover time of capital by building larger ships
to move more commodities from A to B, reducing the ton-miles traveled. This scaling up, requiring
larger amounts of surplus capital, had serious implications for the shipping sector.
From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, global economic growth was extremely unstable.
Increases in productivity led to over-capacity and overproduction, which reduced profitability in
the advanced capitalist countries, especially in manufacturing (Brenner, 2006: 99; Mann, 2013:
119). Trying to remain competitive, US manufacturers over-invested, leading to further declines
reaching as much as 40 percent in the rate of return on their capital stock between 1965–1973
(Brenner, 2006: 99). The impending crisis was compounded by high unemployment and inflation
(Harvey, 2005: 12). Exacerbating the instability was a rapid increase in Eurodollar deposits in the
City of London, brought on by the radical deregulation of finance by the United Kingdom (Mann,
2013: 161).53 Surplus Eurodollars were funneled into UK based banks eager to establish new ship
finance departments, and undergirded the expansion of the sector through new debt-financing
practices. Finance capital has become increasingly significant for overcoming the potential for
slowed, or delayed circulation during fixed capital formation since the early 1970s. It allows for
investments in long-term infrastructure and helps speed up the turnover time of capital by
facilitating fixed capital investments. By the early 1960s, as investments in production continued
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This concept is present in Chapter One the development of the Port of Chittagong/Assam-Bengal Rail network was
in part pursued by capitalists efforts to reduce the friction of space tea had to travel from the hinterland to the British
markets by integrating a rail network to exclusive shipping lines in the port.
53
The City of London continues to operate as a global center for maritime business activities, including insurance and
underwriting, ship registration and ship financing.
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apace, the shipping sector was seen as an attractive market to sink large amounts of surplus capital
(Harvey, 2010: 26; Stokes, 1992: 3, 20; Yolland, 1979). However, by the mid-1970s, it became
apparent that the shipping sector was itself entrenched in the crisis of overaccumulation. The use
of debt financing underpinned by an evolving credit system and the coercive laws of competition
helped to produce a scale of devaluation never seen before in shipping, and that motivated
unprecedented use of ship scrapping markets and initiated a search for ways to permanently
remove and destroy a larger scale of devalued ships produced by an increasingly financialized
sector.

Ships: Devaluation
Offering clarifying remarks on Marx’s concept of devaluation, Neil Smith (2017) in a
posthumously published article, describes two ways the devaluation of fixed capital can occur. In
“progressive devaluation”, capitalists’ reinvestments, driven by the “coercive laws of competition”
in the pursuit of expanding surplus value, bring on devaluation. Capitalists reinvest surplus value
to replace machinery before it has reached maturity, making it unable to reproduce its own value
before it is retired. Given the capital-intensive nature of fixed capital formation and the reliance
on credit for expanding productive activities, as can be seen in the discussion of fixed capital and
value production above this is problematic for capitalists. This progressive devaluation of capital
leads to crisis. As Smith explains, the influx of capital from sectors with a declining rate of profit
(what some geographers refer to as “capital switching,” e.g. Harvey, 1978; Christophers, 2011;
Kutz, 2016) along with heightened competition, hastens a “falling rate of profit” and forces some
capitalists to lie completely or partially idle (Smith, 2017: 13). Progressive devaluation is a
perpetual condition of fixed capital formation.
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The second type Smith identifies, “periodic devaluation”, is the sudden and violent
devaluation that occurs during crises. As Smith (12) writes: “devaluation in crisis affects all forms
of capital—M, C, and P”, but for Marx the devaluation of productive capital is particularly crucial.
Smith (16) notes that “clarifying the different processes involved in the circulation of fixed capital
[will enable an analysis] of how fixed capital moves...and should allow us to fit [it] into Marx’s
reproduction schema”, suggesting that developing a deeper understanding of the origin and
solution of crisis may come from “[likening] the value analysis of the circulation of fixed capital
with the analysis of the circulation of fixed capital as a material commodity”. The analysis in this
chapter positions the overproduction of material commodities (ships) as central to understanding
the production of shipping crises, but also how these commodities reveal the ways in which the
shipping sector attempts to solve its own crises of overproduction.
The year 1975 marked the arrival of a shipping crisis characterized by the overproduction
of shipping capacity. It was enabled by the increasingly easy access to credit through new forms
of circulating finance capital that helped capitalists compete on a more expansive scale, facilitating
the production of a new scale of surplus value and devaluation. The year 1975 was a watershed
moment for the shipping sector as it heralded an expanded use of value-added practices: increasing
the use of slow steaming (running ships at slower speeds to reduce bunker consumption and
slowing the “change of location” for commodities, having a positive effect on freight rates), ship
lay-ups, and ship scrapping. The fixed capital (ships) that had expanded so rapidly since 1965
suffered from progressive devaluation before the shipping sector was affected by periodic
devaluation. While capitalism is generally a flexible enough system to overcome the barriers it
produces, it does not do so without “violent corrections” (Harvey, 2010: 45–47). Since 1975, ship
scrapping (often referred to as shipbreaking) has become a material articulation of the “violent
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correction”, the way around and through deep economic crises and waves of capital accumulation
and oceanic overproduction. The next section traces three key moments in maritime history that
put to work the concepts introduced above to help us think through the production and implications
of crisis in the shipping sector.

Part I: Political economy of overaccumulation and overproduction
Moment 1: Time charters: Financing economies of scale prior to 1964
Prior to the First World War, the oil majors54 owned and operated 90 percent of the world’s
oil tankers, but by 1938 this had dropped to 54 percent (Stokes, 1992: 68). The shift was calculated.
The oil majors needed access to cheap credit to expand commercial operations, and because being
a tanker owner came with larger financial liability they made efforts to remove tonnage from their
books to reduce their risk in the eyes of the banks and encourage looser lending (Devanney, 2006:
18–24; Kendall, 1957; Ratcliff, 1984: 67–68). The majors thus sold off some of their fleets and
formed agreements with independent shipowners to retain access to, and control over, oil tankers
(Ratcliff, 1984: 62–65; Stopford, 2009: 272). These newly defined business arrangements took the
form of time charters: formal transportation contracts between shipowners and charterers (typically
multinational oil, mining, or steel corporations (MNC)) that gave the charterer access to a vessel
for a specified period (Stopford, 2009: 184). 55 The time charter’s significance rests in how it
guaranteed employment for a new type of shipowner, and how that guarantee was used to expand
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Oil majors are a group of large-scale multinational oil companies with integrated divisions in oil exploration,
marketing, refining, transportation, and distribution.
55
The charter defined the terms of a vessel’s use, daily and monthly payments, operation and capital costs. The
charterer took responsibility for fuel costs, port charges, and loading and discharging charges, and directed the ship’s
operations.
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the fleets of independent tanker owners.
By the 1950s, time charters between oil MNCs and independent shipowners typically
granted access and control of ships to the MNCs for a five to ten-year period. They also guaranteed
employment for shipowners and thus a cash flow (Kendall, 1957: 533; Stokes, 1992: 12–13;
Stopford, 2009: 272). A small handful of banks in London and New York employed specialists in
this form of ship finance.56 Known as “conservative asset financiers”, they accepted time charters
as collateral and offered mortgages to shipowners for 50 percent of the ship’s hull at a 5.5–7
percent fixed interest rate for a period of seven to ten years (Ratcliff, 1984: 155–157; Stokes, 1992:
12–13). 57 This arrangement typically gave the owner enough time to repay the mortgage and
therefore was considered ‘risk free’ for banks. This ‘charter-backed financing’ remained the most
common form of ship financing into the 1960s (Stopford, 2009: 272).
Charter backed financing fueled the expansion of the oil tanker fleet through the financing
options, but the geopolitical tensions of the mid-1950s also played a critical role in shifting the
scale of tankers themselves. One of the most relevant political tensions in the context of
transforming shipbuilding and the tanker economy more specifically, were the tensions that
emerged from the diminishing power Britain maintained over one of its most militarily and
economically significant waterways, the Suez Canal. 58 During the post-war period the Pound
Sterling suffered devaluation, and Britain began to lose their competitive edge related to
productive industries (e.g. the decline of British shipbuilding and rise of Japanese shipbuilding,
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Including Chase Manhattan, First National (now Citibank), Chemical Bank, and Hambros (Stokes, 1992: 12).
The other 50 percent of the vessel was financed by a combination of second mortgages with other banks and cash
flow financing.
58
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 had brought an end to the British occupation of Egypt but allowed Britain to
maintain a defensive force along the Suez Canal Zone. British troops were allowed to stay, albeit under pressure by
Egyptian nationalists since the treaty to leave.
57
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albeit with the help of the foremost American shipbuilders by the early 1950s), they did control
much of the flow of oil coming from Iran, Iraq, Aden and what the British referred to as the Trucial
States (the states of Oman and Muscat today) (Kahili, 2014). According to Mitchell, one strategy
the British pursued, to strengthen the Sterling, was to expand its oil production in the Middle East
(2013:118-119). However, this expansion was dependent on the frictionless movement of oil
tankers through the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal, a human made canal that was sliced through the
desert, connected the Persian Gulf with the Mediterranean Sea and functioned as a strategic artery
for trade since 1869. Since 1888, the Suez Canal was a symbol of British and French imperial
dominance and when Gamal Abdul Nasser came into office as president of Egypt (1954) one of
his first goals was to seize control of the canal (Brown, 2001). Decades of tensions between Egypt
and Britain, and a globally expansive and increasingly complicated Cold War context, embroiled
the region in an imperial power struggle. In light of Nasser’s recognition of the People’s Republic
of China the United States broke their commitment to help finance the Aswan Dam along the Nile.
This was part of the context that prompted Nasser to assert his power and nationalize the Suez
Canal Company (the British and French company who controlled the Canal) in July 1956. An
invasion of Egypt was planned by a British-French-Israel alliance later in 1956. In response Nasser
closed the canal for six months. The structural implications for the shipping sector were profound.
Nasser reopened the Canal in March 1957, at the end of the Suez Canal Crisis. But the period had
launched economies of scale that would not slow down in the tanker sector for almost two decades.
The closure of the canal came at a point in history when world trade in oil was growing at
an unprecedented pace. Prior to the canal’s closure the major trade routes for oil were between
the Persian Gulf, ports in Western Europe, the northeast coast of the United States, and Japan,
covering a distance of 4,000-8,000 nautical miles (nm) (Ratcliff, 1984). With the canal closure,
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independent tanker owners were faced with expanding geographies of their trade. Independent
tanker owners rerouted trade around the Cape of Good Hope, effectively tripling the ton-miles
traveled between markets (Ratcliff, 1984: 119). According to one maritime historian: “the event
caused profound structural changes in the demand for shipping services and the innovations [in
shipbuilding] ...were so fundamental that they can be regarded as the greatest technological
advance since the change of steam and steel” (Chida and Davies, 1992: 98). Driven by the
“coercive laws of competition”, shipowners ordered larger ships to replace the wartime Liberty,
Victory, and Empire 59 ships they had used into the late 1950s, but that were becoming
progressively devalued. The average size of tankers built between 1956 and 1958 increased from
85,800 dwt to 103,000 dwt, and the world tanker fleet expanded by 9.5 million gt, an 8 percent
average rate of growth for four years (OECD, 1961: 66). During the so-called ‘Suez boom,’ time
charters were well positioned to finance fixed capital formation in the shipping sector.
The boom, however, was short-lived. In 1958, a severe global recession lowered demand
for oil tankers (31). Some owners continued to receive payments under long-term time charters
and were able to meet their mortgage commitments. For others, laying up and slow steaming ships
were sufficient strategies to reduce costs and maintain their market positions. It took four years for
the freight market to recover, by which time the shipping sector had become increasingly
competitive and unstable (Platou, 1970: 129; Stopford, 2009: 123). Under these conditions,
shipowners sought new value-added strategies, including reducing labor and ship maintenance

59

The Clan Alpine was built by J.L. Thompson & Sons Ltd. in 1942 as a “Type B” tramp steamer Empire ship (a
prefabricated efficient design built to satisfy the needs of wartime transport). Originally named the Empire Barrier,
was one of many post-war surplus vessels who Lord Rotherwick (Herbert Robin Cayzer) then Chairman of the Clan
Line Steamers Association, petitioned the House of Lords to purchase as part of a movement to rebuild the British
merchant fleet. The Empire Barrier became the Clan Alpine in 1945 and traded for the Clan Line until October 31,
1960.
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costs. The shipping sector went through a large-scale rationalization from 1959 to the mid-1960s.60
The construction of larger ships, the rise of containerization and specialized ships, the
standardization of the shipping container, the increasing use of ‘FOC’, the mechanization of ships
and docks gutted labor, and an increasing use of financing all helped transform the maritime sector.
The implications were profound for shipping and for global trade: surplus capacity grew and living
labor became redundant in an increasingly competitive trade economy developing and employing
‘dead labor’ in all-encompassing ways (Cowen, 2014: 100). This speed-up in the shipping sector
was undergirded by financial restructuring—as discussed above, fixed capital formation depends
on increasingly sophisticated money markets and credit systems. Throughout the 1950s,
shipowners transformed the oil tanker fleet through the use of “charter-backed finance.” This
advanced their market share as oil tankers grew from 30,000 dwt to 50/70,000 dwt (‘supertankers’)
by the mid-1950s, and 100,000 dwt (‘mammoths’) by the end of the decade and into the mid1960s.

Moment 2: Speculative finance and speculative growth: 1967–1973
The years between 1967–1973 were among the most active and eventful periods in the
shipping sector’s history, especially for tankers. The geopolitical tensions reached a boil when, a
day after Israel began aerial assaults on Egyptian airfields, Nasser closed the Suez Canal for the
second time in a decade. The closure took place in June 6, 1967 at the onset of what would become
the Arab-Israeli war (Khalili, 2014). The canal closure lasted for eight years when it reopened to
navigation in July 1975. This period had an even more profound impact on the shipping sector
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This was the backdrop in the shipping sector the Clan Alpine was part of and helps to make sense of the periodic
devaluation of the ship and the decision by the owners to sell it for scrap.
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than the 1956 closure. Freight rates were driven up and shipowners already pursuing economies
of scale were in a position to help transform the scale of global trade in oil once again. From 1956
to 1967, the oil trade had expanded by 918 million metric tons (Platou, 1970: 149; Tenold, 2000:
93). Over the next six-year period, Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) at 210,000 dwt and Ultra
Large Crude Carriers (ULCCs) at 350,000 dwt (with a carrying capacity of up to two million
barrels of oil) were designed to handle this growing trade (Ratcliff, 1984: 120). Although the trend
for ‘mammoths’ was already underway, the canal closure accelerated the demand for new contracts
to build 200,000-plus dwt ships (Platou, 1970: 145). The prohibition of ships trading through the
canal meant that in order to gain some of the capacity back, ships that would trade around the Cape
of Good Hope would need to be bigger.61 Shipowners based these orders on analysts’ projections
for growing global trade, specifically oil. Banks previously uninvolved in shipping opened ship
finance departments, and new financiers were eager to lend to shipowners. Much of the capital
made available to these shipowners came from the Eurodollar deposits that had been expanding at
an alarming rate, from $9 billion in 1964 to $46 billion by 1970 (Stokes, 1992: 25; Tenold, 2000:
93).62
From this new group of undisciplined and inexperienced ship financiers, ‘asset-backed
financing’ emerged. In contrast to charter-backed financing, this form of financing severed the link
between the need for collateral (secured future earnings) and access to bank capital. Financiers
offering asset-backed financing paid little or no attention to whether shipowners had secured longterm time charters (Stopford, 2009: 274; Stokes, 1992: 25); the hull of the vessel itself was enough
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At the time of reopening the Suez Canal could handle ships with a draft up to 240,000 dwt, so while many larger
vessels were too big to traverse the canal, they would often unload cargo onto a canal boat on one side and reload it
on the other. This has been taking place since the rise of VLCCs and ULCCs with a larger than 240,000 dwt draft.
62
With this large scale of Eurodollar deposits posed risks to capital as surpluses needed to circulate before they risked
overaccumulation.
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security against the loan. As Peter Stokes, maritime economist and cofounder of Bulk Transport
Ltd, noted, “many owners were happy to contract tonnage without having arranged either
employment or financing, and equally many shipyards were content to accept orders from owners
with whom they were barely acquainted and whose credit worthiness was unknown to them”
(1992: 30). The shipping sector was being used as a market to “mop up” surplus Eurodollars, but,
as with all fixed capital investments, with an eye on future profits.
Asset-backed financing helped expand shipping surpluses, setting the stage for a “newbuilding credit bubble” by the early 1970s (30). Mortgages offered 80–100 percent financing on
the hull at very low fixed interest rates of .05–1.0 percent, extended over a longer, 20-year
amortization period (24–25). A shipowner needed to earn consistent freight rates over a longer
period to repay such mortgages—a risky wager since competition was growing due to the
fluctuating freight markets characteristic of the 1960s. Yet, the benefits outweighed the risks in
the eyes of financiers and shipowners. In 1970, the revenue raised from a single voyage between
the Persian Gulf and Europe for a 210,000 dwt VLCC was $5 million. Since the purchase of a new
tanker of similar size was roughly $22 million, the VLCC could be paid off in fewer than five
voyages. At the market’s peak, the cost of a VLCC rose to $45 million, but the mortgage could
also be paid by earnings received from half-a-year’s voyages on the spot market or sold in the
second-hand market for a profit (Ratcliff, 1984: 156). In this context, spot and short-term time
charter markets emerged as more profitable ways for shipowners and charterers to capitalize on
stronger freight rates. By not locking into longer term contracts, parties could renegotiate terms
and rates after 12, 24, or 36 months. This was significant for tanker owners since global trade in
oil at this time was projected to increase, thus a short-term contract allowed them the flexibility
and option to raise their freight rates at the end of each subsequent contract in response to market
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conditions. Shipowners were able to capitalize on the higher rates they received trading on the spot
market and increased orders based on a new scale of surplus capital and credit available from the
ship financiers.
The long-term time charter market was a way to secure stable earnings in a fixed contract,
reducing economic risk during times of
low freight rates. The spot and shortterm time charter markets, in contrast,
were high-yield, high-risk markets and
very profitable for tanker owners
during times of high freight rates. 63
Figure 9: Growth of the world fleet since World War II. The growth
Shipowners reinvested in their own
of the world fleet is shown as an increase in the gross tonnage (in
red) and in the number of ships (in blue) (Source: Frisk, 2012).

operations, but in so doing, expanded
the entire world fleet (Figure 9). Even though the 1967 canal closure and growing trade warranted
larger ships, the scale of the orders placed during this period can be understood retrospectively as
having been driven by speculation and the coercive laws of competition.64 Speculation was not
new in shipping, but its scale and form during this period was. The influx of billions of dollars in
the form of asset-backed financing during the period between 1967 and 1973 helped shape the
books of shipping departments, the accounting sheets of shipowners and oil companies, and the
types of practices and spaces the same owners came to depend on when the oil ‘crisis’ manifested
and overproduction occurred.
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A well-cited example is the Norwegian shipowner Hilmer Reksten, who pursued a new building program largely
financed by debt (Stokes, 1992: 35; Tenold, 2000).
64
For further reading on the relationship between speculation and overaccumulation see Harvey’s Limits to Capital
(2006) and also his “Contradiction 15: Endless Compound Growth” in Seventeen Contradictions and the End of
Capitalism (2014).
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Moment 3: Devalued fixed capital
The largest ship launched in 1973 was the Globtik London. Built at the Ishikawajima
Harima Heavy Industries (IHH) shipyard in Kure, Japan, it weighed 484,000 dwt, and had a
carrying capacity of 3.65 million barrels of crude oil (Incredible Engineering, 2013).65 This ship
was emblematic of the shipping bubble of the late-1960s and early 1970s. At this time oil was the
world’s most traded commodity, and the transportation of oil and the construction of VLCCs and
ULCCs followed. The push to order these vessels reflected expanding routes between oil markets
and a general sense that the oil trade would continue to grow. Tankers became the most lucrative
trading vessels for shipowners and financiers, and tanker orders in the early 1970s reflected
expectations of growing economies of scale in oil production, consumption, and distribution.
Tensions between OPEC and oil multinationals manifested in oil price increases in 1970,
and again in 1973. After the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, Arab oil producers
reduced oil supplies and later put an embargo on countries supporting Israel in the war (Mitchell,
2013: 173; Ratcliff, 1984: 155). Oil prices jumped from $2.70/per barrel before the war to
$11.00/per barrel by 1974 (Statista, 2017). This affected US oil imports which experienced
declines from 115,905 million barrels in October 1973 to 62.95 million barrels by February 1974
(US Energy Information Administration, 2017). This represented the most significant decline in
the 100-year history of ocean-bound oil transport, and the most severe downturn in crude oil freight
markets (Ratcliff, 1984: 152). Overnight, surplus ships suffered periodic devaluation at a scale not
yet experienced. The shipping sector was catapulted into crisis. Shipowners moved deep into their
cash reserves to save fleets or were forced into mergers, take-overs, and bankruptcies. By 1975,
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According to UNCTAD’s Review of Maritime Transport, in 1973 the average size of an oil tanker above 10,000
dwt was 170,570 dwt (1974:14).
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Lloyd’s Register’s Casualty Returns began reflecting the implications of the speculative ordering
and scale-up over the previous decade under the new conditions. A 1975 passage titled “Broken
up” sums up the moment well: “The total tonnage [scrapped this year] was a record and is
substantially higher than the figures for 1973–1974. This is an indication of the accelerating rate
of disposal of ships rendered surplus by the depression following the energy crisis and continuing
high output figures from shipyards, this trend is expected to continue for several years” (Lloyd’s
Register, 1975: 59).66 Seventy-six percent of the 5.1 million gt scrapped in 1975 were tankers—a
70 percent increase since 1971. By 1978, tanker owners were scrapping first generation VLCCs
(Lloyd’s Register, 1978), a remarkable situation considering that a new VLCC cost $31 million in
1970 and had a second-hand value of $52 million in early 1973. By 1975, second-hand VLCCs
were worth only $10 million (UNCTAD, 1975: 26–28).
The devaluation of fixed capital in the shipping sector continued into the next decade and
devastated shipping mortgages. A new ULCC originally valued at $40 million was worth $5
million on the second-hand market by 1982. For example, if a shipowner purchased a ULCC with
a typical ‘asset-backed mortgage’ at an amortization rate of 20 years and traded the ship on the
spot market rather than securing a long-term time charter, and if seven years into the 20-year
mortgage the sector entered a trough, that shipowner would be in trouble without sufficient cash
reserves to buy time through the slump. By the mid-1970s, outstanding debt on world tankers was
estimated at $35 billion, most of which was held on VLCCs and ULCCs (Ratcliff, 1984: 158). The
shipping sector may have helped solve the capital surplus absorption problem temporarily. Yet, as
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The time it takes from ordering a ship to its delivery spans on average two to three years. Even in an economic
downturn or shipping crisis orders are still fulfilled since they are confirmed via contracts between the shipbuilder and
shipowner. There are occasions when orders have been delayed or cancelled but this is usually an exceptional moment.
The way the ship building market works is that new ships can continue to be delivered and come online even in a
downturn. A shipbroker explained to me that in the late 1970s ships were being delivered and immediately put in lay
up (Chance, 2014, personal communication).
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maritime economists have noted, the excessive availability of credit was a key factor in the
production of overproduction that gripped shipping by 1975 (Peters, 1993: 38; Stokes, 1992: 105;
Tenold, 2000: 25, 92).
By then, shipowners had limited options for dealing with devalued ships and exploited all
the value-savings strategies mentioned earlier. They slow steamed—ran ships at slower speeds to
reduce bunker consumption and lower operating costs. They utilized lay-ups, that required them
to pay anchorage fees, maintaining ship insurance and certifications, crewing the vessel, and
supplying the crew with necessities (water, food). Oil tankers could also be used as floating
storage, but this too came with costs. When ship values reached true “distress” levels, as
determined by the banks during the ship valuation process, owners contacted brokers to find buyers
for the scrapping of the ships (process is described in Chapter Three). This was the only option
that could permanently remove tonnage from the active fleet.
The year 1978 was a record year for the amount of tonnage scrapped. A total of 10 million
gt was permanently removed from the world fleet. Sixty-six percent were tankers between five and
nineteen years old—the most modern vessels in the world. Other trades were not immune. By 1982
the bulk sector also entered into a crisis, and what started as a ‘tanker crisis’ in the 1970s became
a “shipping crisis” by the early 1980s when the bulk sector experienced the implications of their
own economic speculation. The exception was in the worlds container sector, which experienced
the addition of 25.3 percent more vessels between 1982-1984 (UNCTAD, 1984:16). Between
1975 and 1981, 5,939 ships were scrapped, equaling 47.8 million gt. That number grew to 9,930
ships and over 100 million gt over the next six-year period, 1982–1987 (Lloyd’s Register, 1987).
This surge of devaluation necessitated a corresponding expansion of the spaces able to absorb the
scrap ships. Although the majority of ships were scrapped in Asia (Taiwan, China and South
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Korea) during the 1980s, emerging shipbreaking markets in South Asia (Bangladesh, India, and
Pakistan) began buying an increasing proportion of ships, helping to satisfy the needs of the
shipping sector while transforming how scrapping would come to be done for the next thirty years.

Part II: Slow geographies of oceanic overproduction
Introduction
The shipping sector’s economic woes of the 1970s produced a “double dip” slump as the
depressed trade conditions continued into the early 1980s. The demolition data after 1981 revealed
a pattern of increasing amounts of overproduced vessels, evident in the amount of ships sold for
scrap. In 1981, overcapacity was recorded at 149.1 million dwt which accounted for 27.6 percent
of the world’s active fleet. Due to the sharp reduction of oil consumption in industrialized countries
tankers accounted for a great majority at 87.6 percent of scrapped ships (UNCTAD, 1981: 25).
Overcapacity continued to expand into the mid-1980s and by 1985, 161.8 million dwt (32.2
percent) of the active world fleet was considered surplus (24). Strategies to avert or delay economic
losses expanded during this period while an extreme scale of periodic devaluation was revealed in
the astonishing amount of over 100 million gt ships scrapped between 1982 and 1987, surpassing
any previous five or even ten-year period (Lloyd’s Register, 1982; Lloyd’s Register 1987).
Scrapping in the world’s top three markets swelled by 1985. Taiwan scrapped 35.2 percent;
China, 22.5 percent, and South Korea 13.1 percent of the world’s total ships sold for scrap (Lloyd’s
Register, 1985). In addition to these top three markets, three South Asian markets emerged:
Pakistan (1975), India (1978), and Bangladesh followed in 1981. In 1981 the first Bangladeshi
based shipbreakers scrapped five vessels totaling 41,631gt (Lloyd’s Register, 1981: 124). This
nascent industry grew to 43 shipbreakers operating in 1985, who collectively scrapped 818,242 gt
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(Lloyd’s Register, 1985:38-88). By 1986 there were 67 shipbreakers operating across yards located
along a 3 km coastal area in Chittagong District. That same year the president of the newly
established Bangladesh Shipbreakers Association estimated that 20,000 people had been directly
employed by the new shipbreaking firms and that scrapping ships had become a major economic
activity for Bangladesh (Kamaluddin, 1986). By the mid-1980s, entrepreneurs in Bangladesh
offered ship brokers and cash buyers competitive prices on the global demolition market and were
gradually emerging as one of the up and coming domestic shipbreaking markets. However, for the
shipping sector struggling through the double dip slump, the 3.68 percent of scrap ships broken up
in Chittagong was a small fraction of the world’s total tonnage sold for demolition in 1985. The
South Asian markets, and in particular Bangladesh, would have to wait until the late 1980s early
1990s to become a central location for the removal of devalued fixed capital from the world fleet.
The factors for the shift from East Asian to South Asian countries can be tracked through a period
of global economic restructuring and the ways in which capital was being moved through
internationally active banks and private markets. Part II highlights some of the underlying
political-economic conditions that help to position the rise of Bangladesh’s shipbreaking market
by the early 1990s. The double dip slump of the 1980s was brought on by a confluence of factors
unfolding at interconnected scales and emanating from different economic sectors. Part II provides
a sectoral analysis that reveals challenges emerging in the shipping sector and a distinct set of
challenges developing in the global finance and banking sectors. This analysis grounds the
expansion of the shipbreaking market in Bangladesh by the early 1990s while it identifies
shipbreaking as a material manifestation of an increasing amount of global capital circulations.
In Part I, an analysis of ocean-going vessels as a form of fixed capital was emphasized in
order to track the circulation of capital through the shipping sector and to propose an alternative
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perspective to the ones provided by orthodox maritime economists that tend to focus on the supply
and demand dynamic as the condition that undergirds the necessity for shipbreaking during times
of crisis or heightened periods of disequilibrium. Specifically, I argue that while supply and
demand have influence over freight rates and those rates influence the profit margins of ship
owning companies, there is an underlying set of logics that act to encourage the fluctuations of
supply and demand, and as Harvey notes, driven by the ‘coercive laws of competitions’ as well as
speculative behavior by capitalists during periods of economic growth as well as economic
contraction. To develop this line of thinking it was necessary to track new forms of debt-financing
strategies (mortgages and equity funds) that undergirded the growth and the general conditions of
value production and devaluation during periods of economic crisis. The grounding of
shipbreaking as a necessary condition for capital circulation in and through the shipping sector
became explicit when we analyze the ship as a fixed form of capital.
Pivoting from this analysis, and rather than focusing on the unprecedented expansion and
flows of finance capital into shipping markets by undisciplined debt-financing, Part II focuses on
the implications of the slowed movement and circulation of fictitious capital into the sector
(barriers to circulation) and how this led to new forms of financing that helped lay the foundation
for a new form and scale of shipbreaking activities by the early 1990s (the way around the barriers
to growth). The story that emerges from the shipping and ship demolition data extends the histories
and theoretical understanding presented in Part I by focusing on the period between 1989 and
1993, revealing how the shipping sector’s scale of value production and devaluation was
increasingly conditioned by its relationship to an evolving global financial sector—thus,
understanding the emergence of the contemporary global demolition and domestic shipbreaking
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markets, we must consider the foundational role finance capital played in laying the groundwork
for a permanent yet still expanding need of shipbreaking capacity.
This analysis proceeds in four parts. The first part orientates us with the general economic
conditions of the shipping sector during the late 1980s to early 1990s through a brief analysis of
shipping and shipbreaking data and concludes with a mention of the economic and regulatory
challenges the sector faced by the late 1980s. The second part focuses on regulatory developments
evolving in the global banking sector that affected shipping markets during the period in question.
These regulations had a transformative impact on the circulation of capital into shipping markets
and helped to deepen the financialization of the sector by the early 1990s. The third part examines
the status of the global demolition market by pivoting to Taiwan’s ship scrapping sector, the
world’s largest market between 1968-1988. I briefly examine Taiwan’s market position during the
double dip slump of the 1980s and how changing conditions helped make way for South Asian
markets, in particular Bangladesh. Then, in a final section I pivot to Bangladesh in order to
contextualize the shifting scale of the shipbreaking market, placing this maritime activity in a
broader “developing” economy context.

The state of the shipping sector: challenges and a new path forward
Banks suffered extensive losses in the decade after the 1973 global economic crisis
motivating some to reevaluate their relationship to the shipping sector. Some banks closed their
ship finance departments while others continued to lend with more cautious positions,
transforming the landscape of ship finance at this time. However, the brief spikes in freight rates
between 1975-1976 and 1978-1979, alongside traditional debt-financing still opened by banks
with longstanding relationships in the shipping sector, led optimistic shipowners to continue to
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order vessels, albeit at much lower levels in each subsequent year after 1973. At the height of the
market in 1973 the total orders placed for new vessels was 257.9 million dwt, but by 1976 the total
declined to 119.2 million dwt with further declines to 65.7 million dwt by 1977 (UNCTAD, 1977).
Though new build orders declined dramatically, they were considered to be “speculative” in this
post-crisis shipping landscape. UNCTAD noted in their 1977 review that the increased supply of
tonnage was not matched by a corresponding expansion of demand for shipping services, thus the
orders would contribute to weaker freight markets (19). In 1976 ship mortgage debts taken on all
oil tankers and bulk carriers amounted to $6.17 billion, with VLCCs accounting for the highest
sector of investments at $2.3 billion (Stokes, 1992:56). Mortgages dropped from $2.9 billion to
$1.7 billion by 1978 and even further by 1979 (56). The biggest drop was in tankers with over $2
billion fleeing the sector. Thus, the new orders and mortgage debts in the late 1970s reveal on one
hand, owners and investors speculating on future earnings evidenced in their efforts to remain
competitive while, on the other, a large-scale withdrawal of capital. In other words, some owners
too the risk and ordered more ships hoping the sector would rebound and others retreated from the
sector all together.
A tanker sector recovery took place between 1978-1979, but was short lived as the sector
began to reflect the deceleration of the world economy.67 Considering the scale of bank exposure
and liquidity issues of shipping companies, it is equally important to note the dramatic interest rate
increases on shipping mortgages, from 9 percent in 1978 to 17-20 percent by 1980 (Stokes, 1992:
61). The interest rate hike helped to expand surplus ships in the increasingly depressed market
conditions. Slow steaming and using tankers for storage were strategies drawn on during this
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The three main factors that pushed the oil trade down were: expanding use of coal; price speculation from the
previous year that expanded oil tanker storage; uncertainties from geopolitical conditions, namely another OPEC
possible intervention regarding the increased the price of oil per barrel (as they did between 1978-1980 when it
increased from $12.79 to $35.52); and increased oil production in major oil consuming nations (UNCTAD, 1988).
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period, leading UNCTAD to remark that the practices had become virtually “permanent features
of international shipping” (1980:17). In 1980 tanker orders accounted for 17.1 million dwt, a mere
fraction of what they were five years prior (135.4 million dwt in 1975). By 1983 tanker orders
bottomed out at 7.2 million dwt and only began to gradually recover in 1986 (UNCTAD, 1987:
33).
More generally, the shipping sector slump dragged on into the mid-1980s with modest
measurements of growth in international seaborne trade each year until 1988 with the exception of
an uptick in freight rates between 1981-1982 and again in 1985. Borrowers defaulted on $10 billion
worth of loans between 1983-1987; commercial banks wrote off $3 to $4 billion, while some of
the more experienced ship finance banks wrote off 1.0-5.0 percent of their loans with the highest
writing off 10 percent (Stopford, 2002). This led the ship financiers to reevaluate their relationship
to the sector. As the landscape of ship financing transformed during this period, some banks closed
their ship finance departments while others continued to lend with more cautious positions. As
debt-financing provided by banks was being withdrawn from ship finance, other flows of financing
began to open through the creation of new financial mechanisms and strategies. An example of
this flow is reflected in the relationship between the ship orders underpinned by the Hong Kong
based Asian dollar surpluses, government sponsored and financed shipbuilding programs, and the
shift into capital markets through ‘equity-financing funds.’ The equity funds were pioneered by
Peter Stokes’s firm Bulk Transport Ltd, whose investors bought, traded, then sold second-hand
ships within a predetermined time frame (Ratcliff, 1984: 152–153; Stokes, 1992: 58-61; Stopford,
2009: 274). Other investors exploited what is referred to as “asset-play”, buying second-hand ships
when the market hits bottom, holding on to them, and then selling when the market conditions
improve. Asset-value investments became a general trend during the 1980s and were underpinned

116

by a period of deregulated capital markets. An example of this influx of capital can be traced
following the “Big Bang” of 1986,68 when non-experienced investors found the shipping sector to
be a viable “sink” for freer flows of capital (Hall, 2018: 22-25; Harvey, 2010: 21–23).
Also prevalent through the decade were shipowners with strong cash positions that took
advantage of the low cost for new and second-hand vessels and exacerbated the already weak
market expanding the order books for bulk carriers. Between 1980-1984 international seaborne
trade declined each year and while the orders for tankers reflected this decline through the growing
scale of tanker surpluses, orders for bulk carriers swelled to 32.7 million dwt, or more than half of
the total 55.3 million dwt on order. Thus, as the tanker orders declined to record lows, bulk carriers
became the new investment vessel of the mid-1980s (UNCTAD, 1981).
By the mid-1980s, the shipping sector suffered from continued overproduction as investors
took advantage of market conditions, they kept second-hand ships active and continued to order
new builds. As noted above, the sector permanently removed active vessels in record numbers by
scrapping their surpluses. In the view of maritime economists, scrapping should improve the
overall condition of the freight market however, stakeholders speculating on future earnings
continued to order ships according to future growth as a way to anticipate and capture a competitive
market position. As the shipping crisis deepened through the 1980s, the sector suffered from
continued overproduction as investors took advantage of reduced ship costs and continued to
expand the world fleet.
Because of the competitive and sensitive nature of shipping and their dependence on access
to accurate, thorough, and up to the minute data on shipping markets, in recent years, shipping data
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In efforts to create a singular global trading network where banks could operate more freely across borders, the
deregulation of securities markets in the UK helped to interlink global stock and financial trading markets (Harvey,
2010: 20).
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has been made proprietary by non-ship owning companies. This poses challenges for researchers
like me; however, it was possible to track the general trends of the movement and speed of capital
into and out of shipping to demystify the relationship between finance capital and the shipbreaking
market. Ultimately, the patterns and behavior of shipowners become important factors in tracking
the circulation into this productive sector. The behavior of shipowners and investors create a
spiraling pattern of capital investment into shipping at an ever-expanding scale that materially
transforms the fleet. It is this circulation of capital that ultimately produces both progressive and
periodic devaluation at an alarming scale. Using the data collected by Lloyd’s Register on ships
broken up and the data on shipping collected by UNCTAD, it becomes possible to identify how
scales of speculation undergirded by the “coercive laws of competition”, underpinned by finance
capital, continued to produce a foundation for expanding amounts of overcapacity and thus an
ongoing need for shipbreaking capacity. In light of the volatility of the shipping economy and the
speed at which shipowners react to markers of growth, contraction, and decline, it is not surprising
that UNCTAD noted that the pattern of speculative behavior continued through the late 1980s
(1989: 24). The overcapacity that plagued the shipping markets throughout the decade of the 1980s
to early 1990s was brought on by a shipping market underpinned by the restructuring and
deregulation of global finance capital partnered with a new global geography of trade (Peters,
1993). The shipping sector became embroiled again in a new scale of global capitalist
accumulation and devaluation.
Maritime economists mark 1988 as the end of the shipping crisis. At that point there was a
ten year high in global freight rates led by imports into developing countries, trade into African
and South East Asian countries was three times greater than developed countries (UNCTAD, 1989:
ix). In 1989 surplus tonnage declined to 11.5 percent from 19 percent in 1987, while seaborne
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trade increased by 5.5 percent from the previous year as compared to the 1.3 percent increase in
1987 (4). The improved market conditions motivated shipowners to modernize their fleets. Orders
increased to 42.8 million dwt reflecting efforts to gain back some of the 25 percent of global
tonnage scrapped since 1975 (24). The energy was short lived though, and by 1991, the shipping
sector began to feel the impact from new challenges emerging from the world economy and from
within the sector.
The challenges included rapid increases in the cost of new builds that also pushed up the
cost of second-hand vessels. These increases affected both the tanker and dry bulk shipbuilding
sectors and were significant for a sector just coming out of the double dip slump. An example of
the profound cost increases can be seen in comparing the costs of a new VLCC in 1985 with that
of 1990. In 1985 a VLCC could be purchased for $47 million, which increased to $90 million by
1990, while a 120,000 dwt bulk carrier was $27 million in 1985 and increased to $45 million by
1990 (UNCTAD, 1994: 43). This rapid increase in the cost of new builds signaled an “end of the
era of cheap ships” (UNCTAD, 1989: 26).69
Also affecting the shipping sector were the rising expenses in operations including higher
maintenance and repair costs, and increases in port fees (UNCTAD, 1990: 29). The increasing
capital-intensive nature of the industry, even in a period of growing global trade, pushed
shipowners to search out ways to offset the rising costs. They sought out value-added strategies
and expanded their use of open registries (also referred to flags of convenience (FOC))70 giving
owners and managers fewer restrictions on the crews they employed and ultimately allowing them
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Stokes notes that a reason for the increase was tied to the removal of government subsidies that existed through the
1980s slump in countries that had productive shipbuilding sectors (1992: 205)
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The move to an FOC also relieved owners from keeping up with environmental certifications as compared with the
more established flags. An example of the environmental implications from the increasing use of FOCs is evident in
comparing two sets of data. At the height of the double dip slump in 1985, 203 million dwt had been registered with
an FOC, by 1992 four years after the crisis was said to be over, this amount increased to 233 million (UNCTAD, 1988:
11).
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to reduce the labor costs by hiring seafarers from countries with lower wages. As the sector was
improving in order to serve the expanding trade, many shipowners kept their ships active longer,
increasing the average age of the total world fleet from 12.25 years in 1988 to 15.05 by 1993. The
older ships (most often registered with an FOC) were also less productive and had higher
maintenance and insurance costs. The high costs of maintenance and low profit margins led
shipowners to skip surveys leading to a rise in accidents and casualties at sea; the increasing
casualties and “mushrooming liabilities” from pollution, the costs of insurance and P&I doubled
between 1991 and 1993 and accounted for 20 percent of the ships total operating costs (Peters,
1993:24).
While the shipping sector was confronted with increasing capital costs as seen above,
access to finance (for new builds, maintenance and repairs) was shuttering. Initially this was due
to a retreating group of ship financiers who experienced deep economic losses during the extended
shipping crisis. This was followed by a period of global economic deceleration and a
transformation of financial regulations which attempted to limit the circulation of capital through
internationally operating banks. These regulations were aimed at banks who had previously
funnels large amounts of capital (with limited restrictions) into the shipping sector. These same
banks were now self-regulating their lending, which caused a slowdown of the movement of
capital into the shipping sector. This came at a moment when the shipowners needed it most. As
the shipping sector was faced with this new reality—less access to debt-financing for new orders,
maintenance and operations—new types of financing, and a new geography of global maritime
activity began to emerge.
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Risking crisis: tracking global financial regulations into the shipping sector
In the aftermath of the 1973 global financial crisis, the central banks of the Group of Ten
(G10) 71 formed the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The Committee, made up of G10
central bank Governors, was established to “enhance financial stability by improving the quality
of banking supervision worldwide” (BIS website, 2018). The Basel Committee became a key
policy maker of a neoliberal regime whose aim was to mitigate future risks created by the lending
activities of international banks. In essence, banks operating internationally would regulate
themselves in order to thwart future crises. The Committee went on to enact three separate
Accords, known as Basel I (1992), II (2007), and III (2017). The focus of this section considers
the affects Basel I had on the global shipping and domestic shipbreaking markets during the early
1990s.
The Basel I Accord was drafted in the wake of the debt crisis that rocked Latin America in
the 1980s (Gindin and Panitch, 2013: 214; Rude, 2004: 90). US banks were exposed to extensive
losses from the Latin American debt crisis, sparked by the United States Federal Reserve Chairman
Paul Volker’s ‘draconian’ interest rate increases. The accord was drafted to promote stability in
the international banking system, which had been deregulated over the course of the 1980s to
encourage freer flows of global capital. Through a set of regulations and disciplinary measures to
protect banks operating internationally from future credit risks, protecting against risk allowed
banks to take risk that could facilitate new rounds of accumulation (Rude, 2004: 90). For example,
Basel I set forth capital adequacy guidelines and called for a minimum ratio of capital to riskweighted assets of 8.0 percent (BIS website, 2018). This meant that for each loan extended to a
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so-called “risky” industry or lender, banks operating internationally were required to hold 8.0
percent against the amount of the loan in liquid assets. The loans’ “weighted risk” was rated by an
internal rating system established by the banks themselves. Basel I became part of a policy regime
aimed at regulating the flow of capital through the international banking sector, on an ideology
that promoted economic growth through a “freer” flow of regulated capital, i.e. a system of risk
management. As new barriers of capitalist growth emerged in the 1980s, the capital adequacy
requirements and the internal rating system were enacted as a crisis management strategy aimed
at protecting the internationalizing financial system which required coordinated global
intervention in order to be able to “contain and shape risk and to calm and shape turmoil when the
economy erupts into financial crisis and recession” (Rude, 2004: 89). By planning for the eventual
crisis, growth could proceed apace.
For the maritime economy these protocols assumed that decelerating global economic
growth anticipates an expansion of surplus capacity and production of periodic devaluation. As in
the mid-1970s, the sudden devaluation of fixed capital necessitated a demand for larger amounts
of shipbreaking capacity, but in 1990 this did not occur. One factor that is able to explain why the
scrap figures were anomalous was that when the global GDP declined 2.5 percentage points (from
3.7 percent to 1.56 percent) between 1989 and 1991, the commercial banks holding large amounts
of shipping debt suffered from extensive losses. In 1991 Citicorp, the holding company of
Citibank, reported third quarter losses of $885 million (mainly to asset write downs and
restructuring). The Chairman of Citibank announced it would temporarily suspend its lending and
impose self-discipline (Stokes, 1993: 109). Since Citibank had the longest standing presence in
the ship finance markets their decision dramatically affected the shipping sector. Limiting access
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to bank capital for shipowners translated to a reduction of orders, shipowners held onto older ships
longer and pulled back on scheduling ship surveys.
The second factor can be attributed to the Basel I Accord, which had a profound impact on
ship mortgages as observed in their limited accessibility. Shipping mortgages were considered and
rated “high risk” by the banks, therefore banks would be required to hold more capital (8 percent)
on the amount of each loan. For example, if a shipping mortgage was written at $60 million, the
bank needed to hold $4.8 million in capital. This form of risk management made banks more
selective on whom they offered mortgages. The extensive losses from debt-driven expansion in
the 1980s and the new capital adequacy requirements engendered a new degree of risk aversion in
the shipping sector (Stokes 1993: 106-108). Just when access to bank capital tightened, and
maintenance and operational costs were on the rise, shipowners found themselves needing more
capital at the very moment when they could not get it. Stakeholders in the shipping sector maintain
that during periods of decelerating economic growth (as measured in global GDP), slowed
international trade and a depressed freight market leads to larger amounts of periodically devalued
ships, as surplus value evaporates leading shipowners to scrap vessels. Instead of the expected
amounts of tonnage being sold for scrap between 1989-1991, demolition data reflects record low
numbers. In 1989, 2.47 million gt was sold for scrap. This dropped to 1.8 million gt in 1990, and
a slight uptick in 1991 to 2.3 million gt. Maritime economists and UNCTAD analysts explain that
the decline in scrapping is the outcome of a period of equilibrium between supply and demand,
but I suggest that the data reveals a more nuanced story tied to regulating flows of global capital
and how these regulations affected the capital available to shipowners. The year 1991 experienced
the biggest decline for the sector with 3.35 percent of new orders cancelled and a -7.3-percentage
decrease in orders from the previous year (UNCTAD, 1991: 38).
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During these few years, the financing available for the shipping sector went through a
transformation in part due to its high-risk rating and the regulation of access to bank capital that
followed. This slowed certain forms of capital circulating into the shipping sector and even though
there was a depressed freight market, the limits placed on access to bank capital slowed the rate at
which shipowners scrapped their vessels. This context helps to explain the dramatic reduction in
the demolition data between the years 1989-1991. In a sense, the shipping sector experienced
equilibrium but at the cost of running sub-standard ships and only because there was a barrier built
that slowed their ability to order new vessels.
As this brief history shows, the financialization of shipping had a direct effect on the
shipping sector and the production of periodic and progressive devaluation of fixed capital. The
circulation of capital and accumulation of surplus capital in general had become dependent in part
on the capacity of shipbreaking markets in particular places at particular times. In the late 1980s
and early 1990s, as the global economic landscape was being re-organized, two particular places
were bending to the new rules of this financialization: Taiwan and Bangladesh. It is to this story
that we turn to.

Part III: Locational shake-up for the global demolition market
Taiwan and the changing tide
The decline of Taiwan’s shipbreaking industry and the rise of Bangladesh’s shipbreaking
industry not only mirror the ways capital moves through shipping, but also act in contrast to one
another to show how the new world order was unfolding and embedded itself into the financial
and physical landscape while altering the lives of those who were connected to the industry.
Bangladesh’s rise to becoming one of the primary global markets for shipbreaking by the late
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1980s was in part an outcome of developments in ship scrapping markets elsewhere and tied to
patterns that manifest uneven development. By the late 1980s the most important shipbreaking
market was preparing to shut down and this closure helped to position the expansion of
Bangladesh’s shipbreaking market.
Kaohsiung, a municipality of Taiwan, is located on the southwestern coast along the
Taiwan Strait. Until the late 1980s, the Port of Kaohsiung, was the location of the world’s most
important shipbreaking markets, scrapping at its peak 7.83 million gt amounting to over 50 percent
of the ships scrapped in 1982 (Taiwan Today, 1985). Though Taiwan’s ship scrapping history in
Kaohsiung can be tracked back to the 178 vessels that were grounded, wrecked, or sunk in and
around the port during World War I, it did not become a location for the global demolition market
until the early 1960s. This period marked the beginning of Taiwan’s rapid industrialization,
supported by a construction boom that demanded scrap metals and steel (Terao, 2008: 65). The
government began providing incentives for the importation of scrap ships. By the early 1970s
Taiwan’s construction and machinery industries received 70 percent of their domestic steel need
from scrap ships. In 1972 the prices soared for global scrap steel increasing from $42 to $87 per
ton in 1973. This had a tremendous impact on the prices paid for scrap ships increasing the price
from $62 ldt to $82 ldt (Taiwan Review, 1973). In light of the new prices for global scrap, the
government offered incentives to shipbreakers, helping the country to retain their leading market
position.72 The incentives were aimed at promoting and managing the importation of scrap vessels
and helped Kaohsiung remain the world’s leading market, a position it maintained for two decades
(Terao, 2008: 62). When the bottom fell out of the global shipping markets in 1975 there were 117
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shipbreaking enterprises employing 50,000 workers spread across 24 breaking berths in the Port
of Kaohsiung (19 privately owned and 5 public). The berths were located in specified areas and
each area was delineated at 18,000 sq. ft. with a 300-ft. berth, while each breaker owned and
operated their own cranes (Taiwan Review, 1973). In 1971 the Taiwanese breakers formed the
Shipbreaking Association, a representative group of active shipbreakers. The Association was in
part established to reduce the competition among breakers within the domestic market through the
negotiation of scrap vessels with ship brokers in the world’s major seaports (Taiwan Review, 1973;
Taiwan Today, 1983). Between 1978 and 1983 the Kaohsiung shipbreakers scrapped 60 percent
of the world’s devalued ships. The Taiwanese market was busy. It was organized, and it was an
integral part of the global maritime economy during this period.
Taiwan’s domestic economy in the early 1960s was designed around the simultaneous
development of the port and expansion of manufacturing activities near the port. Not unlike the
reasons underlying the transformation of the Port of Chittagong, Kaohsiung became an economic
engine, and the port, a central conduit supporting the import of manufactures and export of
agricultural products and later manufactured commodities (Todd, 1993: 6). The large-scale
infrastructural projects envisioned in 1958 in the 12-year Harbor Extension Project focused heavily
on this import/export driven positioning. The port development project followed a systematic
approach, beginning with the expansion of light and heavy industries in the 1960s, and adding
container terminals by the 1970s (Todd, 1993: 6). Metals, specifically iron and steel, were
necessary inputs yet were chronically short in supply. The shortages pushed Taiwan to develop an
extensive mixed metal recycling industry (Terao, 2008). Shipbreaking was developed as part of a
strategic and organized way to import the raw materials needed through an expansion of this metal
recycling industry. Using empirical data collected from the Interchange Association, Terao details
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the amount of ship plate and scrap iron obtained from recycling ships to supplement the domestic
demand (64). 73 By the time the double-dip slump hit Taiwan’s shipbreaking market, between
1982-1986, recycled steel and iron accounted for 41 percent of the total domestic “iron source”
used (64).
While the material from scrap ships helped to transform the costal landscape into a market
for economic growth in Taiwan, it also moved Taiwan away from its dependency on this scrap.
Thus, the growth of an export orientated manufacturing sector, the need for more containerized
cargo capacity, new laws aimed at reducing scrapping related accidents (making it costlier to
import scrap vessels) and the sudden dearth of scrap ships in 1988 from the brief rise in global
freight rates all became factors that motivated the Taiwanese government to evict the shipbreakers
and convert the shipbreaking berths into container terminals to support the expansion of intermodal
transport and global trade. Taiwan’s maritime economy was coming online through an equalization
process that would make them competitive with other Asian markets in the manufacture and export
of commodities. This was not unanticipated, as early as 1973 Taiwan Today noted that the Port
Authority did not authorize the construction of permanent scrap facilities, satisfying the need to
remain flexible in light of a changing domestic economy and the ways in which they imagined
their global economic integration in the future. Taiwan’s scrapping market declined from 73
percent in 1981 to 30 percent in 1988, and eventually to 6.6 percent in 1989, only to be phased out
completely by 1990 (Lloyds Register, 1981; Lloyds Register, 1988; Lloyds Register, 1989).
This closure was not taken lightly by global shipping stakeholders. Even during a period
of higher freight rates shipowners expressed concern over the loss of a shipbreaking market and
actively sought out alternative markets for ship demolition. By 1990 concerns were growing as to
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where and what markets will be able to absorb the amount of scrap vessels anticipated in the near
future.74 In Tradewinds the Japanese Transport Ministry said it would help construct facilities in
three South Asian yards (1990). By 1992, Japan, the world’s largest shipbuilding market and a
large ship owning nation, was in a “desperate search for scrap yards to demolish dozens of
tankers”. The Ministry also stated that the amount of single hulled vessels to be scrapped in the
upcoming years accounted for 270 million dwt while the scrapping facilities current capacity was
10 million dwt across the three South Asian shipbreaking yards, including the China’s market (The
Journal of Commerce, 1988). Different stakeholders sought out solutions to this lack of capacity
in different ways. A group of Japanese stakeholders set out to research what the steel demands
were in each shipbreaking country. Another solution was proposed by the Chairman of Oak
Steamship Co. of London and was to be voted on by the International Association of Dry Cargo
Shipowners, known as Intercargo (Porter, 1988; Lewis, 1992). It called on bulk carrier owners to
establish a pool of funds that could be used by shipbreakers to improve their shipbreaking
capabilities and expand capacity. The amount of the fund proposed was $500,000. Though the
proposal did not pass, it is important to acknowledge the attention, efforts, and sense of urgency
directed towards the expansion of shipbreaking markets during the late 1980s (Landells, 1993).
These efforts reveal that shipping sector agents actively sought out alternatives to Taiwan and
shifted their attention towards South Asia as the viable outlet to expand shipbreaking capacity.
Without an outlet to permanently remove fixed capital from circulation, the glut of active vessels
would continue to affect freight markets and extend shipping crises for stakeholders. In 1988 the
ships sold through the global demolition market amounted to 5.01 million, the lowest tonnage
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scrapped since 1974. It was in this ‘depressed’ scrap market that Bangladesh emerges as one of
the top three yards for the first time. Bangladesh shipbreakers scrapped 479,666 gt or 55 ships,
which amounted to a substantial 10 percent of the ships scrapped worldwide (Lloyd’s Register,
1988: 6).

Bangladesh comes online
In 1990, shipbreakers at Kaohsiung scrapped their last vessel. It was a small Japanese
owned 2,373 gt roro cargo75 carrier built in 1967 (Lloyd’s Register, 1990: 38). This marked the
end of a stable period for the ship brokers, owners, and cash buyers who had relied on Taiwan’s
ship scrapping market for two decades. The closure worried many in the shipping sector. There
was an extensive number of tankers expected to be scrapped in the coming years brought on by
the US Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the subsequent international regulations outlined by the IMO
in 1992. Both regulations were aimed at reducing risks of oil spills and accidents in the wake of
high-profile spills. Through a mandatory series of structural changes for new builds after July
1996, where oil tankers needed to be fitted with double hulls, the resolution was expected to
fundamentally alter the composition of the tanker fleet, 70 percent of the 270 million tanker
tonnage would become progressively devalued. It was anticipated that the scrapping capacity
needed to absorb the vessels was 30 to 40 million dwt per year beginning in 1995 (The Journal of
Commerce, 1992). At the sale of the last scrap vessel to Taiwan’s yards in 1990, India shipbreakers
declared that they were capable of breaking down the world’s largest VLCC’s (Lloyd’s Register,
1990: 6). This, however, did not fully reassure stakeholders and efforts to identify more capacity
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were sought out. They found this in part in Bangladesh. 76 In 1990 Bangladesh shipbreakers
scrapped 21 vessels that amounted to 216,717 gt (12 percent of the world’s total), and though the
number was extremely low, it was enough to make them the second largest market in the world.
The dramatic and rapid decline of scrapping and availability of scrap ships between 1989
and 1991 was grounded in a complex set of shifting financial conditions unfolding at the national
and international scale. In Bangladesh, the challenges to this circulation included: an unregulated
foreign exchange market, reduced access to ‘letters of credit’ (LC), and the early stages of banking
sector reforms directed by the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Access
to foreign currency capital by Bangladesh shipbreakers was limited and it had a direct impact on
the scale of ships bought for scrap. This domestic condition complicated the growth of
shipbreaking at a time when stakeholders in the global shipping sector were desperate for a new
market able to satisfy the capacity lost when Taiwan closed.
Throughout the decade of the 1980s, private capital trickled into Bangladesh at rates
between -.03 percent to .47 percent of the national GDP. As a result, by 1991, Bangladesh’s
productive sectors struggled with the limited availability of foreign currency. UNCTAD noted this
issue in their 1991 report as a primary reason for low scrapping numbers in the South Asian
markets (46). Lloyd’s Register Casualty Returns referred to the low scrapping as grounded in an
“insufficient financial structure” (1991: 6). Industry news reports reiterated these observations and
noted that scrapping was affected by a shortage of foreign currency in domestic markets, while
also highlighting the increases in import taxes on scrap vessels as an additional constraint
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(Ytteborg, 1991). The global demolition market’s common currency is US dollars, and the extent
to which the domestically scaled shipbreakers can function and compete within this global market
is tied to their access to dollars within their own financial markets. But before we discuss the
relationship between foreign currency, inadequate banking reforms and shipbreaking, it is
important to introduce in more detail the financial mechanism upon which this market functions:
Letters of Credit, most commonly known as an LC.
Generally, the main function of the LC is to guarantee that a seller will receive a buyer’s
payment amount at a specific time for a previously negotiated specified amount. The bank acts as
a third party and reduces the risk to both parties. Due to the international nature of trade, LCs are
fundamental to carrying out transnational financial transactions and have become foundational to
conducting financial transactions in the global economy. When a shipbreaker and cash buyer or
broker negotiate and agree on the amount and terms of the exchange of the scrap vessel, “sales &
purchase” (S&P), the buyer will approach their bank and request to open an LC. The buyer shares
with the bank the details about the agreement before they open an LC. The LC binds the buyer and
seller through a legal contract of negotiated terms. The LC will be expanded on in greater detail in
the next chapter.
Between the 1970s and 1990s shipbreaking markets worked with different kinds of LC.
The type of LC used determined the direction the shipbreaking market moved in. In other words,
certain shipowners navigated to the markets that used their preferred LC. It is in this context that
the LC can be understood as a factor in the geography of shipbreaking. An example shared with
me by a New Jersey based ship broker (in the business since the 1970s), illustrates this point. In
the 1970s and 1980s US shipowners preferred the Taiwanese market to the Indian market. This
was due to the type of LC used in Taiwan which was a “confirmed irrevocable letters of credit”
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(CILC). CILC are contracts that cannot be amended or cancelled and involve two banks, the
issuing bank (buyer’s) and the advising bank (seller’s bank). The other LC used was called a
“usance LC”. These were more common in the Indian shipbreaking markets. An “usance” LC is a
type of documentary credit that guarantees payment to the seller’s bank at a specified future date,
typically between 120 and 180 days, meaning the seller’s payment is delayed.77 Thus, the CILC
was a financial mechanism that helped to keep the devalued fixed capital circulating through the
Taiwanese markets. In Bangladesh, it was not uncommon for shipbreakers to use a “revocable
LC”. In practice, this type of LC can be revoked at any time without prior notice to the beneficiary
(Ali, 2005: 47). For example, when the LC is issued and the ship delivered by the owner or cash
buyer to outer port, without notice the buyer (shipbreaker) could cancel the deal. This produces
unstable market conditions and potentially major losses for the seller. In the contemporary
shipbreaking market the most common LCs are “sight” or “usance,” both are irrevocable. The only
difference is that the issuing bank pays the beneficiary of a usance LC at a specified future date.
Whereas with a sight LC, the issuing bank pays when the correct documentation is received from
the seller.
Banks benefit from these financial services by charging fees for using these types of debt
products. To protect themselves from the risk of the shipbreaker who chooses not to pay, the bank
charges a fee that is usually a percentage of the size of the LC issued. It is also common for banks
to require different types of collateral. For example, the oldest international bank operating in
Bangladesh, and only one of four international banks to offer LCs to shipbreakers, is very selective
about whom they offer LC, to and has committed to working with only four of the top shipbreakers.
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The rise of LC parallels the rise of the cash buyer. The cash buyer is a middleman who operates as the primary risk
taker between the buyer and seller. The cash buyer literally began because they put up the cash for a vessel so the
seller would not have to wait. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.
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In addition to a high interest LC, with interest rates ranging between 17-20 percent, a bank can
now require the yard to prove facility upgrades that are compliant with the regulations laid out in
the 2009 Hong Kong Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships
(Convention) (presented in more detail in Chapter Four). If there are no improvements, or they are
delayed, an LC can be denied. As these details show banks can alter where the global demolition
market touches down through issuing a particular type of LC or not. An important take away is
that LC have become a key financial mechanism in the production of uneven geographies of
shipbreaking.78
By 1991, Bangladesh was an emerging shipbreaking market whose domestic economy
lacked “adequate financial structure” capable of supporting the economic activity demanded by
the global capital, such as limited foreign currency and LC. The global demolition market and
other domestic shipbreaking markets depend on the existence of a stable banking system capable
of facilitating transnational transactions. Fundamental to this is a functioning banking system.
Mann remarks that for any of the market relations under capitalism to work, especially at an
international scale, there must exist a means of circulation of exchange and payment (money), and
this circulation is produced by banks (loaned) for profit (which is taken in the form of interest
charged on the loan), or in the case of an LC, a fee charged based on a percentage of the total
amount of the LC (2013:15). Under the supervision of the World Bank, in 1990, Bangladesh
launched a financial sector reform program (FSRP) aimed at creating the “adequate” financial
structure needed for handling the circulation of global capital into Bangladesh’s increasingly
Another example reveals how profound this is to shipbreakers in domestic markets. In 1990 Indian shipbreakers
were commanding much more of the market than their Bangladeshi counterparts. India had broken up over 1 million
gt (60 percent of the world market) and Bangladesh scrapped 12 percent. This shifted the following year when the
State Bank of India started requiring breakers to make a cash deposit of 10 percent in order for them to have a LC
issued (Andvig, 1991). This led to a complete withdrawal of all Indian shipbreakers from the market. By the end of
1991 India commanded just 29.41 percent of the market having given up a large percentage to Bangladesh who had
commanded 21.65 percent of the total market (Lloyd’s Register, 1991).
78
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privatized sectors.79 The banking sector reforms helped to establish a stronger financial platform
for Bangladesh’s manufacturing, agricultural, and industrial sectors. As noted, by 1991
Bangladesh’s market share for buying scrap ships doubled to 40 ships (21.65 percent of the total
amount of tonnage scrapped globally) positioning them as the second largest shipbreaking market.
By 1992 Bangladesh broke their first VLCC and by the end of the year, over 75 percent of their
scrapped vessels were some of the largest VLCCs in the world (Lewis, 1992). With a financial
sector created to accommodate manufacturing and industrial growth, Bangladesh was poised to
remain a leading market through the 1990s. The environmental implications of this new market
were huge. In 1989 3.45 km of coastal area was dedicated to shipbreaking. By 1999 the area had
doubled (Abdullah et al., 2013). In order to expand shipbreaking capacity, shipbreakers
encroached upon coastal fishing villages and small-scale agricultural production, as they clear cut
coastal mangrove forests. This new landscape was the evidence of the success of Bangladesh
shipbreakers who broke up between 2 million to 3.8 million gt between 1994 and 1999 (UNCTAD
1994; 1999). Foundational to this development was the creation of a foreign currency market in
the wake of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund reforms and an increasingly
privatized banking sector eager and able to issue LCs.
As capital flowed into the Bangladesh economy, LC were opened that allowed shipbreakers
to buy scrap ships. In maintaining one of the world’s most important shipbreaking markets since
the early 1990s, helping ‘mop up’ overproduced and devalued fixed capital, Bangladesh’s
shipbreaking market became vital for the continued circulation of capital through the transport
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The targets of the Financial Sector Reform Program (FSRP) were: Liberalization of interest rates; Indirect monetary
management; Implementation of capital adequacy requirement of commercial banks; Introduction of new policies for
loan classification; Modernization of the banking sector and introduction of updated accounting system; Revision of
the legal structure of financial sector; Development of capital market; Strengthening central bank’s supervision;
Improvement of overall management of the banking sectors with special emphasis on credit management; and
Computerization in the central bank and in the government owned commercial banks (Bahar, 2009:6).
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sector and the production of surplus value in the shipping economy. For economic growth to
continue apace in the shipping markets an equally transformative context developed the creation
of the high-yield bond market in the early 1990s. The high-yield bond market became a factor in
understanding the way in which Bangladesh was able to come online expanding on par with the
two other growing South Asian markets: India and Pakistan.

“High yield bond” market: filling the 1990s capital gap
The landscape of capital flows that had slowed tremendously during the 1980s and
deepened during the 1991 recession (as explained in Part II) had profound implications for the
shipping and shipbreaking markets. The economic challenges faced by the shipping sector between
1989-1992 became the foundation for developing radical changes in how the sector would come
to be financed by 1993. In 1991 actions taken by the then Chairman of the US Federal Reserve,
Alan Greenspan, were aimed at mitigating the recessionary status of the US economy, but the
outcomes had much broader implications for the global economy. Violating government
regulations, Greenspan relieved the banks from their responsibility to hold capital requirements on
their ‘risky’ long-term government bonds. When the bonds appreciated dramatically, the bank’s
balance sheets were restored and as Brenner notes, “the financial crisis emerged from its worst
crisis of the postwar epoch more than well placed to make the most of any break toward economic
growth” (2006: 278-279). Commercial bank’s return on equity and assets increased by 100 percent
between 1993-1994, compared to the three-year period between 1989-1991 (279). The global GDP
grew from 1.56 percent in 1993 and to 3.02 percent in 1994 (World Bank, 2019). Also, in 1994
world seaborne exports increased 9 percent while overall international trade increased from 2.2
percent to 3.0 percent between 1993 and 1994 (UNCTAD, 1994: x). In this new global economic
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context, two developments took place in the shipping sector: an increase of banking activity in
ship finance lending, and the explosion of new uses for a financial mechanism that was initiated
in other sectors during the late 1970s—the development of the high-yield bond market.
In 1992, when bank capital in shipping slowed, shipowners found alternatives to banks in
the private capital markets as private capital flowed into the sector in the form of high-yield bonds
(HYB). That same year, Sea Containers Ltd, a transport and container leasing company operating
out of Bermuda, opened the first HYB for the shipping sector in the amount of $125 million
(Grammenos and Papapostlou 2012: 417). A bond is a fixed income debt-instrument that exists
between an investor and borrower, basically a loan that is made to a borrower with a specified end
date (Investopedia, 2019a). The “high-yield” represents a bond with a lower credit rating. Since
HYB’s are rated below “investment grade” bonds by the main credit rating agencies, Standard &
Poor and Moody’s, they are “non-investment grade”, and the lowest rated ones are referred to as
“junk bonds” (Grammenos and Papapostlou 2012: 417).80 HYB have been used by start-ups and
capital-intensive companies to raise money for their operations since the late 1970s. 81 In the
context of the struggling shipping market of the early 1990s, HYB were seen as a fast way to raise
money, albeit a riskier one since the terms of these bonds have shorter maturity periods than
longer-term shipping mortgages. Thus, it was during the period of disciplined credit that the HYB
market emerged as a significant alternative for raising money in shipping. In 1993 shipping
companies raised $985 million dollars on the HYB market, and between 1993-1994 estimates were
between $2 and 3 billion (421; Newbold, 1994). The influx of private capital through the HYB
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Investment grade bonds are low risk bonds, examples are Treasury bonds or municipal bonds (Investopedia, 2019a).
In 1977 Lehman Brothers pioneered the HYB market when they underwrote four high-yield issues in the amount
of $178 million (Grammenos and Papapostlou 2012: 417; Geisst, 2013: 260).
81
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markets was reflected in the order books. In 1992 total orders for ships globally was 22 million
dwt, by 1993 orders almost doubled to 43 million dwt (UNCTAD, 1994: 42; UNCTAD, 1997: 36).
During the 1980s slump, when banks experienced extensive losses, it was estimated that
only 12 banks were involved with shipping finance. But by 1992, the number increased to 67, and
by 1993 it grew to 89. In 1994 there were 119 banks involved in this new investment landscape
(Porter, 1995). By the end of 1994 another shift took place, as noted above by Brenner,
underpinned by improvements in the banking sector’s balance sheets. The bank spreads were
dramatically narrowed at that time meaning the money made on interest payments was much
higher than what they had to pay in interest. The banks became flush with cash and this was the
moment the banks began to “take back” the ship finance market from the HYB market (Newbold,
1994). This shift is reflected in the dramatic decline of the HYB market in 1994 and 1995 (both
years raised $175 million as compared to the $985 million in 1993). The order books reflected
these improved market conditions, orders for new vessels remained high, undergirded by a
resurgence of interest in shipping by bank financiers. New vessel orders peaked in 1998 at 57.1
million dwt (UNCTAD, 1998: 36).
This new circulation of capital into shipping from the banking sector did not develop
quietly, and concerns emerged from the more established ship finance banks. The Executive Vice
President of Der Norske Bank noted in 1995 that “The [shipping] market again is
overbanked…Banks don’t know what to do with their available funds these days” (Porter, 1995).
The critiques were again aimed at the “inexperienced” investors. The managing director at
Deutsche Schiffspank remarked, that the shortage was not in ships, yards, or banks but in discipline
of the those providing ship mortgages (1995). Despite these worries, the shipping sector continued
to take advantage of the new capital flows throughout the 1990s, and with this context came the
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rise of the South Asian shipbreaking markets and the production of a new type, and exponentially
increasing scale, of devalued fixed capital. The scrapping data between 1993-1997 fluctuated
between 8.7 million dwt and 10.7 million dwt per year. Bangladesh was the third most used
shipbreaking market in 1993 and 1994, before becoming the second most important yard for the
global ship demolition market between 1995 and 1999. After the Asian Crisis in 1997 and another
period of bank discipline, the HYB market grew again to an astonishing $2.72 billion, while the
same year 13.4 million gt was devalued and absorbed by the breakers. The following year in 1999
global ship demolition data reached 18.1 million dwt (Lloyd’s Register, 2000).

Conclusion
This chapter presented a political-economic analysis of how scrapping ships became an
increasingly important strategy employed by shipowners to help resolve crises of overproduction
since the mid-1970s. The shipping economy that developed since the 1950s evolved from. Key
geopolitical moments are nodded to and introduced in order to help frame how they affected the
shipping sector and maritime economy more generally. New insights that emerged from this
analysis are significant in understanding the underlying logics of the economic development in the
shipping sector since that time. The first, discussed at length by Harvey (2010: 40-57), is the
necessity for capital to expand, the barriers it creates to its expansion, and the way in which capital
solves this dilemma. Harvey refers to this as the “capital surplus absorption problem” and it is an
inherent issue with the reproduction of capital on an expanding scale, and the turn towards
financialization in the early 1970s was one way around this problem (30; 2014). In this chapter I
extended Harvey’s insights to address how the shipping sector functioned as a sink to “mop up”
surplus capital, expanding tonnage capacity, and when an economic downturn occurred the
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subsequent production of, and expanding scale of, overproduction and devaluation of this capacity.
This grounded a second insight: the increasingly important role financialization played in the
expansion of shipping and shipbreaking markets since the mid-1970s. Initially this was represented
in the loosening up of the ways in which banks extended debt-financing options to shipowners,
but within a 20-year period, grew to include a variety of ways in which shipowners accessed capital
flows in order to remain competitive: asset-backed financing, private equity, high-yield bonds,
including also a movement for shipping companies to go public that took hold in the early 2000s.
Another insight alluded to in this chapter, but would need more empirical research to prove, is the
way in which the crisis of overaccumulation can be tracked through the movement of capital into
shipping sector through the expansion of order books during specific periods of time. This potential
“capital switch” begins to address Christophers’ call to empirically demonstrate the movement of
capital from one sector to another in order to avert crises, but in fact simply delays it (2011), while
shipbreaking markets have been developed by multi-scaled agents since the mid-1970s to alleviate
the effects of economic crisis in the shipping sector.
The geography and movement of shipbreaking traced in this chapter also introduces the
context of the shift from Taiwan to Bangladesh. This shift reflects the contradictory tendencies
inherent in the structure of capitalism (Smith, 1996:74). On one level it speaks to processes of
“equalization of conditions and levels of development” (74), understood through the
transformation of Taiwan’s docks from shipbreakers to containerized cargo. Taiwan came on-line
with other port cities and manufacturing centers. Also apparent is Bangladesh coming on-line as a
shipbreaking nation, transforming their coastal landscape from rural and forested to urban and
industrial. These processes, also discussed in Chapter One as a “necessary precondition” illustrate
the see-saw nature of capitalist development, where some places develop and expand at “the
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expense of others”, when processes of differentiation begin to run its course. Finally, this analysis,
and the claims presented in this chapter, could only have been arrived at by taking seriously the
ship, not as a form of waste, but as fixed capital.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Actors, Devices, and Spaces of the Global Demolition Market
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Introduction
March 21, 2013: Capital Link’s ‘Invest in International Shipping Forum’
The Metropolitan Club in midtown Manhattan is an Italian neo-Renaissance style building
built in 1893 to serve its club members and their guests. The iron-barred and gold-plated gates act
as a physical boundary separating the city’s public sidewalks from the private inner workings of
the exclusive club. Considered by its founding members as the “millionaires club,” this building
became one of many places leading financiers and bankers, politicians, and industrialists met in
the late 19th century. This club symbolically and materially represents a piece of American
imperialist history, while also pointing to the stakeholders that helped to launch another round of
global capitalist development into the early twentieth century. Today, the Metropolitan Club is
used as a conference space for corporate events. One of these events is the annual Invest in
International Shipping Forums (IIS Forum), a shipping conference sponsored by Capital Link.
Capital Link was founded in 1995 as an “investor relations, financial communications and advisory
firm with a strategic focus on the maritime, commodities and energy sectors, MLPs [Master
Limited Partnerships], as well as Closed-End Funds and ETFs [Exchange-Traded Funds]” (Capital
Link, 2019). Capital Link also organizes over a dozen conferences annually that focus on the
maritime sector. The types of knowledge that is presented and circulates at these types of maritime
industry conferences and how it changes during exceptional periods helps expand an
understanding of how the global demolition market is produced and how shipbreaking markets
become known to remote stakeholders who operate in the shipping sector.
On March 21, 2013 I attended the seventh installment of Capital Link’s IIS Forum at the
Metropolitan Club. It was a gathering of high-profile stakeholders from across different parts of
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the global shipping sector gathered to present and discuss their sectors’ economic health, risks,
and opportunities. I was prompted to attend this conference out of my desire to meet one of the
most important stakeholders in the global demolition market, the cash buyer.82 Global Marketing
Systems Inc. (GMS) was the cash buyer in attendance in 2013. The same year their website stated
that GMS was the world’s largest cash buyer of scrap ships, handling over 30% of the global
market. Meeting a GMS representative was my objective in attending this conference.
I took the train from my home in Brooklyn and walked over to the Club on Fifth Avenue.
The entrance was on 60th Street and was marked by a burgundy canopy that extended out hovering
over a part of the city’s public sidewalk. I walked through the iron gates and followed a crimson
carpeted path to a door on the left side of the interior courtyard. I entered and ascended a short
staircase that led me down a marble floored hallway into the Great Hall. The Capital Link checkin desk was located between the double-sided marble staircase. I checked in and was offered my
name tag and the event literature. The main panel discussions of the IIS Forum were held in the
West Lounge off of the Great Hall. When I arrived, the room was set up with long tables draped
in white table clothes, that
extended the width of the room,
minus space for a central aisle
and two narrow side aisles. At a
room capacity of 400, every seat
had been taken. The tables were
orientated towards the panelists’
Figure 10: Author in crowded IIS Forum 2013, at the Metropolitan Club,
Manhattan (Source: IIS Forum, 2013).
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A cash buyer is a company that specializes in the trading of scrap vessels.
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table, podium, and projector. As

host to the IIS Forum, the Metropolitan Club had been bringing together Wall Street financiers
with stakeholders of the global shipping sector since 2007. The IIS Forum made a space in
midtown Manhattan for shipping sector agents to discuss the economics as well as the risks and
opportunities that characterized the investment landscape of shipping in 2013 and beyond.
Capital Link launched their first installment of the IIS Forum at the Metropolitan Club in
2007.83 This was an important year for stakeholders. Two years earlier US shipping public equity
markets (IPOs) raised $3.35 billion, the highest ever in the shipping sector. This growth in ship
finance was driven by Chinese exports and “emerging developing economies” (Grammenos and
Papapostolou, 2012; UNCTAD, 2008). Almost 500 million dwt was on the order books, with
almost half of the orders placed for dry bulk carriers and surplus tonnage was at a 15-year low.
The period 204-2007 was characterized by a “shipping market boom”. In collaboration with the
NASDAQ and the NYSE, the IIS Forum was marketed to potential attendees as a space where
institutional and private investors, analysts, and bankers could connect to shipping agents in the
economically vibrant shipping market.
In 2008, the IIS Forum objectives were laid out more explicitly by its president, who noted
that shipping was still at the early stages of its full potential on Wall Street “represent[ing] a small
fraction of overall market capitalization”, while also noting that the sector was developing into a
mainstream investment option for investor portfolios (as noted in Chapter Two) (IIS Forum, 2008).
Despite acknowledging the short-term volatility and cyclicity of the market, financiers
increasingly viewed shipping as a vital business in the global economy and therefore an
increasingly viable market for long-term investments. In other words, the shipping sector was
being marketed as a sink to mop-up surplus capital with an eye on long-term returns, a kind of
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The same year they launched the Invest in International Shipping Forum in London. Both of the Forums were
positioned as a way to make shipping companies attractive for investors and equity markets.
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‘spatio-temporal’ fix. It was the objective of Capital Link and their sponsors to expand on the
relationships between global finance and shipping, a relationship that had entrenched shipping
stakeholders deeper into financial markets for the past four decades. Though 2005 marked a record
year for the issuance of shipping IPOs, the following two years were not minor: in 2006 over $1
billion was issued and $2 billion in 2007 (Grammenos and Papapostolou, 2012: 396). Also
revealing was the $3.4 billion raised in secondary offerings in 2007 (396).84 In efforts to circulate
finance capital into the fixed capital investments of various shipping sectors, the first IIS Forum
in March 2007 presented Wall Street financiers with a modest group of panel presentations that
introduced the four main shipping sectors: containers, dry bulk, tankers, and liquid and natural gas.
In 2007 the cash buyer was not present, nor was there any mention in the Forum’s literature of the
demolition market. Instead, the trade boom focused the discussion on ways to expand economic
growth in the shipping sector. However, 2007 also marked the beginning of the sub-prime
mortgage crisis, and in its wake, dramatically different conversations would soon take place at
shipping related conferences world-wide. The economic crisis would not leave any global market
immune from its affects.
One of the deepest contractions in global industrial production since the mid-twentieth
century followed the Lehman Brothers collapse in 2008. This presented financiers and investors
with an entirely different conversation at the 2008 IIS Forum. Invited speakers discussed the
effects of the crisis on each sector with specific attention on how each company was addressing
the “credit crunch” and the other ‘crisis’ conditions exacerbated by the euphoric and speculative
ordering of ships during the China boom years. Basically, shipping companies whose efforts in
2007 successfully sold the sector to Wall Street in 2008, presented their plans to “weather the
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A “secondary offering” is an additional offering of shares after an IPO.
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storm,” detailing how they planned to navigate in a new landscape of dramatic declines in demand,
falling freight rates, growing surpluses, as well as their growth strategies in light of profound
limitations placed on access to traditional forms of finance and money capital. For the first time,
the IIS Forum brought to the forefront discussions on the relationship between new deliveries and
demolition, specifically the role scrapping could play in helping the sector deal with their
unprecedented amount of devalued fixed capital and thus improve market conditions and usher in
a renewed fleet and a new round of accumulation. Each of the different shipping market sectors
presented strategies on how they planned to protect their positions and reduce their credit risks
with a sense of optimism. Newer investors were not familiar with the strategies shipowners
exploited since the mid 1970s to relieve some of the self-induced growing pains of accumulation
and devaluation. Scrapping, as it turned out, had not been on their radar and little was known of
this global market.
Depressed freight rates continued into 2010 and the scale of devaluation was reflected in
the high levels of scrapping and ship lay-ups. The 2010 IIS Forum welcomed, for the first time, a
cash buyer to discuss the lesser known global demolition market as an arena for investment. The
founder and CEO of GMS, Dr. Anil Sharma, used his 2010 presentation to discuss how much
value was embedded in the shipping sector’s idle vessels and to introduce “ship recycling” to a
crowded room. The title of Dr. Sharma’s presentation was “Ship Recycling: Residual Values”.
This Capital Link conference marked the first time a formal presentation was made to financiers
and investors by a cash buyer. With increasing amounts of tonnage scheduled for delivery through
2010 and into 2011, scrapping unproductive tonnage was becoming an increasingly vital strategy
for the shipping economy. In 2011, Dr. Sharma discussed the global “ship recycling” market,
GMS’s market position within it, the depressed market conditions, and suggested that GMS would
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help the sector establish “equilibrium” that benefits the economics of the shipping market overall
(Sharma, 2011). He encouraged investors to consider scrapping as a viable and profitable
opportunity and introduced the domestic shipbreaking markets and explained that access to capital
remained a consistent issue for shipbreakers and that the anticipated growth of the global scrap
market in 2011 was estimated to be $5 billion. He commented on the (in)visibility of the scrap
market in the eyes of investors and shipowners stating, “it [ship recycling] remains a hidden and
ignored pillar of the shipping sector” and argued that the scrap market is “recession proof” while
it also benefits the environment and crew safety (2011). Of course, Dr. Sharma’s presence
suggested that those attendees should use GMS as their cash buyer.
All in all—the restructuring of ship finance in the wake of the economic crisis, the declining
demands for goods and its implications for the freight market, in addition to new legal regimes
adopted for shipbreaking, the glut of global steel, and a growing journalistic and popular culture
awareness of the environmental and occupational issues related to shipbreaking in South Asia
played an increasingly significant role in determining how stakeholders acted in a transforming
sector and helped determine and shape their business strategies during the slump. It was with
awareness of this broader context in mind that Dr. Sharma’s presentation to the investors at the IIS
Forum 2012, “Ship Recycling: Headline Risk or Opportunity,” directly acknowledged the
spotlight NGO activists and investigative journalists placed on cash buyers. Dr. Sharma sought to
control the conversation related to the intensifying environmental and labor critiques and used his
presentation as a way to position GMS as a leader in the global demolition market pushing for a
“green ship recycling” agenda. His presentation aimed to discredit and quiet critiques of the
industry by offering an alternative view to investors and owners. Instead of the dire environmental
and labor conditions stakeholders had heard about, he focused on the progress and improvements
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made by shipbreaking yards. “Despite ongoing developments [at the shipbreaking yards] and
continued investment in facilities and training, media continues to emphasize outdated reports and
Images” (Sharma, 2012). Taking a proactive stance on leading a “green revolution” in ship
recycling, Dr. Sharma explained that GMS was the first and only cash buyer to receive ISO
9001:200685 and the first to develop a “Green Ship Recycling Plan” (GSRP) in coordination with
a classification society. He emphasized the economic viability of ship recycling to relieve the
economic woes of the sector and told stakeholders that ship recycling was beneficial for national
economies, referring to the $119 million in tax revenues raised in Bangladesh in 2012 (Sharma,
2012). Efforts were directed at positioning ship recycling as positive on climate change mitigation
and explained how it reduces the demand for extracted, processed, and transported iron ore, noting
a 70% reduction of waste (2012).86 He ended with a rhetorical question, “Where will the world’s
aging fleet go?” summing up the case for shipowners to use ship recycling as the most economical,
and socially and environmentally responsible way to solve the problem of overproduction,
promoting GMS as their only responsible option to do so. Quite a convincing case had one not
known of the environmental degradation and toxic and fatal conditions shipbreaking holds for
already poor laborers.
The year 2012 set a new record for scrapping, extending beyond the previous one set in
1985. At the time I attended the IIS Forum in 2013, Dr. Sharma was no longer the face for GMS,
instead his Special Projects Coordinator, Evan Sproviero offered to investors the presentation
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ISO 9001:2006 (now ISO 9001:2008) is a “Quality management systems” Standard. An organization needs to:
demonstrate its ability to consistently provide product that meets customer and applicable regulatory requirements”
and “enhance customer satisfaction through the effective application of the system, including processes for continual
improvement of the system and the assurance of conformity to customer and applicable regulatory requirements” in
order to buy the standard (ISO 2008, 2019).
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In his presentation, Sharma did not offer a process by which the percentage was arrived at. The full statement
from his presentation is “Scrap steel reduces related water pollution, air pollution, and mining wastes by about 70%”
(Sharma, 2012).
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“Ship Recycling in Today’s Market Conditions,” and for the first time GMS had aggregated data
on the economics of the global ship recycling market. Sproviero explained that in 2012, $5.1 billion
was circulated through the scrap market, of which the three main yards, India, Bangladesh and
Pakistan, handled $3.9 billion of the “hidden” value embedded in the total amount sold from
scrapping, 70% of the 56.5 million dwt (Sproviero, 2013). Sproviero reiterated what Dr. Sharma
shared with the Forum the previous year as he described the environmental benefits from
scrapping, but also noted that the “greatest hope for recovery, stability and financing [in the
shipping sector]” would come from ship recycling (2013). I sought out Sproviero and found him
talking to a group of investors in a room adjacent to the West Lounge. I introduced myself and my
research to him. He expressed interest in what I was doing and asked me to reach out to him, he
then offered me his business card. It was through Sproviero that I would gain access to Dr. Sharma
and GMS and these connections helped me link up with a global network of stakeholders, the
actors of the global demolition market and from these people I would learn about the devices they
used ,and spaces they used and made to make their market work. Each person I met with offered
me new information and insight into how this global market worked, what kinds of work it does,
and where it does it. It is to this geography of the shipbreaking market that we now turn.

From the Metropolitan Club in New York to Hotel Agrabad in Chittagong
The “exclusive agent”
GMS has exclusive agents in each ship breaking market. I met one when I travelled to
Chittagong in June 2014. We met at the Hotel Agrabad on the Sabder Ali Road for our first
meeting. The hotel is located near the river in Double Mooring Thana.87 Since the 1950s Agrabad
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Double Mooring had been incorporated into port modernization planning under British imperial interests in the
early 1900s. It became a thana of Chittagong City in 1950. Agrabad is a smaller section in Double Mooring and the
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was developed into a commercial and financial hub of Chittagong City hosting many international
financiers and business executives as well as government officials. Hotel Agrabad was built in
1969 and was one of the more established hotels. The agent explained to me on the phone prior to
the meeting that we would travel to his office together located a few minutes from the hotel. I
arrived at the hotel early and after clearing a security check located outside the door of the hotel’s
entrance, I was invited in by the doorman to the hotel lobby. The lobby interior boasted hardwood
walls with a geometrically designed marble floor, a chandelier was suspended from a circular
patterned ornamental ceiling that highlighted a vase of white roses placed on a round table below,
becoming the focal point of the space. Hanging on a wall behind the concierge desk was a series
of world clocks (Image 27). The times and locations of global cities were noted with the names of
corresponding city’s below—Dubai, Tokyo, Singapore, New York, London, and Dhaka—an
indication of the cities Chittagong orientates itself in relation to.
The agent met me in the lobby, and we headed to his office at the Six Star Building a few
minutes away. We exited his car onto a narrow and busy street filled with pedestrians, store front
shops, and street vendors. We walked into the building and up a dark set of cement stairs. The
agent took out his flashlight to illuminate the steps up to the second story. We arrived at a door
with a name of a shipping company noted above it and entered an office space with desks behind
low partitions. There were about a dozen or more men working, some were on phones and others
moving around. This was a place of business. The walls were beige, and the rooms dark because
of the local government cuts the electricity periodically during hot days. We entered into a smaller
office where an older man with reddish hair was sitting behind a large desk. He was on the phone

hotel is located a block from the Chittagong Port, the World Trade Center, and many of the foreign and domestic bank
headquarters.
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Image 24: World clocks: Dubai, Tokyo, Singapore, New York, London, Dhaka
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listing off a series of numbers. The man was the owner of the company and the exclusive
agent of GMS, the father of the younger man who met me at the hotel.
The father introduced himself and we talked for a few minutes about how I was introduced
to him and his son, then a worker entered the office and offered me a snack. I began with a short
introduction to my research interests and what I hoped to learn while in Chittagong—responding
immediately he asked if I had seen a beaching. “Today [a ship] was beached, and one comes in
tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, that will be on the 17th or 18th” (Exclusive Agent A, 2014,
personal communication). I asked, “I thought ships weren’t beached in Chittagong during
Monsoon season?” He responded, “No, no, it’s not like that…we don’t care…there are a lot of
yards, but all are not in similar condition, some yards are very pretty, very well maintained, some
sites are OK, they are cutting, they are making money, the vessel which was beached today was
fantastic.” He turned to his son and told him to take me to a yard. The father was interrupted with
a call and asked the person on the phone if “the vessel is arriving on the 14th?”
For the next couple of hours, we discussed the contemporary shipbreaking market in
Chittagong, its history, and their role in the business. “We are the exclusive agent for GMS, we
work for them, we do not work for anyone else” (Exclusive Agent B, 2014, personal
communication). GMS has established a global network of agents that provide services for the
global demolition market. Exclusive agents are those who work only for GMS and are located in
each of the largest shipbreaking markets, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and China (as of 2014). The
significance of the exclusive agents for GMS is based on their long-term relationships with the
local shipping industry. Having a local agent with a long-standing relationship with shipbreakers
is essential. The exclusive agent relays information to the shipbreakers about the market, this could
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include supply and types of ships, the global rates for “pig iron”88 and how these markets influence
global scrap prices. Their role is essential for the cash buyer under the contemporary market
conditions, acting as the middlemen between the cash buyer and the shipbreaker and handle all the
formal negotiations between the two parties. The success of the cash buyer in each domestic market
is in part dependent on these exclusive agents and the relationship they maintain with the
shipbreakers. As the agent explained, “We are in a good relationship with many of the breakers.
We know all the breakers, who is active who is not. We exchange information, they make an offer
and if the price is good, we sell” (Exclusive Agent A, 2014, personal communication). The
knowledge of the local scrap, steel, and foreign currency markets, as well as national and local
environmental and import regulations, provides a valuable service to the shipbreakers who know
the ins and outs of how to cut up the ship and how to make money from the materials, but have
come to rely on the specialized knowledge collected and shared by the exclusive agent with the
breakers to assist their own commercial activities.
The involvement of this exclusive agent extended back to the 1980s when the father
worked for shipping companies as a young man. He was able to parlay his shipping and trade
knowledge into a new establishment: in 1990 he started his own company focusing on
shipbreaking. The office we met in was the original location. He explained that many relationships
established with shipbreakers go back to that time. In the contemporary market these personal
relationships are crucial since many of the shipbreakers are older and do not use email for business,
they rely on verbal agreements made with the local agent. This makes trust one of the key
ingredients in their commercial dealings with the agent. As we were talking a call came in and
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Pig iron is crude iron. It is a product of the “blast furnace.” Once refined, it can be made into steel. It is also known
wrought iron or ingot iron.
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interrupted our conversation. When the agent got off the phone, he explained that they just sold a
ship. The next steps of this process will require the buyer to come to the office in Agrabad to sign
the MOA.89 The breakers will visit the agent’s Agrabad office to retrieve information on available
scrap ships, negotiate offers in person, and sign paperwork associated with the closing of a deal.
In relation to the exchange of money, Bangladesh’s central bank regulates the foreign
currency that flows through the economy and since all ships are bought and sold in US dollars, the
payment must be made through domestic banks. There is no money exchanged between the
exclusive agent and the cash buyer, the shipbreaker pays the global cash buyer through a bank
issued LC. The seller’s bank (cash buyer, cash buyer as shipowner, or shipowner) is paid by the
buyer’s bank (shipbreaker’s domestic bank) and the exclusive agent receives their commission
from the cash buyer via their banks. The rate the agent receives is a previously negotiated flat rate
that does not change.
We also discussed a typical day for the exclusive agent they smiled and explained that they
sometimes “we get an email at 7:00 in the morning, right when you wake up, check emails and
I’m like, ok I have to send this and this, even before I freshen up. I smile and say that is our day”
(Exclusive Agent B, 2014, personal communication). When they are in the midst of making a deal
with a US based trader it means the night’s sleep is gone due to the time zone issues. When a vessel
becomes available the global cash buyer will confirm with the seller, and then connect with their
exclusive agents in each domestic market to identify a potential buyer. The local agents contact
the shipbreakers who they know are in the market for the type and size of ship that is available.90
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A memorandum of agreement also known as a memorandum of understanding (MOU) is a nonbinding agreement
between two or more parties outlining the terms and details of an understanding, including each party's requirements
and responsibilities. An MOU is often the first stage in the formation of a formal contract (Investopedia, 2019b).
90
Bangladesh based shipbreakers have shown preference over the decades for oil tankers and bulk carriers since more
steel plates are extractable based on their design. That said when I visited the yards, I also saw small military vessels,
a couple of small ferry’s and container vessels. Even though there is a preference (as with any industry) the financials
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They share the details of the vessel including the type, size, price, and whether there are any
unexpected objects or substances of economic value on board the vessel. This could mean a room
full of boxes of alcohol that the shipbreaker could sell to a hotel or restaurant, or it could mean
remaining bunkers (fuel and oil) could be sold to local shipowners. At this point, the exclusive
agent may discuss with the shipbreaker market trends and if they think whether waiting a week
would be beneficial or not. But as was made clear in our conversation, the exclusive agent acts in
the best interest of the cash buyer first, not the shipbreaker. If the vessel is of interest to the
shipbreaker, the negotiations proceed through the exclusive agent. The seller (cash buyer or
shipowner via a broker or cash buyer) and the buyer (shipbreaker via the exclusive agent) need to
come to an agreement on the price of the vessel; if that does not happen the global cash buyer may
turn to their other exclusive agents located in different domestic markets. Competition becomes
apparent not only between the shipbreakers in each market but between each domestic market.
Thus, the relationships established between the exclusive agent and the breakers place the
exclusive agents in competition as well, a multi-scaled global network of competition characterizes
the scale of scrapping at each domestic market.
In this tripartite relationship, between the cash buyer, the exclusive agent and shipbreaker,
risk is embedded in the market relations they operate in. The exclusive agent walks a thin line,
their market position and company success is reliant upon the economy and decisions of the local
shipbreakers, whose own position as competitive scrap ship buyers is dependent on the condition
of the local steel market as well as the global cash buyer, who offers the ships to the local market.
The agents depend on the success of the shipbreakers and the productivity of their yard technology
(living and dead labor, management and facilities) to scrap, recycle, and resell the material at a

of companies are not all of equal standing and smaller breakers will have a reduced ability to compete for the optimal
vessels.
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profitable rate, and that in turn helps build trust. The exclusive agent is dependent on the global
cash buyer’s profitability and market position, and that is dependent on maintaining relationships
with ship brokers and shipowners operating across scales. On the one hand, this interdependence
makes the exclusive agent a key hinge to the functioning of the global demolition market and
global shipping economy more generally, while on the other hand, the interconnections reveal the
vulnerability of the exclusive agent within each domestic market and in relation to each other.
Since the global cash buyer has access to their exclusive agents in other markets, there is no
commitment to any one market in particular—the relationship between the cash buyer and the
exclusive agent is secured and defined through an intersection of risk, trust, and competition.
There is another factor to consider in relation to competition and risk. As long as there is
more than one domestic shipbreaking market, the global cash buyer has the power to choose who
they sell to. As a Singapore based sales and purchase trader (S&P trader) shared, GMS controls
60% of the market in Bangladesh, “we have the muscle, if they [shipbreakers] start trying to mess
with us we will say, well then you are not getting any more ships so behave yourself (Sales and
Purchase Agent 2, 2014, personal communication). More recently some shipowners are making
requests to sell their ship to a particular type of yard, one that has shown more commitment to
“greener” shipbreaking.91 Conversations such as these gave me an awareness of how crucial the
cash buyer is in helping to decide the direction of the shipbreaking market, like the shipping agents
and, tea planters, and political actors of the imperial period in Chittagong, these shipping agents,
along with the flows of global capital, help influence the geography of the shipbreaking markets.
In regard to the historical questions I had for the exclusive agent, he suggested I should
speak with one of his closest friends, Captain Anam Chowdhury. The son of the exclusive agent
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The larger shipowners, like Hapag-Lloyd and Maersk & AP Moller, are beginning to their ships be broken up at
yards that are considered “green”- meaning compliant, or close to being compliant, with the Convention.
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explained how well the Captain and his father knew each other and said he would arrange for me
to meet with the Captain during my visit to Chittagong.

The beaching captain and the ship recycler
The exclusives agent’s employee would take me to meet Captain Anam. We met at the
Hotel Agrabad and had to wait for a bit in the Hotels café. The captain was late arriving from an
early morning job where he had to travel to a ship anchored in the Chittagong’s outer port. While
we waited, I had a chance to talk to the employee about his role for the exclusive agent. He
explained that he occasionally traveled out to sea to meet the ships being prepared for beaching,
at which time his job was to help examine the condition of the vessel. He told me that the water in
the Bay of Bengal is usually very rough and bumpy and that he got sick many times. When they
arrive to the boat, they climb up a rope ladder on the side of the vessel to get to the ship’s deck
(Image 28). This is a hazardous part of the process. If you lose your balance and fall, you lose your
life: the work itself is dangerous and for that reason he does not like to do it.
When the text came in that Capitan Anam was ready to meet, the employee explained we
had to travel to a temporary location. We traveled in a CNG to a building under construction. We
maneuvered over and around piles of rebars, plastic tubing and scattered bricks before arriving to
an open area on the ground floor of the building, completely accessible, though dark. We walked
through the construction materials to a concrete staircase without railings, the open sides made me
feel very unstable as we walked up to the 3rd floor. We entered into a large office space, the
electricity was out making it all seem very dark and there were only a few windows letting in
natural light.
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Image 25: View of laborers climbing rope ladder to access ship deck
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Like the exclusive agent’s office there were men hustling around, while some paused to
look at me as I was being escorted to an office off of the main area. Someone asked how I was, I
responded, “ami bahlo achi” (how are you?). The employee took me to an office where I
immediately recognized Captain Anam, he looked just like his profile photo posted on his
company’s website. He had a henna dyed beard, fair skin, and a baseball cap on. He was sitting
next to another man that I also recognized from the website as one of his colleagues. They were
sitting in front of a larger desk and behind the desk was a bald middle-aged man that turned out to
be the owner of the company whose office we were in, Master Abul Kashem of MAK Corporation.
MAK Corporation is a diversified company that includes a shipbreaking operation as well as a
rerolling mill and a bank. He asked me my name and then said, “please sit down.” Captain Anam
referenced other researchers whom he had met with over the years that came from different
universities from around the world. He mentioned people from Leeds, Tokyo, and Norway. He
described one of the researcher’s work, “it focused on the material flow management of the
shipbreaking industry. His subject was on the economic side of the industry, why shipbreaking
should exist, why it should take place, and what is its viability. The present situation is viable but
if you put in other investments it will not be economically viable” (Chowdhury, 2014, personal
communication). In saying this, I had a suspicion that Captain Anam was referring to pressure
coming from international organizations pushing for a set of directives (as outlined in the
Convention and EU SRR), that would make improvements to the shipbreaking yards and industry
with the objective of improving conditions for laborers and the environment (introduced in next
chapter ). These directives, would ensure that shipbreakers would be “compliant”, making them
legal operations in the eyes of international and European Commission law when the Government
of Bangladesh ratifies the Convention and it comes into effect. He referenced the argument
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proposed by the NGO Shipbreaking Platform and other activists and environmental groups who
oppose the method of ‘beaching.’ Captain Anam dismissed their opposition based on two main
conditions. First, the capital needed to build dry-docks would be so great it would destroy
shipbreaking and the local secondary economies that have developed from it. His opinion was that
this shift would require ship recyclers to incur substantial debt and affect their ability to remain
competitive in the global demolition market. The second reason was related to the geomorphology
of the area, he explained that building dry docks is not practical because of the silted intertidal
zone; the sea floor is constantly shifting making it difficult to construct permanent structures. This
was a good example of the posturing of actors in the shipbreaking market to either defend, explain,
or take a position on why or why not to make yard improvements were possible. I learned to
navigate around these sensitivities in order to have a different conversation about shipbreaking,
where my interest was in understanding the history of the industry and the markets, spaces, and
people it intersects with. The historical questions I had prepared for Captain Anam offered a chance
to deflect defensive explanations and instead get at the reasons why shipbreaking was in
Chittagong to begin with.
In the first few minutes of being introduced to Captain Anam, one of Master Kashem’s
assistants brought us a plate of food, some wrapped sandwiches on white bread, stuffed meat
pastries with chicken, and some water. All the people in the room took one of the snacks and when
it was offered to me, I cautiously choose the meat pie that looked like an empanada. As I ate it
Captain Anam talked about his day. “We started at 6:00am in the morning, we went out to the sea,
to outer port and came back right now…it is monsoon season right now, so the waters are very
bumpy”. He pulled out his iPad and showed me shipbreaking statistics and eventually he navigated
to his company’s website MITI Enterprise. I explained to him that my research in Chittagong hit
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a road bump due to the early monsoon flooding that affected the area I was staying in particularly
hard and kept me house-bound for four days as the waters flooded our street, at times up to waist
height, which did not bode well for my shin-high galoshes. Captain Anam explained that
Chandgaon is a very low-lying area, and suggested the floods were saying “Welcome to
Bangladesh”. We both laughed. Master Kashem interjected, “people in Chittagong also stay inside
the house when the streets are flooded.” This is of course mostly true for those who do not for rely
on selling chicken, eggs or vegetables to residences in the Chandgaon area and other areas in order
to help meet their own daily needs for survival.
After Captain Anam finished sea training at the Bangladesh Maritime Academy between
1975-1977, Captain Anam became a seaman for 15 years. He sailed along the east coast of the
United States for 18 months between 1977-1979, and later became a Captain for his last six years
on the sea before joining the maritime sector onshore in 1991. With the extensive knowledge he
acquired about ships and the maritime industry he acted as an advisor to the Bangladesh Ship
Breakers Association (BSBA)92 in 1993 and became their master beaching captain.93 He beached
ships for ten years before parlaying his expertise in MITI Enterprise, a company he founded in
2004. MITI is a shipping agency that under Captain Anam has become a leading consultant on the
improvement of safety and environmental conditions related to breaking ships. In 2014, MITI
Enterprise was named the safety agency for Ship Breaking and Recycling by the Ministry of
Industry. They also act as consultants to individual shipbreaking yards who are interested in
developing practices and facilities that are compliant with the Convention and ISO 30000:2009.94
92

The Bangladesh Ship Breakers Association (BSBA) is an organization comprised of shipbreakers in Bangladesh.
Their organizational mission is to “safeguards the rights of its members and [it] ensures and environment friendly ship
recycling activities helps the industry to grow, develop and make Bangladesh as number one ship recycling nation in
the world” (BSBA, 2019).
93
A master beaching captain is an expert at grounding (or beaching) a ship into an inter-tidal zone. It is akin to a
maritime pilot, someone who is able maneuver to a ship through particular waterways.
94
ISO 30000:2009 is specific to management systems for safe and environmentally sound ship recycling facilities.
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Captain Anam had bigger plans, when I met with him at his Lokman office in Agrabad later in
2016, his team was in the process of developing a ship recycling plan for the Government of
Bangladesh to be implemented in all the shipbreaking yards.
In the 2014 meeting, Master Kashem had pointed to Captain Anam and exclaimed, “he
knows everything about shipbreaking!” with a smile. This echoed what the local agent said about
the captain. The captain nodded and explained that local agents of global cash buyers have an
interest in maintaining a good standing with him; without his experience they would not be able
to complete the delivery of the vessel to the shipbreaker and therefore would not get paid. The role
of the beaching captain is an important position within the shipbreaking market. The beaching
captain is hired for their expertise related to ships and ship operations by the buyer or buyer’s
representatives and is paid a percentage of the sale for his services. In the case of Captain Anam,
his commission is paid for by the shipbreaker yard owner) and is based on the size of the vessel he
beached (Sekander, 2016, personal communication).
In 2016 Captain Anam invited me to watch him beach a vessel. One of the exclusive agent’s
employees picked me up from my hotel to travel to the shipbreaking yard. When I arrived at the
yard, we parked behind a large white multifloored building. I later learned that it was the yard’s
newly constructed office building, built within the last two years. I was taken up to a balcony on
the second floor that overlooked the entire shipbreaking yard. There I met the owner’s brother. He
told me their father is Master Abul Kashem (the same Master Kashem whom I met in 2014) and
said their beaching captain is Captain Anam. The beach was very wet and muddy from the
rainstorm that had passed earlier in the day. From the balcony we discussed many things as we
awaited the arrival of the new investment. The brother said, “it is a good day for beaching because
the waters are calm”. The vessel being beached by Captain Anam was purchased from a new
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principle in India who sold the 18,000 ldt vessel for $250/ldt ($4.5 million). There was already one
vessel being broken up in the yard that had been beached ten days earlier. In the distance another
vessel was visible, but I was told it was in another yard. The yard we overlooked was demarcated
by a cement wall on the north and south boundary. I asked the brother about the role of the beaching
captain, “it is his job to position the vessel between two flags” (Image 29). The flags were
strategically placed in the water and marked a narrow section in the intertidal zone, like a parking
space for the ship. The deepest point in that area is three to four meters. At the time of our chatting,
Captain Anam was already on the ship and was in the process of piloting it directly towards us into
the area of this zone. Captain Anam had boarded the vessel about 20 km offshore to prepare it for
the 2:00 pm beaching. As the vessel was being steered towards the shore, and the yard workers
continued their work, all of us in the office awaited the grand arrival.
It was a cloudy day as we waited for the vessel to appear on the horizon. After 30 minutes
one of the guys commented that he could see the ship. I looked to the horizon and said, “I can see
it too!” It appeared to move gracefully towards us on the beach. As we waited for the vessel’s hull
to slam into the tidal zone and for Captain Anam to power down the engines, there were a few
people visible walking across the yard towards the waterline, one of the men held a baby in his
arms. It turned out to be the brother who owned the yard and his baby son. He timed the beaching
perfectly. Looking out at the horizon line we saw the vessel, the closer it came the clearer it
became. The yard owner paused as the workers came to a standstill and as they all watched the
ship as it was gracefully beached. Once it was over, the workers began to move again. I turned to
Mamun and said how surprised I was at the softness of the beaching, “Was that it? What happens
now?” The brother explained that “the Captain will lower the anchor of the ship and in 10-15
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Image 26: Parking space for beached vessel marked by orange flag
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Image 27: After the beaching of Radiant, Evergreen owned container ship
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minutes he will climb down the ladder onto a small boat that will then bring him to shore”
(Image 30).
About ten minutes went by before we saw Captain Anam making his way through the
debris of the yard and over the muddied areas with a young man walking behind him. He was
coming to the yard offices. Captain Anam showed up on the balcony where I proceeded to tell him
how interesting the beaching was. He introduced me to the younger man who was with him who
turned out to be his nephew who just finished the maritime academy and was now being trained in
the ways of beaching a vessel. We all sat down on the balcony together overlooking the yard and
talked for a few minutes about the process, details of the vessel just beached, and what will happen
next. “The vessel looked like it was moving so slowly” I said. He explained to me that, “the faster
you move the more it sinks down you have to go 3.5 to 4 knots with these ships, you cannot go at
full speed”. I thought about the many times I read in the literature on shipbreaking about the speed
at which ships were beached “at full propulsion”. The information Captain Anam shared
contradicted these sources. He did add that the larger the vessel, the more speed is necessary in
order to beach it as high as possible in the intertidal zone. Captain An turned to me and his nephew
and said, “come on let’s grab something to eat.” My time with the exclusive agent and Captain
Anam reinforced the importance of talking directly with the agents of global demolition market in
order to learn how it operates in real-time.

The cash buyer
The cash buyer, a company that specializes in the trading of scrap vessels, emerged in the
late-1970s during a period of unprecedented losses for shipping companies and their stakeholders.
Many ship owning companies were forced to liquidate their assets in order to pay down debts or
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to avoid bankruptcies, mergers, and takeovers (see Chapter Two). The maritime economist and
Clarkson’s analyst Martin Stopford notes that in recessionary periods the freight market tries to
force out surplus capacity by permanently removing tonnage through scrapping. The challenge for
a shipowner is to stay in control of their balance sheets so that losses accrued during a recession
do not force the company out of business. Afterall it is the “financial performance [that] sorts out
the winners from the losers” (Stopford, 2009: 263). Performance here, in part, refers to a
company’s cash flow (the difference between costs and revenue) and the decision-making
processes a shipowner makes during depressed conditions. Buying, selling, and keeping vessels
are integral to the healthy performance of ship owning companies. When the sector is in a
recessionary position and a shipping company has no cash reserves, they are considered weak
(263). For the companies who are not in weak positions, or with the threat of bankruptcy, even
though they may have experienced economic losses as a result of the depressed trade economy,
building and maintaining cash reserves—to balance their internal losses—became a primary
concern, especially in light of not knowing when the market will begin to show improvement. One
of the ways in which a shipowner may be able to improve their cash reserves and market position
is to sell their unproductive vessels. Understanding how much this will help the position of the
ship owning company is dependent on the value of these assets, which is determined by a valuation
process responsive to current market conditions.
Market valuation is the process of estimating the market value of a ship at a particular point
in time. It is typically requested by a shipowner, banker or investor from a S&P trader broker. The
S&P trader has access to extensive databases that enables them to conduct ‘comps’ (comparisons)
with similar ships that sold recently or are currently on the market. The broker can determine the
market value within a few hours and provide a valuation certificate to the stakeholder who
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requested it (Stopford, 2009:263). There is a second kind of valuation process that is of concern
here, that is the demolition value, also referred to as the scrap or recycling value of a ship. This is
a valuation process applied to ships that are, under general conditions (i.e., not in shipping crisis),
over a certain age. It reveals the gap between the market value and scrap value. This gap intersects
with the current freight market and operating costs and helps to inform the shipowner on whether
or not to sell the vessel for scrap.
When the ship owning company makes a decision to sell a vessel for scrap, receiving
payment from the buyer needs to be frictionless. This is where the cash buyer intervenes, satisfying
the intermediary position. Chapter Two discussed Taiwan’s shipbreaking market between 19681988. Taiwanese shipbreakers used banks that issued “confirmed irrevocable letters of credit”
(CILC) to finance the purchase of their scrap ships. The CILC helped them maintain their leading
global market position, in part because the emerging shipbreaking markets did not use CILC.
Instead the domestic banks in the scrap markets of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh issued
“revocable LC”. As previously discussed, this is an LC that can be cancelled at any time. These
new markets also issued an “usance LC,” which releases the funds in a deferred manner.
Shipowners found these LC to be onerous and risky for two reasons. First, it was not uncommon
for the vessel to arrive to the domestic market and have the shipbreaker “revoke” the terms of the
sale in the last minute. The second issue was that the usance LC was opened by the domestic bank
based on a period of 90 to 180 days, meaning that the funds are not released from the buyer’s bank
to the seller’s bank immediately, and there may be a considerable delay of payment. This would
have been far from ideal for shipowners needing to raise their cash flow and reserves quickly. A
US based ship broker who started working in the 1970s, explained to me in a meeting that his US
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based clients were satisfied to work with CILC because it could not be cancelled, and receipt of
payment took place immediately (Chance, 2014, personal communication).
When the Taiwanese government phased out their shipbreaking industry, the only viable
option to absorb the devalued vessels was provided by the South Asian shipbreaking markets. This
was the same period the cash buyer became a very important conduit, as they emerged as a critical
link for the shipowner and the shipping markets95 during the period of the mid- to late-1980s. The
agent who navigated between the shipowner and shipbreaker, by offering cash to the shipowner
and accepting the usance LC from the shipbreaker’s bank, was called a ‘cash buyer’. The cash
buyer absorbed the risk the shipowners wanted to avoid, especially in the context of a deepening
and increasingly larger scaled shipping crises after the 1970s. This allocation of economic risk
became even more attractive into the 1980s. As the shipping sector became further indebted, the
significance of the cash buyer increased. For a price this agent absorbed the transfer of risk
embedded in the sale of the scrap ship to the shipbreaker. With the closure of Taiwan, and the
search by shipowner associations for a new market, the cash buyer (as a global agent) helped to
make the South Asian shipbreaking yards more attractive for shipowners and helped shift the
direction of scrap ships based on their willingness to sell a risk.
One of the first and most prominent cash buyers was a German company called Eckhardt
Marine, headquartered in Hamburg. They had been active from the mid-1970s until 2011 when
they were deemed insolvent (Garfield, 2011). Eckhardt had established relationships with end
users (another name for a shipbreaker) in Spain and the former Yugoslavia and handled the
majority of scrap ships sold to these yards. Though not nearly as big as Taiwan, Spain had a
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There are four markets defined by my maritime economist Martin Stopford that a shipowner’s trades in. They consist
of the newbuilding market where new ships are ordered; the freight market where ships are chartered; the sales and
purchase market where shipowners sell their second-hand ships; and the demolition market where an owner can sell
their ship for scrap (2009:177).
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thriving scrap market between 1971-1979, second only to Taiwan. Like the Taiwanese, the Spanish
banks working with the demolition market also issued CILCs and this reduced the need for cash
buyers. Along with Eckhardt, there were cash buying operations at Samsung and Mitsubishi. The
Japanese ship brokerage houses had positions as cash buyers and set up offices in Taiwan (Chance,
2014, personal communication). Wirana was another cash buyer founded in Singapore in 1983.
Wirana is one of the oldest cash buyers still operating today and competes with GMS in the Indian
shipbreaking market. However, across the industry, it is acknowledged that GMS “revolutionized”
cash buying operations since the early 1990s, and because of this they have come to control a large
percentage of the global scrap market. GMS maintains that this success is steeped in a commitment
to transparency, trust, and credibility, as will be touched upon in the next section.

Global Marketing Systems Inc. (GMS)
“Every cash buyer is the same until the market drops”, read a GMS advertisement in their
Dubai office. In 2009 the market dropped after the global economic crisis, and the ships sold for
scrap sored from 8.3 million gt in 2008 to 25 million gt in 2009. In the years since, the ship
scrapping data dropped below 20 million gt briefly in 2010 to 18.67 mil gt. In 2012 all previous
records were broken when UNCTAD and IHS recorded 36.82 mil gt had been sold for scrap
(UNCTAD, 2013: xi-xii; 36).96 Overnight, global demolition market agents became significant to
shipowners and investors alike and the inclusion of cash buyers at industry led conferences
worldwide (that typically had been reserved for shipping investors and shipowners) reflected this
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UNCTAD mentions a few intersecting factors related to this spike in scrapping in 2012. The first is the shipbuilding
cycle, the period between 2001- 2012 was the largest cycle for new tonnage ever recorded more than doubling the
global tonnage, and 2012 was the last year ships were being delivered that had been ordered during the boom years.
The shipping sector was continued to feel the effects from the 2007/2008 economic crisis on demand, finance and
trade (2013: xii).
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change. A Dubai based S&P brokers for GMS explained that when GMS was founded the cash
buying industry was “shady”, nobody wanted to be involved with demolition in the 1990s because
of all the last-minute attempts at negotiations under revocable LC. In the post-crisis context, he
explained, these dealings were still going on, two out of four demolition deals not done by GMS
were renegotiated at the time of delivery between 2012-2013 (Sales and Purchase Agent 1, 2014,
personal communication). The trader leaned back and casually said, “S&P brokers and traders who
specialized in demolition vessels were the underdogs, the scumbags of the [shipping market]”.
This changed with the arrival of Dr. Sharma’s GMS. As Dr. Sharma explained to me in a meeting
in 2016, “the supply of scrap ships was there but the market did not have developed structures, the
yards, the brokers, the cash”, in other words the infrastructure to handle the new scale of scrap
ships that the shipping markets were producing (Sharma, 2016, personal communication).
Dr. Sharma was born in Gujarat to a family from northern India. He grew up near where
shipbreaking in India is located today. He moved to the United States in the mid-1980s to pursue
graduate work and eventually became a business professor at Western Maryland University. He
recalled a story when he worked as a professor in the early 1990s. He visited his home in Gujarat
where his brother and other close friends were tied to the shipbreaking business. His brother
learned that the United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) was placing their US Naval
ships up for auction to reduce the size of its fleet in light of the end of the Cold War (Sharma,
2016, personal communication; Hess et al., 2001: 27). Sharma’s brother, the owner of an
established shipbreaking yard in Alang, asked him to go to the auction and bid on the ships. Dr.
Sharma explained he had no idea how to do this nor did he have the money to do it, but he managed
to secure financial backing from an Indian business associate in London at 5% interest on the loan,
and in 1992 he bid and won the purchase of six of the eight MARAD vessels. In 1993, GMS Inc.
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was born. As Laursen noted in an interview with Dr. Sharma, GMS became one of the biggest
buyers of MARAD vessels in the 1990s (2016).
GMS was not dealing in the Bangladesh market in the 1990s, as the company mostly
worked through Dr. Sharma’s personal contacts in India. In the early 1990s, Dr. Sharma started to
receive phone calls from other countries. In 1993 the Russian embassy in Washington, DC asked
him if he wanted to purchase their wartime vessels. He hired a retired admiral to help GMS
negotiate offers for the Russian war ships. GMS became the largest buyer of Russian Navy ships
(Sharma, 2016, personal communication). From this Cold War context emerged one of the most
important cash buyers of scrap ships today. By 1999 the Cold War vessels market had dried up,
but by this time, GMS had firmly established their reputation as cash buyers in the global
demolition market and many recognized Dr. Sharma as building this market position based on
GMS’s transparency in what had been a very “shady” and unstable marketplace. Because of this,
shipowners and brokers supplied GMS with a steady flow of ships (Shuker, 2001). By the early
2000s GMS was selling ships across the main domestic shipbreaking markets: India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and China. It is this very success, of moving scrap ships to shipbreaking markets, that
directly implicates the company (whether they like it or not) as prominent actors in the production
of environmental degradation and hazardous and dangerous working conditions for the poorest
global laborers.
Behind every cash buyer is a whole team who makes the cash buying market happen. Over
the years Dr. Sharma has created a global team of employees who handle all aspects of the
demolition business, including S&P trader agents, financial and insurance specialists, operations
managers, green ship recycling experts, and environmental engineers. This global team has grown
alongside the expansion of global overcapacity of tonnage and new ways of using the global
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shipping infrastructure and maritime logistics. GMS currently operates out of offices in historically
significant cities for the maritime and financial sectors while Dr. Sharma’s first office opened in
1998 in Cumberland, Maryland, was near his home and the university where he had his day job.
Since then he expanded the reach of GMS to serve their developing and growing client base. At
the time of the global economic crisis of 2007-2008, GMS moved its headquarters to Dubai (2008).
GMS then established offices in Shanghai (2010), Tokyo (2012), Singapore (2013), and Hamburg
(2014). GMS also opened an office in a WeWork space in Seoul, South Korea and maintains an
office south of Piraeus in Voula, Greece (2016). In addition to offices located in these nine
locations, GMS also has exclusive representation in the world’s largest recycling markets:
Chittagong, Bangladesh; Alang, India; Gadani, Pakistan; Ismir, Turkey; and Shanghai, China.
The global reach of their offices is impressive but equally impressive are the processes that
make their operations possible, the global network of maritime logistics agents that negotiate the
complex legal and financial arrangements that facilitate the movement of scrap vessels to their
final destinations. This process and infrastructure will frame the remainder of this chapter. The
information included here is generalized in an effort to illustrate the typical role played by largescale cash buyers active in the global demolition market. The agents introduced in this section
include: the S&P trader, insurance agent, operations manager, and financial officer. Other agents
whom I spoke with during fieldwork will be incorporated to develop a fuller story of the how it
works, where it works and who and what make it work. The spatiality of this market is constantly
evolving and set in motion by the agents who help to produce it. These agents operate remotely,
and their actions are not immediately visible or apparent. The market agents’ actions are contingent
on other complex dynamics at work, some of which was mentioned above in relation to the
intersection of different commodity markets—and it was a challenge to research. The next section
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introduces the S&P trader and the negotiation process they engage in that positions the cash buyer
as a transitional shipowner. It reviews the steps, agents, mechanisms, and places involved when a
cash buyer takes over (becomes the owner of) a vessel in Singapore OPL in an “as-is, where-is”
deal, which has become a common practice since the 2009 shipping crisis.

The S&P trader
The Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (DMCC) is a 200-hectare area designated along the
Sheik Zayad Road in Dubai. The physical location of this area was called the Jumeriah Lakes
Towers (JLT) in 2002. JLT is a large-scale development, a “smart city” whose success is founded
in its status as the world’s top “Global Free Zone”97 a title it has maintained since 2015 (fDi
Intelligence, 2018). The DMCC was established in 2002 by the Government of Dubai to create the
physical, market, and financial infrastructure that would enhance commodity trade flows and offer
to companies around the world leading financial services and a place for commerce. The JLT
comprises of 26 clusters, each one
made up of three buildings or
towers. The clusters are grouped
around three manmade lakes and
one larger green area. The first
towers in the JLT development
were completed in 2006, and
Figure 11: Saba 1 Tower in Jumeriah Lake Tower at DMCC (Source:
Photo by the Author).
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The OECD Observer separates free zones into four general categories: free trade zones, export processing zones,
special economic zones, or industrial zones while the DMCC is one of the most well-known free zone it was set up to
attract a variety of financial, commercial and industrial economic activities through economic incentives. Some of
these incentives include reduced administrative paperwork; no limits on foreign ownership and a reduction in labor
regulation (OECD Observer, 2009).
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15,000 businesses now occupy 68 towers spread over a 200-hectare mixed-use landscape
demarcated by its “Free Zone” status and its proximity within seven hours to five billion people.
The JLT is also marketed by the DMCC for its sense of “community” where over 100,000 people
“live, work and thrive” (DMCC, 2019). JLT residents and others can engage in a range of activities
that include sporting events, kids’ football leagues, outdoor art galleries and even flea markets, to
list a few of the highlighted activities from the DMCC website.98 With the DMCC as the backdrop,
it was not surprising when, in 2008, GMS moved their headquarters from Cumberland, Maryland
to Saba 1 Tower in JLT, Dubai, UAE (Tradewinds, 2008). By the time I had my first meeting with
a GMS agent they had already been operating out of their Dubai headquarters for six years.
I arrived in Dubai after my travels in Chittagong where I had learned a considerable amount
about the domestic shipbreaking market (the lives of those who make it up) and I had also become
keenly aware that to understand this market, it must be in tandem with the globally scaled
conjuncture of economic and political factors: agents intersecting within the demolition market at
different scales and in different national jurisdictions. There are agents strategically located in
different time zones in different places and occupying different roles, but they are all collectively
taking part in the production of the ship demolition market, and thus, influence and produce the
development and expansion of the shipbreaking market in Chittagong.
I took the Dubai metro to my first meeting scheduled with a Senior Trader at GMS. There
were are no express trains in Dubai at that time, and the Red Line was a long, 20 stop ride from
my hotel to the Saba 1 Tower. The driverless train was the first of its kind and is the most advanced
automated passenger train in the world. As the train moved between stations an automated voice
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From Keller Easterling: “Dubai’s first free-trade zone, the Jebel Ali Free Zone, was established in 1985. Since then,
Dubai has rehearsed the ‘park’ or zone with almost every imaginable program, such that its urban fabric is now an
aggregate of zones, each of which has often been named a ‘city’” (2014).
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announced the names of each stop. There was a
meditative and melodic quality to the automated
voice—Next stop Emirates Tower—Next stop Burj
Khalifa/Dubai Mall—Next stop Noor Bank—Next
stop Mall of the Emirates—Next Stop Dubai Internet
City—Next stop Damac Properties, and finally, my
stop, Jumeriah Lake Tower. It was just past the
famous Palm Jumeirah, the series of small
manmade crescents of landfill jutting out into the
waters of the Persian Gulf creating islands
referencing a palm tree. I exited the metro to very
Figure 12: GMS offices, Dubai (Source: Photo by
the Author).

spacious and empty feeling sidewalks. Adjacent to

the metro stop was a cluster of medium sized skyscrapers made of pale colored cement, and blue,
green and gold colored reflective glass. The buildings were located around a small human-made
lake with water that was bright green. The buildings in their own right were exciting, some even
adventurous in design, but collectively they gave off a sterile feeling. I found the GMS building
and took the elevator up to their offices. Upon entering through a double-sided set of glass doors,
a visitor is confronted with a large model of a tanker ship under a glass case with GMS painted on
its funnel. I had arrived for my meeting with the Senior Trader who arrived after a few minutes
and greeted me in a very friendly manner then escorted me to the GMS meeting room.
Black leather ergonomic swivel chairs were situated around a long conference table that
was separated from the office hallway with a frosted glass wall. I began by sharing some of the
experiences I had in Chittagong and shared my developing research concern: to ensure that I
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understood the history of how shipbreaking started in Bangladesh and how the market worked. He
chuckled, and suggested I talk to the “big guy for the history, Dr. Sharma”. We quickly got into a
conversation about the role of a S&P trader for a cash buyer and the current market conditions.
Any company that has a commercial interest in buying or selling new or used ships has to
have an in-house S&P agent (Maritime Info, 2018). The S&P agents typically specialize in certain
sectors of the shipping market. For example, at Clarkson’s, one of the oldest firms in the brokerage
business, there were 74 S&P agents spread across eight offices located in major shipping centers,
with specializations in Ro-Ros, containers, and the off-shore market to name a few. Ship owning
companies also have to have in-house S&P agents whose primary role is to negotiate the selling
and buying of vessels for that company. Because of the nature of the shipping market it is also part
of the S&P agents’ role to know and understand the market conditions in order to best advise the
owner or board of directors on when to act on buying or selling ships. GMS is a company with a
more specialized interest in trading demolition vessels. Generally, the S&P trader who works for
the cash buyer acts as an intermediary between the seller (shipowners), their chosen broker,99 and
the buyer (ship recycler). The S&P trader helped me understand the complexity of the global scrap
market and the ways in which the cash buyers’ traders interact with other market agents by offering
examples of what he does from the Dubai office.
Generally, the S&P traders talk to brokers first. Most of the deals in the second-hand, new
builds, and demolition shipping market, are handled through ship brokers that act on behalf of the
owner of the vessel who is looking to sell a ship. The ship brokers function in a similar way to real
estate brokers, they connect a seller with a buyer. The ship owning company has an in-house S&P
agent who begins the process by calling their ship broker who then contacts a buyer. The ship
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Ship brokers act on behalf of a shipowner and function as an intermediary between the owner and buyer of ships.
The S&P trader are a specific type of broker who has specialized knowledge in a second-hand ship sector.
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brokers I spoke to in the US and UK have established relationships with certain cash buyers that
they will contact first in the case of it being a demolition vessel.100 If it is a second-hand vessel the
owner is selling, they will call another ship broker. In terms of demolition sales, the cash buyer
functions as the hinge to making the global market work, since it is through the cash buyer that
capital continues to circulate in an economy underpinned by debt and volatility.
Once the shipowner’s S&P agent gives their chosen ship broker the details of a ship they
want to scrap, the broker markets the ship to cash buyers. The choice of who the cash buyer markets
it to depends on a confluence of factors that include the domestic steel market, the brokerage firm,
the shipowner, and also relationships the ship broker has developed with different cash buyers. For
example, when the trader at GMS gets a call from a ship broker about a vessel on the market for
demolition, the role of the S&P trader is to investigate the deal. The investigation process includes
analyzing who the owner is, what brokers are involved, how many are involved, is it a joint deal
or an exclusive deal? It is the role of the S&P trader to investigate the “best channels” and that
includes taking into consideration any favors they may owe. In Dubai a text message had
interrupted my meeting with the S&P trader, it was a counteroffer in response to an offer he made
earlier in the day for a vessel. “These messages and calls come in all day”. Everyday counteroffers
are made by the seller’s brokers. After the ship broker markets the ship and identifies the channel
of the sale, they begin the negotiations with the S&P trader. The Senior Trader at GMS explained
that no two deals are alike, “Every deal is unique— in its own way.”
There are however some general considerations the trader must make. As with the financial
markets, fundamental to successful dealings is knowing how to play the market, when to buy and
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In some instances, the shipowner’s S&P agents call the cash buyer trader directly. This is increasingly more
common the past decade since the cash buyers have established reputations with shipowners who feel comfortable
working directly with them. It is also beneficial to both parties as it eliminates brokerage fees which are usually paid
by the seller (shipowner) in the amount of 1.0% the sale of the vessel.
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sell. The trader explained “timing, therefore, is everything,” and central to the process of timing
the market is speculation. He noted, “I have to try and sell [the ship] for more than what I bought
it for, but if it’s a ship with a delivery in two months, I might not find a buyer today, I speculate.
Then I have to time my selling. Buying is much easier than selling. Buying…I can ask you to buy!
Selling is the difficult part. It’s very competitive and you have the competitors offering above
today’s market, so you have to see is it worth it, is it not worth it? Demolition fluctuates everyday”
(Dimitriou, 2014, personal communication). This is where the process and role of a trader in the
ship demolition market becomes interesting. If the trader does not already have a buyer, or if the
buyer has not yet legally committed to it (signing the MOA for example) the cash buyer buys the
ship and becomes the shipowner. Because the demolition market is volatile, the cash buyer could
gain or lose from a scenario like this. Purchasing a vessel “as-is where-is” carries an even greater
risk for the cash buyer. The trader explained that with “180 ship recyclers in India, 60 in
Bangladesh, and 40-50 in Pakistan, there would be no way I could talk to them all.” The trader, in
part, relies on the exclusive agent’s knowledge of the local market. This includes the recyclers’
market position, the local demand for steel, and the foreign currency markets, since “the offer [the
trader] makes is based on what kind of ship, where you will take it, and how the sale will be
structured”. In “as-is, where-is” deals, without a confirmed buyer, the cash buyer subsumes risk
in two ways: first, through the take-over of a vessel as owner for a period of time and moving that
vessel across the oceans to one of the shipbreaking markets; second, risk is evident in the
speculative nature of buying ships without the guarantee it will be bought for scrap, meaning the
cash buyer will become owner of the vessel even if there is no shipbreaking yard committed to
buying it. There are not many options in this context. The cash buyer may choose to trade it on the
spot market or lay it up while they await a scrap buyer. Additionally, when the ship is sold to a
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ship recycler it must exceed the amount the cash buyer paid for it plus the costs accrued from the
time of ownership to the time of sale, and the costs of moving the vessel to its final scrapping
destination. Is it anchored in port limits, on the move, discharging cargo? What type of vessel is
it, how old, and what condition is it in? What type of deal is being offered? Is it a “delivered deal”
or an “as-is, where-is” deal? Is the ship in Singapore? The S&P trader will analyze these different
factors during this part of the negotiations process as they become variables in the final sale and
the type of deal made. The trader explained, “We then do those costs. We calculate the costs.
Figure out how much is it to go to Alang, to Chittagong. We conclude the deal, do the recap, sign
the MOU, within 3 days I deposit 10%, 15%, 20%.” Though the trader says “we” and “I,” these
processes are done by other agents that work with him in the Dubai office as well as agents in the
other GMS offices worldwide. This context raised important questions about the circulation of
money, from whom, to whom, and in what amount does it circulate, and how does this movement
and amount differ between the “delivered deal” and the “as is where is deal?”

The Takeover
Singapore
On September 8, 2009, Simon Parry noted in the Daily Mail that, “The biggest and most
secretive gathering of ships in maritime history lies at anchor east of Singapore. Never before
photographed, it is bigger than the U.S. and British navies combined but has no crew, no cargo
and no destination” (2009). In the wake of the global financial crisis, a new maritime space visually
emerged as photographs and videos circulated depicting a concentrated area off the coasts of
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Image 28: Playground on roof of Maritime Museum of Singapore with port in background
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Image 29: Ships anchored off coast of Singapore
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Singapore and Malaysia
where hundreds of ships were
anchored and idle. Parry referred
to these idle vessels as “ghost
ships of the recession” (2009).
What became apparent in my first
meetings with stakeholders of the
Figure 13: Ghost ships of the recession, 2009 (Source: Parry, 2009).

global demolition market was that
the maritime state of Singapore

and its ocean spaces have become vital locations for the global demolition market. The next few
pages explores this context and how agents in the global demolition market navigate in and through
(while also producing) these oceanic spaces.
The Malacca Strait and the Singapore Strait join to form a passageway that connects the
Andaman Sea to the South China Sea. In terms of world trade this corridor is one of the busiest
and most strategic in the world, connecting the manufacturing markets of Asia to Europe, and the
energy markets between the Middle East and Asia. In 2014, for example, nearly 120,000 vessels
traveled through the Singapore Strait transporting dry bulk cargoes, containers, and energy
commodities between ports in Asia and Europe and East Africa. Nearly 90% of Japan’s crude oil
passed through this strait. In 2014, the Port of Singapore was the second busiest port in the world
following the Port of Shanghai. Singapore handled 34 million TEUs, the equivalent to 581 million
tons of cargo trade by 1,768 of the world’s largest container vessels (Image 31). This translates to
five of the biggest vessels per day unloading and loading at the Port of Singapore. By 2015,
Singapore became the world’s busiest transshipment hub and connected 600 ports worldwide. But
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Singapore is more than a port city, and it is important for my study to understand Singapore’s
significance beyond its being a port city and transshipment hub facilitating the circulation of breakbulk and containerized commodities across regions. There is a physical and political geography
that undergirds global trade and Singapore’s maritime economy. Deborah Cowen draws our
attention to Heaver and Gillen’s work for Canada’s Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative
that push our understanding of a
transshipment hub beyond a node of
“trade across regions,” indicating that
they are also about “creating value
added services and the development of
a significant logistics industry that
among other things reduces cost of the
Figure 14: View of Marina Bay Sands, from Wirana offices in
Singapore (Source: Photo by the Author).

border to shippers” (2014:63). I would

extend this to also consider how the gateway has been used to reduce cost for shipowners—often
distinct from shippers, who often charter ships to move their commodities—during periods of a
‘shipping crisis’. To understand the significance of Singapore as a gateway for the global
demolition market and for Bangladesh’s shipbreaking market specifically, it is useful to think
about the various ways Singapore has produced itself and is produced as part of the rationalization
of the shipping sector that connects the maritime world in very particular ways.
In 1960 the Government of Singapore created the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA), now
the Maritime Port Authority (MPA). The PSA’s directive was to “control and regulate navigation
and shipping in the whole port area (Ho 1996:28). The PSA helped in the pursuance of policy
goals laid out by the government. Central to these policy goals was building a diverse service
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economy for the maritime sector” (29). These policies helped to transform the landscape and
coastal area of Singapore, expanding their square miles from 224.5 in 1965 to 276.5 in 2014
(Comaroff, 2014). As Comaroff notes, the “People’s Action party…has asserted time and again
that the endurance of the nation depends
upon a continual expansion of its market
and its population” (2014). Singapore’s
government

transformed

its

coastal

baseline through the reclaiming of land
from

the

sea.

Today

these

areas

accommodate an airport, the Central
Business District, Gardens by the Bay,
and the Marina Bay Sands and have
helped make Singapore a one-stop service
center for maritime activities that include:
brokerage

firms,

marine

surveyors.

shipping agents, ship financing and
insurance services, bunker supplies and
Figure 15: Nautical chart with detail of Western OPL (Source:
Photo by the Author).

stores, as well as all forms of ship repair

and maintenance and legal services such as ship registration offices.
In the process of altering their coastal baseline, the Government of Singapore was also
recasting the geography of their ocean spaces. The most politically and economically critical ocean
borders established were defined in a treaty first signed by Malaysia and Indonesia in 1971. The
treaty altered their territorial waters extending the range from 3 to 12 nautical miles, while
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recognizing the sanctified principle of “freedom of passage” inherited from the 17th century Dutch
jurist Grotius’s Mare Liberum. By 1977, the two states, plus Singapore, signed an agreement that
defined the lines of innocent passage through their territorial seas where ships traversing the Strait
for international navigation “shall not be impeded” as they shall use the Traffic Separation Scheme

Figure 16: Nautical chart with detail of Eastern OPL (Source: Photo by the Author).

(TSS) as a free highway for commerce (Sien, 1998). Today, the TSS facilitates the safe and
unimpeded movement of vessels, albeit with the illegal interruptions of pirate attacks, and when
vessels collide and slow the movement of other ships (Weng et al., 2012; Maritime Claims and
Services Pte. Ltd., 2009; McCauley, 2014).
As world trade rapidly expanded the MPA designated specific geographical coordinates
within their territorial seas in 1993 to facilitate the exchange of the maritime services (Nippon
Foundation, 2016). These ‘anchorage zones’ supported the rationalization of Singapore’s maritime
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economy while making regional and global flows of trade more efficient (Image 32). Shipowners
and ship managers anchor vessels in these zones for ship registration and marine surveys, as well
as while arranging the supply of crews, bunkers, food, and fresh water. According to the global
maritime industry group Wilhelmsen, putting ships in hot or cold lay-up is expensive and can run
shipowners up to $1000 a day within ‘port limits’—a hefty sum for shipowners searching to
counteract falling rates of profit (2017) following the 2009 shipping crisis. After 2009, it became
clear that shipping was facing a radically different future: extensive economic losses, devaluation
of ships, and the restructuring of financing options available for the ailing shipping sector. The
2009 Review of Maritime Transport suggested shipowners needed to find ways to ‘manage their
losses’ and listed as primary options temporarily laying up ships and permanently removing ships
through scrapping (UNCTAD, 2009: 57). In this period, shipowners began to rely heavily on a
space referred to as Singapore Outer Port Limits (OPL), a place to anchor temporarily idle ships.
The MPA Singapore recognizes two narrow areas along the Singapore Strait as ‘east and
west anchorages zones’ but makes no claims to govern these spaces. To captains, seamen, marine
surveyors, brokers, and traders, these zones are known as ‘OPL’. OPLs are used by shipowners
and managers who require maritime services, but do not need to enter Singapore’s port limits. This
was repeadetly shared across the stakeholders I met with, who mentioned the importance of
Singapore’s OPL in the context of the global demolition market. The S&P trader in Dubai
explained that the risks for the buyer that accompany a demolition vessel sale are safer if done in
Singapore OPL: “in Singapore, taking over a ship is relatively easy because you can do it at OPL
‘off port limits,’ you can do the crew change, flag change without any port state interruptions
making it very safe for the buyer” (Sales and Purchase Agent 1, 2014, personal communication).
A GMS operations agent added to this explanation later, “you can change the flag and get bunkers
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all in a 24-hour period” (Sharma, 2014, personal communication). This situation is compared to
buying a vessel within port limits in Singapore or another port, which under the new owner would
require a ship survey. For demolition vessels “getting port clearance [to leave port], if it’s a piece
of crap rust bucket it will be hard, you might get it detained” (Sales and Purchase Agent 1, 2014,
personal communication).
In the Singapore offices of the two largest cash buyers in the world, GMS and Wirana, the
significance of OPL for shipowners was repeated. Shipowners can anchor their ships and avoid
port and piloting fees. The CEO of Wirana added, that “an equally important consideration, when
you are in Singapore port limits, you can have very onerous things to do like, though my ship is
perfectly ok and can navigate by itself they [MPA] will say ‘No you can cause a danger these are
very busy waters, we will assign four of our tugs that will take your ship in a convoy at your cost
at the price I decide,’ it’s very expensive and does not make sense for demolition vessels” (Dave,
2014, personal communication). When I asked the naval engineer at the GMS office, “why OPL
is significant”, and to explain how they use it, he showed me on a nautical chart in their offices
the general location of OPL and pointing to another area, “all this is inside port limits and is
properly marked and properly allocated, where you are to and not to anchor. But if you come
inside here you will pay port dues and you have to take a pilot; OK it costs money. So, the question
for someone like us, who wants to save money, where can we go that is close to Singapore but
avoid the dues,” as he points to another area on the map— “we go here” (Operations Agent 2,
2014, personal communication). The trader sitting at his desk interjected and added, “Our ships
are demolition ships…our ships are not so good, if the Port State Control comes on board, they are
going to see 100 deficiencies, it is too much money to repair all the deficiencies. The MPA wants
to keep the [OPL] anchorage because it’s very crowded, they don’t want to have breakdowns,
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losses of steering, they want the old girls well away” (Sales and Purchase Agent 2, 2014, personal
communication). PSA does not want the demolition vessels to anchor in the same anchorage areas
as the oil tankers, bulk and LNG carriers, or container ships. The risk of substandard ships colliding
with the active vessels is too great, especially since the 2009 global trade crisis started. Similar to
Dubai’s optimal location for conducting business with other agents and firms in Asia and Europe
on the same day (time zone advantages), Singapore also has its geographic advantages as well.
The Singapore Strait is 113 kilometers (70 miles) long with depths that range from 30 to 120
meters. Historically frustrating sailors in the ‘age of sail’ due to its calm and windless waters,
Singapore is in the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), what Captain Anam referred to as the
“doldrum belt”. There are no cyclones or heavy winds and these conditions combined with the
shallow waters make it an ideal place to anchor and lay up vessels, “Singapore OPL is very
convenient, it only takes a few days to get to Chittagong, so why Singapore? Because of its
proximity to market and availability to services.” (Sales and Purchase Agent 2, 2014, personal
communication).
In 2009, as Parry reported, it became evident that ships were anchored in OPL for extended
periods of time, avoiding daily lay-up fees and Port State Control oversight in efforts to avoid
economic losses while waiting out the global economic crisis. These OPL areas were remade into
a liminal zone. A place where not yet de- or re-valued ships could be suspended while their owner
found new ways to navigate the transformed shipping economy. In 2009, it was estimated that
hundreds of ships were anchored in these spaces; by 2014 marine surveyors confirmed that the
number was closer to a thousand ships laid-up in Singapore OPL, including new OPL areas in the
South China Sea (Singh, 2014, personal communication; Howe, 2015, personal communication;
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Alexander, 2014, personal communication). Between 2009 and 2014, many of these ships were
laid-up for months, usually with only two crew members on board.
In the context of shipbreaking, Singapore’s physical proximity to Bangladesh is crucial to
the ship recycling market (they are four-to-five-day sea journey apart). This distance strengthens
the connection between ships anchored in Singapore OPL and Bangladesh’s shipbreaking yards.
In 2009, Bangladeshi end-buyers offered some of the most competitive prices per lightweight
tonnage on the global scrap market. The proximity of the anchored vessels meant that the transport
costs were lower than selling the ships to competing shipbreaking yards in India and Pakistan.
What has emerged since 2009 is a spatial and regional relationship between two interconnected
markets that together operate as a way to help solve oceanic overproduction and devaluation in the
shipping sector, and thus overaccumulation in general.

“As-is, where-is” in Singapore
It was 8:13 pm on November 13, 2014 when I received a call at my hotel room from the
engineer who works for GMS in the Singapore office. I met him and a Singapore based S&P trader
the day before to discuss what their office roles and responsibilities were for GMS and why there
was a need for a Singapore based office. He told me he planned to go survey a ship in the morning
off the coast of Indonesia and asked if I wanted to join him. I would meet him at the ferry station
at 6:00 am to take it across the strait to Indonesia where we would get a taxi to another ferry that
would then take us out to the boat. The vessel was anchored, without a propeller, off the coast of
Indonesia in a newly developing OPL. 101 His job was to survey the vessel and review the
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Since 2016 there has been expanding use of new anchorage areas being exploited by shipowners to lay-up their
unemployed vessels. Some of these are identified in the Bay of Brunei, near the Malaysian Port of Labuan and off the
coast of Batam the Indonesian island across the Strait from Singapore (Boonzaier, 2016; Reuters, 2016).
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paperwork then to report back to the GMS office. They would do the calculations and see if it was
a good deal for them to buy in an “as-is, where-is” contract and then tow it to the ship recycling
yards. The agent explained that the whole trip would take 10 hours. If I wanted to go, I would
need to get permission from the Dubai and Cumberland offices. We both emailed the offices to
request permission. The reason he was being sent by GMS was to review the vessel and report
back on its condition, and whether it would make the journey if towed to one of the breaking yards.
If so, the tow is a cost that would need to be factored into the price GMS was going to offer for
the ship. The main concern for GMS was if the vessel is in good enough condition, and that the
steel and extra transport costs would be worth it. In other words, was the risk worth the money to
be made. The engineer was a crucial link in helping make that decision. Neither of us had heard
back from the central offices in time to give me permission to accompany the agent. I was unable
to travel on the survey operation with the GMS on this trip, but being looped into the process
deepened my understanding of the “as-is, where-is” deal.

Finance and Insurance Executives
Once the S&P trader in Dubai finalizes the negotiations of a demolition sale the Protocol
of Delivery and Acceptance102 is signed, and the shipowner gives the cash buyer a Bill of Sale as
well as the seller’s other documentation (described in the insurance section). The cash buyer
transfers the negotiated percentage to the ship owner’s bank. This is usually a percentage of the
final sale; it could be 10 or 20 percent depending on the agreement. Once all the steps are enacted
the cash buyer becomes the new owner of the vessel. The next part of this process is referred to as
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A Protocol of Delivery and Acceptance is a legal document that notes the exact time and date of the sale of the
vessel, and the exact time of transfer of ownership (Wasserman, 2008).
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the “takeover.” There is a team of agents that the cash buyer has put together that specialize in
different aspects of this process and will work on the arrangements that make it possible to legally
put the vessel on the move. No matter where in the world the takeover happens, the process is the
same for this team. Common locations of these takeovers include, Hong Kong OPL; Fujairah,
UAE, OPL; Montevideo, Uruguay; and since 2009 takeovers were often done in Singapore OPL.
The cash buyer I met with established Finance, Insurance and Claims, and Operations Departments
to enact the steps that formalize the takeover. Though these processes overlap and happen
simultaneously, I will describe them separately.
The Financial Accounts Department handles all financing related to the ship once it is sold.
I met with a Financial Executive in the Dubai office to discuss the general practices of the cash
buyer right before they become an owner of a vessel in an “as-is, where is deal.” The Financial
Executive is tasked daily with handling the trade finance, LC arrangements, and cash flow
management. They also handle the negotiations with bank agents in the domestic markets. Upon
arrival to the office each morning the Financial Executive gets the cash flow updates from his team
in the Dubai office, calls their exclusive agents in each of the domestic markets, as well as the
company’s traders. The cash flow is how payments going out and coming in each day are
described. When the exclusive agent informs the Financial Executive at the headquarters office,
that a ship has been sold, the Executive needs to find out all the technical details of the sale,
including what bank was used, what the amount was for, and what type of LC is going to be used,
an “usance LC” or a “sight LC”. As we recall from Chapter Two and earlier in this chapter, there
are profound differences between the two different types of LC used in today’s demolition market.
In the contemporary market they no longer use a “revocable LC,” which was common in the 1970s
and 1980s. Today, the LCs used are either sight or usance, and both are irrevocable, meaning the
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only way to cancel the LC is for both parties to agree. Once the Financial Executive determines
which LC is being used, they take a second set of steps to ensure the cash buyer is not at risk.
When a ship recycler opens a usance LC, the period of time before the bank releases the
money to the shipowner (who is now the cash buyer), could be between 180-360 days. This is not
ideal for a cash buying company. In order to remain competitive in the volatile demolition market
they must be in a positive cash flow position in order to continue buying and selling demolition
ships. What larger cash buyers are able to do, in order for their money capital to help facilitate the
circulation of devalued fixed capital, is to request a forwarded amount from their US or European
based bank at a discount. The discount is the percentage the bank will charge to the cash buyer for
the capital being forwarded and will cover the amount owed by the LC. When the LC is released
by the recycler’s bank it will be paid to the cash buyer’s bank. In this process the risk no longer
lies with the cash buyer but has been transferred to the cash buyer’s bank. The discount is the cost
of the risk commodified.
The bank assesses the risk and determines the price through a process that evaluates the
domestic bank, the bank who opened the LC for the ship recycler. The interest percentage reflects
the scale of risk in the eyes of the bank. The Financial Executive of the cash buyer is part of this
process in the following way: the cash buyer’s bank typically discounts the amount forwarded for
Indian banks at 1.5 percent, whereas for Bangladesh banks, which are considered a higher-risk
market, are discounted at 4 to 5 percent. Dealing with amounts in the range of $4 – $6 million for
a vessel, the discount between the two equates to a considerable amount. If the discount goes
higher than 5 percent the Financial Executive explained that they will get on the phone with the
exclusive agent and request that they communicate with the shipbreaker who is buying the vessel,
and tell them they need to look for a different bank, that their recycler’s chosen bank is proving to
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be too risky for the cash buyer’s bank to discount the money forwarded less that 5 percent. The
other alternative given by the cash buyer to the shipbreaker is that they could increase the amount
paid for the vessel. At the end of the day the Financial Executive of a large cash buyer intersects
with financial agents across scales and national jurisdictions in order to complete their part in the
process of taking over a ship.
Another critical aspect of the takeover is that part of the process that protects the ship
owning company from the “perils of the sea”: ship insurance.103 The cash buyer I had met with
established an Insurance and Claims Executive in 2014. In GMS, this executive organizes the
complex insurance arrangements for demolition vessels. When the trader finalizes the negotiations
of a vessel, the next steps is to call the Insurance Executive. The trader shares what type of deal
was made (for our purposes we will continue to work in the parameters of an “as-is where-is”
deal), the trader shares where the vessel is located, the vessel’s description as outlined in the
documents required in the deal, and the planned route of the vessel. If the route is unknown, they
will instruct the master to proceed to one of the ship recycling markets and, on the way, change
the route if necessary. After the trader shares these details with the Insurance Executive, the
Executive will contact their insurance broker with this information package, and “the game
begins.”
At this point in the process of the takeover, there are a few different types of insurance to
arrange, and the Insurance Executive must collect as many quotes for the requested insurance as
possible. The quotes will include the standard Protection and Indemnity insurance, or P&I
insurance. P&I covers “all maritime liability risks associated with the operation of a vessel”, the
ship’s hull, and its machinery (International Risk Management Institute, 2019). The P&I coverage
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For an history on rise of insurance through its maritime context see Jonathan Levy’s chapter “The Perils of the
Sea” in his book Freaks of Fortune, The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in America (2012).
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also covers injury or death to a crew member, 3rd party, or passenger during the “operation of a
vessel,” but if the crew member is killed or disabled and the shipowner is deemed liable, the
shipowner is required to pay. Demolition vessels are often substandard, and at times not fully
functional without the assistance of a tow, therefore the cash buyers protect themselves against
accidents that cause injury or death by purchasing a ‘crew liability insurance’ policy.
The demolition market is considered to be a high-risk market by insurance companies and
because of this there are not many companies that insure it. So, the Insurance Executive and their
insurance broker must put together a team of underwriters that assess the risk for the insurance
company; they work towards 100 percent coverage. The individual insurance companies may
cover 5, 10 or 15 percent of the insurance policy. The Insurance Executive will have to identify a
leader of the team, and the leader is a company that has expertise in insuring and assessing the
risks that come with demolition vessels. Thus, the role of this leader is to assess the risk of the
particular ship in question and its reported voyage. The leader also sets the terms, conditions and
rates and because of their expertise, handles any claims made during the voyage. It is part of the
agreement between the cash buyer and team (followers), that if the leader accepts a claim the
followers will pay the claim. Also, part of the leader’s role is to establish the terms, conditions,
and rates. Included in the conditions is a warranty survey. A Warranty Surveyor will go on board
the vessel and confirm its ability to complete the voyage. The surveyor then provides a “Certificate
of Approval” (CoA) to the cash buyer, Master captain, and insurance company. The CoA includes
any recommendations that the new shipowner (cash buyer) needs to do to the vessel in order to
complete the journey safely. The CoA represents a critical final step initiated by the Insurance
Executive and completed by a string of agents, that all helped to prepare the vessel for movement.
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Operations
Equally crucial to preparing a ship for movement is the office of Operations. The division
is headed by an Operations Manager who completes the physical preparations of the takeover. This
manager handles a variety of tasks necessary to prepare the vessel for movement. One of the first
things that needs to be handled after the trader finalizes the “as-is where-is” deal is to arrange for
a crew to be sent to the vessel. The cash buyer, now shipowner, works with a few different
management companies that supply crews to the demolition vessels. The crew generally consists
of 15-17 men who are each tasked with different jobs. These jobs were explained to me by the
manager in Dubai and include an engineer whose main task is to keep the vessel running, and a
deck crew in charge of sonar, GPS, and radar who all help direct the ship to its final destination.
The crew managing companies used by GMS are often based in India and employ Pakistani and
Indian seamen.
Once the crew arrives to the vessel it is part of their collective duties to communicate back
to GMS the supply and bunker levels so that GMS can arrange for supplies. If the vessel needs
300 gallons of bunkers but only has 10, the cash buyer needs to supply this to the vessel. The same
goes with water for the crew’s showers and cooking. Most of the supplies needed are delivered to
the vessel while it is anchored in outer port. The budget allocated for everyday life of the crew is
$10 per day per person. So, if the journey is ten days, the costs of supplies for a crew of ten would
be $1,000. This amount though seemingly small, gets incorporated into the calculations of the final
sale price of the vessel. Another economic variable is the cost to get the crew home once the vessel
is beached. In the past decade it has been common for more than one deal be completed
simultaneously and in different locations, therefore, the Operations Manager must maintain
relationships with many different managing agents who supply crews for demolition vessels. The
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demolition vessel is often a substandard vessel and the condition may create problems during the
movement that an experienced crew should be able to handle. Therefore, a list of the crewmen’s
names, their experience, and resumes are provided to the Operations Manager by the crew
management company to aid in their evaluation of the seamen’s capabilities.
The Operations Manager is also tasked with changing the register (flag) of the vessel during
the initial stages of the takeover. Demolition ships are infamous for being under the legal
jurisdiction of a ‘flag of convenience’ (FOC) also known as an “open registry”.104 The reasons for
the Operations Mangers choice to use an FOC for their demolition vessels is practical, with a
primary consideration of cost, due to the lower environmental and labor standards associated with
an FOC. But also, because they are flagging a demolition vessel, there is an additional factor to
consider. That is, if there are any issues with the vessel moving to the shipbreaking country, the
vessel might need to enter into a port and be put under the scrutiny of Port State Control (PSC).105
The PSC is the expression of a sovereign authority over their territorial waters—“the power of
actors from a state to ‘board’, inspect, and where appropriate detain a merchant ship flying a
foreign flag that enters its port”—the first line of defense against the potential for accidents to
occur caused by substandard ships (DeSombre, 2006: 87). The states who participate in the port
state system are governed by a group of MOUs106 that have created “a systemized process of
enforcing international laws and rules” (92). If a vessel is detained by PSC it is prohibited from
leaving port until the port state control officers see that the owner had fixed the vessel’s
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The Maritime Transport Committee of the OECD defines a FOC as a "flag of such countries whose law allows –
and indeed makes it easy – for ships owned by foreign nationals or companies to fly those flags in contrast to the
practice in the maritime countries where the right to fly the national flag is subject to stringent conditions and involves
far reaching obligations" (DeSombre, 2006: 70; NGO Shipbreaking Platform, 2015).
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As DeSombre notes, “Port state control is the power of actors from a state to “board, inspect, and where appropriate
detain a merchant ship” flying a foreign flag that enters its port (2006: 87).
106
The aim of the MOUs is to create a systemized way to reduce the odds of accidents at sea and illegal labor practices,
thus what emerges is that certain ships are targeted more than others based on a shared system of information
exchanged between PSCs that are party to specific MOUs.
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Image 30: Office of St. Kitts Neves shipping registry, Romford, UK
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deficiencies for safe ocean travel. The more substandard the vessel, the longer and more costly it
will be to free its movement. This context is contextualized below by the Operations Manager.
The Operations Manager I spoke with explained his process to me in choosing a FOC. He
highlighted three main factors. The first is related to the standards the registry requires of the
shipowner. If it is an established FOC, like Panama or Liberia, they will have more and higher
standards and regulations than a newer FOC like Comoros or Tuvalu. For a vessel destined for
demolition these standards would require the owner to make heavy investments only to sell it for
scrap—economically this is not optimal for the cash buyer. The second consideration is the crew.
Each FOC has a different set of restrictions related to labor conditions and inclusive of nationality
of the crew who command the vessel. The FOC of choice for the Operations Manager has already
been vetted it for their crew regulations. The third issue is that of a “single voyage” (SV) certificate.
This SV certificate is not offered by all FOC. The more established FOC focus on long-term trade
options and offer products that focus on those markets. Whereas a newer FOC, ones who do not
yet have a record of safety established and are “blacklisted”,107 they need to attract business with
offerings like SV certificates to shipowners. The Operations Manager explained to me that his
FOC of choice past few years has been Saint Kitts and Nevis (SKN) (Image 33). SKN offers a
“special registration certificate” (SR Certificate) which is functionally the same thing as an SV
Certificate. The intention of this certificate is to legally support the movement of a vessel from one
location to another. For example, if there is an oil platform or fishing vessel that completed a job
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There are three lists when it comes to open registries: the white, gray, and blacklist. All new open registries are
placed on the blacklist. As they improve their standing, they move to gray and then white. Generally, for ship recycling
this means that the paperwork and standards related to the vessel being flagged become more restrictive. Under these
conditions the cash buyer would often change to another flag, unless there is a good relationship established between
the FOC and the cash buyer. In the case of GMS they did have a good relationship with the open registry of St. Kitts
and Nevis.
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and is waiting to be moved to the next location, the owner would get a SR Certificate to cover the
movement from point A to point B (Powell, 2015, personal communication). Or, if there is a vessel
without a propeller, a “dead” ship, SKN can offer a SR Certificate. The SKN Registrar explained
that these SR Certificates are good for a three-month period, so if a cash buyer does not yet have
a specified buyer, they can move the vessel to Chittagong or Singapore OPL, or Alang, India and
anchor it until a buyer is found and the sale confirmed. The cost of the SR Certificate, at a few
thousand dollars, pales in comparison to the costs of trading a vessel. In the case of the cash buyers
they work with regularly, they offer the SR Certificate for a set price based on their commitment
to flag a certain number of ships with SKN per year.

Figure 17: FOC used for scrapping (Source: NGO Shipbreaking Platform, 2015).

The third situation is the reputation of the FOC of choice. The SKN Registrar explained
that they had been tightening up requirements for shipowners and their vessels the past four years
and this restricted the types of ships they chose to register. The effects of this was that their position
as an FOC improved and by the time I spoke to SKN they had just been moved to the “gray list”.
The higher standards helped ships in longer-term registrations with SKN by offering them more
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ports of entry.108 It is the improved FOC reputation and status that also helps the cash buyer. The
Operations Manager explained “I want a serious flag—the reason [for this] is because sometimes
my ships go into port…our ships are pretty old ships, and the PSC will tell the owner to fix this
and fix that. This is not good, this means you are not leaving port for a while,” at least until you
fix the issues identified by Port State Control Officers. The intersection of FOCs and PSC with the
global demolition market becomes important to disentangle, as it illuminates another potential risk
the cash buyer takes on when they do “as-is, where-is” deals.
If the vessel was bought “as-is, where-is” and is located a great distance from the South
Asian ship recycling yards, a more reputable flag might be chosen in case of an issue en route that
would require the vessel to go into a port for servicing. PSC is governed by a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) that is made up of a group of port states. There are MOUs that cover most
regions of the world and some states are listed on more than one. As a member state of one of the
regional MOUs, the port state agrees to uphold “existing international agreements on labor, safety
and environmental protection” based on the regulations defined in IMO and ILO conventions
(DeSombre, 2006:91). The PSC is the regulatory body in each state that is responsible for
following through with the set of agreements made by the members of the MOU. They agree to
the following conditions: inspect a certain percentage of vessels that come into their ports each
year; agree to standard inspection based on a list of international obligations and share this
information with each MOU member (92). If a vessel is inspected and shown to have too many
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When SKN had opened their registry in 2006 they were interested in “driving the bottom line” because the
registration paid for by the shipowner was between $3,000-6,000 and contributed to their financial commitments to
the government of St. Kitts and Nevis. These vessels were on the “wrong end of the market,” and the Registrar
explained that they probably would not take them on today, as a more established FOC in 2015. By wrong end it
means they were substandard ships and would be detained in many Port States if they had entered port limits. A
detained vessel, depending on the reasons for its detention could cost the shipowner millions of dollars and take
sometimes up to 1-2 years to address the issues enough to leave port.
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deficiencies, particularly those that pose risks to maintaining safe working conditions or are
hazardous to the environment, the vessel will be detained and the information pertaining to the
detention will be shared with the ship registry, the classification society, and the other member
states. As DeSombre (2006) points out, this process of ship detention data sharing facilitates
singling out certain vessels and flags, and these considerations are the basis of the Operations
Manager’s decision to use one flag over another.
The takeover of an “as-is, where-is” vessel includes many different agents that put to work
a range of financial, insurance, and practical mechanisms. The different agents of the cash buyer
are in touch with a global network of agents, located around the world, who make the takeover
possible. Once the flag is changed, the international crew arrives from India, and the bunkers and
crew’s food and water supplies are ordered and delivered from the maritime services local to where
the ship is located, the vessel is ready to be moved. As the Operations Manager expressed to me
“the others do the negotiations to buy the ship and arrange the finances and insurance and I do
everything else after that, I make the journey happen [to the shipbreaking yard].”

Conclusion
This chapter set out to provide a substantive account of the global demolition market: who
are those actors who work it, where do they work from, what spaces do they work in, and what
devices do they use. This analysis was necessary in expanding on a ‘critical geography of [scrap]
ships’, in doing so what became apparent was the particular actors, devices, and spaces that make
up the global demolition market. This market is complex and, as with the shipping sector more
generally, shifts in response to the conjuncture of geopolitical factors and economic processes that
that play out across different territories and in different financial sectors. The shipping and
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financial market actors use devices in new ways, and produce new types of spaces. In this chapter
the spatiality of the global demolition market crisscrosses through conference arenas, where
stakeholders discuss the economic conditions of markets and how companies and investors
respond to challenges posed by global economic conditions; and in historic and colonial
neighborhoods transformed into commercial, financial and maritime centers; and in the free zones
established to attract global companies; and in the ocean-spaces produced from the effects of a
global financial crisis. This research responded directly to a recent call for economic geographers
to critically address the spatialities of markets and the characteristics of their spatial construction
as a way to critique capitalism (Leon, et.al., 2018), but also to empirically ground studies of
markets (Peck, 2012; Cahill, 2019) and the ways in which these studies might be pursued (Berndt
and Boeckler, 2009; Brenner et al., 2011; Peck, 2012; Christophers, 2014). What is common across
the set of articles referenced here on markets is the desire to make markets material; in other words,
to de-fetishize markets in order to understand the spatiality of the market in question (Hall, 2012;
Peck, 2012; Christophers, 2014; Cahill; 2019). This chapter is an initial attempt to do this work in
the context of the shipbreaking market.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Concrete Futures
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Introduction
Coastal Geomorphology: sea tides and river sediment
Water is a central and determinant feature in the creation of the physical geography of
Bangladesh. Three different types of water are the “companion of life in Bangladesh”—silt laden
river water, rainwater, and sea water have all been profound agents in making the land and seascape
of this region. Each form of water flows in different patterns, altering the land in different ways
helping to become a foundation on which a different landscape can be developed. These flowing
waters have their own temporalities, making Bangladesh a land made by the rhythms and
movement of water and silt at different timescales.
Three major rivers that emanate from the Himalayas—the Ganga (Padma in Bengali),
Brahmaputra (Jamuna in Bengali), and the Meghna, otherwise known as the Ganges-BrahmaputraMeghna (GBM), as well as their tributaries—are the veins that move silt and clay through Bengal,
much of it transferred and deposited in regions throughout Bangladesh, making fertile soil, the
foundation for crop cultivation.109 The river system carries with it 2.4 billion tons of sediment
yearly (Ahmed, 2016), with deposits that created the 10,000-year-old geomorphological formation
known as the Bengal Delta or Ganges Delta, the largest delta in the world, equal in scale only to
the Bengal Fan,110 also the largest in the world. Formed over thousands of years by the siltation
process are the small islands referred to as the ‘mouths of the delta’. The easternmost island is
Sandwip Island lying approximately 18 km from the shoreline of Sitakunda upazila on the
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In the past few decades the silt has had higher levels of sand that has led to more than usual amounts of river erosion
accelerating the displacement of local people as they move to other areas for growing or to the growing urban centers
of the country in search of work.
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The Bengal Fan is an Abyssal Fan, also known as underwater delta. “Fans” are underwater geological structures
associated with large-scale sediment deposition (Curray et al., 2002).
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mainland of Bangladesh. Sitakunda, located 20 km north of the mouth of the Karnafuli River and
Chittagong City, is a coastal flood plain used for agriculture and fisheries. Over the last few
decades Chittagong has become increasingly industrialized and densely populated.111
The tides in this region help to determine when areas along the coast become flooded and
still with slack water, and when they are emptied to reveal expanses of wet ground; exposed twice
a day, this is the intertidal zone. This liminal space is where the ocean meets the land between high
and low tides. These zones host a variety of marine life and because the environmental conditions
in the tidal zone are harsh, marine life has learned to adapt in order to survive. Tidal zones around
the world vary in distance from the high to low tide water mark, as well as depth, and both depend
on the region’s geomorphology.
The intertidal zone along the southeastern part of Bangladesh is characterized by a broad
and shallow shelf, making it a ‘macro-tidal zone’, that extends the coast to Comilla District and
south past the Bangladesh border into Myanmar, while it extends into the Sandwip Channel to just
over 2 km. This macro-tidal zone has a high tidal range relative to the beach slope with a depth of
more than seven meters during high tide (Bergmann et al., 2018). The nearshore exposure also
experiences sediment shifts from monsoonal runoff, tidal currents, floods and storm surges. These
factors combine at varying timescales to dramatically reshape the morphology of the coastal area.
This macro-tidal zone also hosts a vital mudflat. The mudflats, referred to as tidal flats, are
coastal wetlands that form over time on top of intertidal zones. Mudflats host a unique ecosystem
and also operate as a natural barrier to erosion, tides, and storm surges. The Sitakunda mudflat was
created by siltation processes from its location between the Karnafuli River, 20 km to the south,
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The development combined with cyclonic activities and monsoon patterns, make this region a “hotspot of
vulnerability” (Bergmann et al., 2018: 2). A biodiversity “hotspot” is defined by two criteria, the first is that the area
must have at least 1500 endemic species of plants, the second is that it must have less than 30 percent of its original
natural vegetation (Conservation International, 2019).
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and its location at the estuary of the Meghna River, the eastern part of the Bengal delta. The oceans
and seas embody their own rhythms. Tides are determined by an interconnecting astronomical
force, the rotation of the earth and the gravitational pull by the sun and moon. The ocean currents
through the Sandwip Channel change throughout the year according to the seasons. The ocean
currents move the sediment from the rivers into the sea either north or south, while the tides move
the sediment towards the waterline of the macro-tidal zone. The silt collects in the macro-tidal
zone to form the mudflats. It is this set of geomorphological characteristics—the Meghna River
estuary, Karnafuli River estuary, Sandwip Channel, and ocean currents and tides—that make the
Sitakunda upazila coastal area uniquely suited for the beaching of ships. Here in this macro-tidal
zone, an ecologically sensitive region, where the ebb and flow of the tides and movement of the
currents, determines patterns and rhythms of non-human and human life. The beaching of ships is
organized around a tide schedule, and thus the shipbreaking market is timed by the tides, cyclonic
currents, and monsoon seasons of this region, in addition to circulations of global capital.112 South
Asian historian, Sunil Amrith, noted that the transformation of the environment—and particularly
the ecology of water in the context of Asia—was as consequential for its modern history as the
political and cultural transitions that has preoccupied critical attention (2018: 6-7). The ways in
which the movement of water has transformed the environment over different timescales has had
a profound effect on the economics, politics, and social life of southeastern Bangladesh and the
way the landscapes have been able to be shaped and structured.113
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The seasonal patterns extend to the northern districts where harvest season determines the availability of migrant
labor. Recruiters from Chittagong travel to agricultural districts to recruit laborers when it is not harvest season.
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Particular landscapes in specific places are made of, and made for, capital circulation and capital accumulation
(Mitchell, 2012: 44). The shape and structure of a landscape, as Mitchell notes referring to to Sauer is to “understand
the landscape not just as things haphazardly on the land… rather as a morphology” where morphology “is to establish
the character of the landscape and to place it in a system” (2012: 44).
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This chapter begins by returning to the boat ride from the introduction of this dissertation
to describe the shipbreaking yards. From the boat some things were visible while others remained
unseen, hidden by the waters of high tide and the distance between our boat and the beaches. The
visible landscape frames part of the shipbreaking process and highlights the labor and
environmental issues that accompany it. Shifting perspective to view the shipbreaking process at
a typical yard from the land reveals who does the work, how the work and the yard are organized,
and significantly what the labor and environmental issues visible are. The second section, Forces
at Work, shifts to the regulatory context with an emphasis on yard improvements, where the focus
is placed on the conjunctural moment of regulatory and economic forces that are have a profound
effect on the way in which these yards are developing. In the final section Concrete Futures,
another first-hand account is used to describe an atypical yard in Bangladesh. I use the term
“atypical” here, because this yard represents what the IMO is advocating for in every yard,
investments made in yard infrastructure that will effectively improve conditions for workers and
the environment. The conclusion of this chapter considers the implications developing from this
“ship recycling” moment.

Making Sense of the Landscape
Scrap vessels of the tidal zone
In June 2014 the shipbreaking market in Bangladesh was strong. Shipbreaking yards in
Sitakunda bought 5.5 million gt, breaking down more bulk carriers than any other ship type.114
The second most popular ship scrapped in 2014 was the oil tanker.115 Each shipbreaking yard
varies in tonnage capacity based on its size, technical capabilities, and the relationship the yard
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77 bulk carriers that amounted to 2.9 gt or 825,845 ldt (UNCTAD, 2015: 44; Solar Shipping, 2014: 8).
31 tankers that amounted to 827,000 gt or 300,000 ldt (UNCTAD, 2015: 44; Solar Shipping, 2014: 8).
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owner has with local vendors, most importantly the rerolling mills. The perspective offered to us
from the boat brought the entire part of the intertidal zone used for shipbreaking into view. As
noted in the introduction some ships were beached recently, lying fully intact further, while others
wee almost unrecognizable as ships and pulled closer to the beach with only their hull (or fragment
of their hull) remaining, and still smaller pieces were pulled all the way up onto the shore. Prior to
our arrival at the boat, my host in Chandgaon had explained to me that we would be watched by
security guards and other yard employees concerned with their practices being reported on so we
had to travel cautiously. Before 2009, the yards were accessible for curious visitors, filmmakers,
and even journalists, 116 but since that time, the yard owners became protective, not wanting
outsiders to view the yard activities. They expanded security lookouts with the goal of scaring
away journalists and activists who had heavily critiqued the yards practices in reports and exposés
for almost two decades. Security guards located at the entrance gates no longer let in outsiders and
because of this context we did not venture too close in the tidal zone for fear of being spotted.
Despite these impediments, riding along at a comfortable and safe distance, new scenes and
information emerged from the landscape.
As we left the inlet the view that appeared was of dozens of beached vessels and ship
fragments located in the tidal zone. Certain vessels visually stood out based on their color, scale,
shape, or visibility of laborers on board. Kima was one of those vessels, a massive reddish colored
95,877 dwt oil tanker that had been sold by GMS to S Trading Shipbreaking Yard at $488.22/ldt
(16,425ldt) (Solar Shipping, 2014; Robin des Bois, 2014: 37). As we drew closer, the tanker and
two laborers could be seen sitting casually with their legs hanging over the side of a narrow and

116

A Bangladeshi colleague, who is an artist, filmmaker and writer, wrote a short piece on shipbreaking (Mohaiemen,
2006). He shared with me in 2013 that the shipbreaking yards were no longer accessible but that before 2009, anyone
could just walk into the yards, as he did in 2006.
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elongated area cut out of the vessel’s hull, located at least six meters from the surface of the water
(Image 34). About ten feet to their left was a spray of bright orange sparks emanating out from a
spot in the hull. Further forward on the hull, towards the bow of the ship, another spray of sparks
could be seen. The sparks were a visual clue that there were two more laborers, cutting through
the hull from the inside. These four laborers are called cuttermen. There are two types of
cuttermen: those that work on the ships and those who work on the beaches. The cuttermen who
work in the tidal zone breaking down ships during the early stages of dismantling are the most
skilled but it is those skills that carry the most risk of fatal injury.
Cuttermen are skilled laborers who use oxyacetylene torches to cut through the ships. Many
cuttermen start as “cutter helpers” when they are children (Dao, 2008). Cutter helpers clean the
rust off of surfaces before torching begins. They also hold the gas pipe connected to the torch.
These young helpers learn the trade from their seniors and when they are older and strong enough,
become cuttermen themselves. The cuttermen are some of the first workers on the ship, employing
torches to cut through the hull, bulkheads and piping, making a clean cut that will enable large
fragments to be cleanly broken off from of the vessel. Once the final cut is made in this process, a
large fragment of the ship free-falls onto the mudflat. This is an uncontrolled demolition method
and creates different forms of pollution. Documented environmental effects from the impact of the
section of ship hitting the seafloor include loss of paint chips, leakage of liquids from broken pipes
and canisters, as well as small metal shards getting stuck in the mud floor (Hossain, 2015). The
cuttermen continue to break fragments until the scrap vessel can be dragged closer to shore, a
process that also leads to the release of toxic materials caused by abrasion (Litehauz, 2015: 8). The
cutting that takes place on the vessel is referred to as ‘hot works’, meaning “any work requiring
the use of electric arc or gas welding equipment, cutting burner equipment or other forms of naked
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flame, as well as heating or spark generating tools which are not certified for use in hazardous
areas” (Safety 4 Sea, 2018). The lighting of a torch in an enclosed area can cause any flammable
gas mixture to ignite, particularly in interior areas deep in the bowels of the vessel. When and if
this occurs, it is usually fatal for the cuttermen. A recent fire at the Mahinur Shipbreaking yard in
Chittagong, on May 15, 2019, killed two workers and severely injured five others when cuttermen
accidentally ignited abandoned waste oil left in the engine room of the Bunga Kelana 4 (World
Maritime News, 2019). Zaihrul Islam, the owner of PHP Shipbreaking and Ship Recycling yard
and active member of the Bangladesh Shipbreaking and Recyclers Association (BSBRA),
explained that the fire broke out at 8:30 am and that six people were taken to the hospital, one
person had been declared dead along the way and another worker found hours later in a different
part of the vessel. This fire came a few months after another blast killed two cuttermen, also caused
by torch lighting while onboard the oil tanker the MTS Warrior. These are not isolated incidents.
NGOs, local journalists, and activists have collected data on the number of fatalities at the yards
between 2005-2012, close to 100 workers lost their lives breaking down ships with dozens more
permanently injured (IndustriAll, 2013). The Daily Star reported that 53 workers were killed and
78 injured between 2011-2015 (Dey, 2016). While accidents impact all those who work at the
yards, those laborers who are killed or injured in larger numbers are the cuttermen and their
helpers. Ships that arrive to Chittagong for beaching in accordance with international and domestic
laws are supposed to be pre-cleaned before the ship is beached and before any torch cutting may
begin. But as the accidents involving cuttermen reveal, since pre-cleaning is an expense for a
shipowner, the cleaning is often not done and legal documents are commonly forged or are
overlooked (Muhammad, 2016, personal communication). Upon receipt of a “hot-works”
certification from the shipowner (however they procure it), the Chittagong Port Authority gives
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permission for the ship to enter territorial waters for beaching (Alam, 2016, personal
communication).
We drove around to the other side of Kima, passing very close to the stern with a full view
of the propeller. Painted in white on Kima’s stern was its name, the country of registry, and the
IMO number. An IMO regulation that states “identification numbers [are] to be permanently
marked in a visible place either on the ship's hull or superstructure” (IMO, 2018). These identifying
features were not visible on all the ships we saw that day. Many of the vessel’s names, IMO
numbers, and ship registries had either been painted out or over to obscure identification in efforts
to avoid public shaming and scrutiny that is common among the NGO awareness campaigns, who
target shipowners, cash buyers, and FOC states, as illegally selling “toxic” vessels to Bangladesh.
(Image 35) Fortunately, Kima’s identification was intact and the flag and IMO number were clearly
legible so gaining access to more information on the ship was possible.
As we rode around the vessel, to the other side, a different stage of breaking was taking
place. After vessels are beached, an early step in the process is to send a group of laborers out
during high tide (Image 36). Depending on vessel type, a group of laborers will access the deck by
either climbing on the ship’s gangway or up a rope ladder thrown over by the beaching crew. Once
on board, they work through each room of the ship to collect items like furniture, radios and
appliances, bathroom and kitchen sinks, toilets, lamps, marine and exercise equipment,
occasionally finding boxes of alcohol (I was told by a ship recycler alcohol is illegal to sell in
Bangladesh so the yard will sell it quietly to a hotel that services international guests). The gathered
items are either boxed and taped or tied up in jute bags and are lowered down to the small boats
securely tied to the vessel by another group of workers on deck who set up a pulley system. Some
laborers are left on the small boat to receive and organize the items in their craft. Vendors from
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local shops who have an exclusive relationship with the recycler will sometimes travel to the vessel
to get ‘right of first refusal’ regarding the items on board.
The dangers for workers who travel to the vessel at high tide and engage in the early stages
of the breaking process are varied. Laborers access rope ladders from their small boats and climb
up to the deck, often barefoot. It is dangerous and could be fatal if a worker lost their balance and
fell. Other accidents happen when objects are lowered down to the small boats; there are times
when the tension is lost, and items fall—hurting the workers on board the small vessels below.
There is no point in this part of the breaking process that is mechanized, and there is no way for it
to be. However risky, this part of the labor process is important for the shipbreaker. The items
removed from the vessels have value in the local economy, as a growing middle-income population
has acquired the financial means to develop new material desires.117 These items circulate into the
local economy and help to provide jobs to local people. These jobs are often used by stakeholders
at all scales as justification to keep shipbreaking in Chittagong. The secondary economies, and the
jobs they bring, are touted as positive outcomes of shipbreaking at ship recycling conferences, by
various stakeholders, including national and local government officials, and by local agents
including Captain Anam, the exclusive agent, bankers who issue LCs and the yard owners
themselves, all whom have stakes in keeping the industry in Chittagong.
Though these secondary economies are economically important, they pale in comparison
to the economy supported from the steel extracted in the breaking process.118 The sale of scrap
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Gregson et al. discuss these second-hand markets, and the commodities that flow through them into Bangladeshi
homes, in one of their early articles published on shipbreaking (2010a). See also Hossain’s “Overview of Ship
Recycling Industry of Bangladesh” (2015) for a detailed list of the materials and machines, uses and reuses, from
shipbreaking.
118
A 2010 World Bank report noted that during the breaking process, 95 percent of the vessel is recycled. Depending
on the vessel, approx. 75-80 percent is steel, and this steel feeds 50 percent of Bangladesh’s total steel production
(Sarraf et al., 2010). A later paper places this last percentage at 60 percent (Hossain, 2015). This percentage changes
based on how much steel is storied as surplus, in addition to demand and cost.
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Image 31: Cutterman working on cutting through hull of a scrapped vessel
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Image 35: Painted over vessel name
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Image 36: Laborers unloading lose items from Kima
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Image 37: Extracted boiler room at shipbreaking yard
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Image 38: Laborers examining the engine room of a scrap ship
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Image 39: Ship fragments
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ships in the global demolition market is quoted in US dollars per ldt. The ldt price excludes all
items not affixed to the vessel, meaning, the shipbreaker does not pay the shipowner for the
individual items on board, nor do they pay taxes on the items, as the government places a tariff on
the weight of the steel structure only. On one side of Kima, cuttermen were at work cutting through
the vessel preparing it for the initial breaking, while on the other side, laborers removed the loose
items. The visible activities that took place on this ship represent these important first stages of the
shipbreaking process in the tidal zone.
It is not uncommon for another group of laborers to be hired to extract the most valuable
items first. The items of interest to a yard owner are more valuable and include, engines, boiler
rooms, pumps, tanks, generators, and propellers (Image 37). The sale of these items is often
negotiated with local or international vendors ahead of the vessel’s arrival, or right after it is
beached. The exclusive agent of a global cash buyer explained how this part of the process works
by sharing a situation he was a part of. The exclusive agent received a contract from a Canadian
based marine engineer with interest in buying an engine from a very well-maintained juice carrier
that was being imported for breaking. The exclusive agent arranged for the engine extraction and
its export to Canada. Because of the value embedded in the engine, and having a buyer already
lined up, the extraction became a priority for the shipbreaker, and a team of laborers was hired to
extract it first. There is always an urgency for the shipbreaker to pay back the bank for the high
interest LC. Captain Anam explicitly tied the necessity of paying back the banks as fast as possible
when he explained that each day interest accrues, even on days off and holidays, “everyone is
working on borrowed time” (2016, personal communication). So, the faster the shipbreaker can
extract and sell the big-ticket items, the less interest they pay to the bank, and more profit becomes
possible.
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The process of extracting valuable items first is not a recent phenomenon, but what is new
is how the work of labor is organized to do these types of extractions. In the past, a yard hired a
contractor who hired a foreman. The foreman directed a group of laborers to break down a vessel
within a period of time, typically 4-6 months. Today, some skilled foremen operate like
consultants, they are brought in by a yard owner to evaluate the length of time needed to extract
an item like an engine, pump, or boiler room. Once the extraction team completes the job, they
move on to another yard. This form of targeted extraction was visible from our boat ride. Many of
the scrap ships furthest from the beach in the tidal zone had large sections of their hulls opened
up; cuts were made in specific areas to access and remove these larger items. In one of the large
openings cut out of the stern of the vessel we could see a man wearing a hardhat and a white
button-down shirt, who seemed to be examining the engine room with a group of laborers (Image
38).
The beach along our ride was obscured at times by a congested collection of large
fragments of ships located along the shoreline. These pieces had been cut down and pulled closer
to the beach. (Image 39). The main job of the wire group is to attach large cables connected to
land-based winches. The group waits until low tide to carry heavy cables connected to the winches
to the ship fragments. They trek barefoot and single file through the muddied and silted tidal zone
to the fragments with the cable over their shoulders, they attach the cables, and once the winches
are engaged, the massive pieces are dragged through the mud and silt closer to shore. Eventually
the winches will drag the pieces close enough to the beach so cuttermen can begin the next stage
of torching. As the ships are dragged, they leave a trail of toxic materials in the silt and seabed.
Well documented are the traces of heavy metals that have been found in the seawater and sediment
along this shipbreaking area, including but not limited to high levels of lead, chromium, copper,
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and zinc, most often found in paint (Hossain and Islam, 2006; Hossain, 2015; Hossain et al., 2016).
Risks for the wire group include cuts from sharp objects embedded in the knee-high mud, snapping
cables, and the risk of being caught under falling objects.
Driving in close proximity to the scrap vessels imbued them with a monumental affect,
bringing the bodily scale and its fragility to the foreground in this landscape. Many of the laborers
we saw worked with minimal clothes and no shoes. Some were perched on the highest point of a
deconstructed section of ship, only a few feet above a blast of flames visible from a worker’s torch
below (Image 40). There was a powerful juxtaposition between human flesh and steel when we
passed three young laborers standing on a small barge next to a vessel whose entire stern had been
cut off, revealing the vessel’s interior all the way to the superstructure. The three young men were
pulling on a cable fixed to the corner of the superstructure fifty feet above them. There was no way
to ignore the risk these young men were exposed to: standing on an unstable metal platform, in
rough waters during high tide, pulling on a cable, shirtless and shoeless, while the view between
them revealed the internal cross section of a ship, in all its sharp, jagged, notched, and rusted
character (Image 41).
As we rode further along the shore another group of workers came into view. A person,
standing upright in a boat the same size as our lifeboat, using a single oar, navigated around a large
piece of ship towards a group of four laborers who were each sitting wedged between the blades
of the propeller still attached to the vessel, most likely after an inspection (Image 42). Removing
the propeller is a critical step in the process of pulling the vessel closer to the beach, which is done
during low tide. In 2015, a cutterman was tasked with removing a 40-tonne propeller from a
container ship. In order to avoid the propeller from getting stuck in the mud, a supervisor had
laborers place a metal platform below it. The experienced cutterman saw this as a danger (he feared
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the propeller could bounce back up) but was told to go ahead with the cutting as planned. When
the propeller was detached, and fell to the surface below, the cutterman’s instincts were right; it
hit the metal plate and bounced back, and in the process severed one of his legs below the knee
and blinded him in one eye (Vidal, 2017). Stories like these are common and effect not only the
lives of laborers, but their families as well. The compensation offered to the laborer is usually
small and covers a short period of time. Families often rely on the shipbreaking laborer’s wages
as the only household income. Cuttermen are paid the highest wages of all workers at the yard but
it is not enough when the risk becomes a material reality.
In addition to the explosions and fires caused by the torching, being struck by broken cables
and falling objects, cuts on the feet and legs by metal shards while walking through the mud, other
risks include slipping and falling from great heights while working, and oxygen deficiency in
enclosed spaces of the ship. The way these risks and hazards affect the lives of laborers on and off
the job became clearer to me when I met with two brothers, age 30 and 31, who, when I spoke
with them, both worked at a rerolling mill. The two brothers had been cutterman for two years
before leaving shipbreaking. They had moved to Chittagong from their village two hours north,
where there was little to no work for them. They both worked for Al Safa Steel Shipbreaking yard
from 2012-2014, during one of the busiest times ever for Bangladeshi shipbreakers. The brothers
had been working alongside a good friend, cutting through a ship in the tidal zone. Their friend
lost his balance and had a fatal fall from the top of a ship. They were very upset by the accident,
and decided to leave shipbreaking for lower paid work at a rerolling mill. Stories like these, of
spectacular forms of violence, become etched into the consciousness of those most closely
connected to the industry and the people that work in it.
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Image 40: Sparks from high above
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Image 41: Three young workers pulling on a rope
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Image 42: Small boat picking up laborers from the propeller of a scrap ship
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As our boat moved along the tidal zone, active and inactive yards were revealed through congested
or empty shorelines and through the presence or absence of winches, magnets, office buildings,
ground movers, smoke and sparks emanating from torching, and laborers. It is the details available
from this perspective of the shipbreaking beaches that moved my attention from the tidal zone to
the shoreline, an area that carries with it a different set of risks for the workers, risks not easily
observed from our boat in the tidal zone. From our lifeboat, what happens on shore was difficult
to see. I needed to shift my perspective in order to understand the activities at the yards. I needed
to view the beach from the beach itself.

Anatomy of a shipbreaking yard
A typical yard
Our car pulled through the security gate of the shipbreaking yard and made a quick right
to tuck into a small dirt parking area wedged between a two-story building on the left and a line of
trees on the right, dense enough to inhibit a view of what was on the other side. We got out of the
car, walked around to the front of the building, entered and walked up one flight of stairs to the
second floor, where there was a covered balcony open on all three sides that ran the length of the
building. On the balcony, there was a small table and some chairs. We sat down and I was offered
some water by a man who I initially thought was the yard owner. It turned out to be the owner’s
younger brother who was also part of the yard operations. He told me that they built the office
building three years ago, he also explained that Captain Anam was their exclusive beaching agent
and I shared that he was part of the reason for my being at the beaching.119
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I met Captain Anam in 2014 and had two meetings with him in 2016. One was a meeting at his office in Agrabad,
and the other was at this yard in Sitakunda.
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Image 43: A typical yard
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Most of the yard activities were visible from this second-floor balcony (Image 43). The
noises emanating from the yard sounded like a construction site, humming sounds of material
movers moving steel plates, combined with yelling from workers known as ‘loaders’, horns from
trucks navigating through the yard, and the voices of workers all helped to create a sense of an
active shipbreaking yard. Nearer to the beach in the tidal zone was a ship half deconstructed with
over half of its hull having been already broken off and dragged further up on shore. In an area
near the waterline the ground was made up of ship parts so many that the dirt and sand was no
longer legible. Younger laborers were visible working on flatter segments of materials. These
workers are part of the ‘sweeper group’ and remove the mud and sludge from the smaller fragments
after they have been dragged up onto the beach. Because the sweepers work barefoot, common
injuries are cuts, exposure to toxic substances, and cornea related issues from particles getting into
their eyes (Doctor, 2016, personal communication). Also working close to the waterline were
laborers known as the ‘hammer group’. They work with sledgehammers to remove rust and harder
materials that get stuck onto sections of the steel. Both of these processes must be done prior to
shore-based cuttermen who work on cutting off pieces from the steel sections until they become
flat steel plates. Hammer group workers often suffer from eye related injuries, as well as repetitive
strain injuries, physical symptoms brought on by noise and vibrations (Hossain et al., 2016;
Doctor, 2016, personal communication). I was told that the workers have been working on this
ship for over two weeks. I was surprised to see how fast the ship had been deconstructed, and that
pieces of the ship had already been placed into piles classified by their material composition.
Overall the yard felt quite congested. The area between the yard’s entrance and the hightide
waterline was roughly 70 meters, while the width of the yard at its widest point was approximately
275 meters. The width of the yard was demarcated on the south side by a long white concrete wall
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that started at the corner of where the yard property met the estuary of the Kumira Canal and
extended toward the water, parallel to the Sandwip Ferry Ticket Terminal. (Figure 18) The

Figure 18: Satellite image of a typical yard (Source: Google Images, 2019).

north side of the yard was delimited by another wall, much shorter in length, separating it from
another yard with a more formal metal boundary. From the balcony I could see about a dozen
brightly painted empty trucks lined up waiting to drive across the yard towards the area where
heavy machinery was located. These trucks were hired by local vendors who bought material and
objects from the yard owner to refurbish, reform, and resell at their own shops. The truck closest
to the office building was being loaded with long metal pipes by five workers sporting shorts with
lose shirts, hats, and headbands, most not wearing any shoes. It had rained earlier in the day and
large areas of rainwater collected around piles of scrap materials; this made the ground and
material slippery and muddy for workers to walk through and work with. There was a yellow
material handler located on the right side of the yard, it turned to be a Caterpillar magnet. The
brother explained to me that they employ magnets to move and load the large steel plates onto
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trucks, and that this job used to be done with manual labor. Their first magnet was bought in 2009,
and by 2016 they owned three (a used magnet cost the yard $26,000 and a new one was closer to
$35,000). Each magnet equals the same amount of work as 50 laborers, the use of magnets saves
time and money for the yard owner.
Time is of the essence for a yard owner, since the faster the ship is broken up and materials
are sold, the faster the yard can make money. From there, they can pay the laborers their wages
and the bank back the debt from the LC. As he told me about this process, I could see a magnet
moving a large piece of steel plate onto a truck close to the shoreline near the scrap ship being
dismantled. There were four other trucks lined up waiting their turn. The steel plates represent a
final stage of the breaking process at the shipbreaking yard. These plates were cut from the hull
and interior walls of the vessel and become the final form extracted through a labor-intensive and
mechanized process. Loaders used to move the steel plates, one by one, onto the trucks, but within
the past decade yard owners found it more efficient to move steel plates with the magnets. The
typical yard today has at least two or three magnets in operation.
Four winches were also visible in the yard. The small structures were covered with a
corrugated metal roof, located equidistance from each other and at different distances from the
waterline. The flags in the intertidal zone had been aligned with the winches—this alignment
facilitates the dragging of the large fragments onto the beach from the tidal zone. Winches are a
fundamental feature of all yards; you cannot engage in shipbreaking unless you have winches.
Winches were the first structure constructed in a shipbreaking yard. I learned from a local activist
that the first shipbreaking winch still exists in the place it was set up, though today it is hard to
find due to disuse and overgrowth.120 Winches are engaged after the wire group secures cables to

120

Near the south installment of BBC’s shipbreaking yard, the first ship was beached, and the first winch machine
still exists, though hard to find with the overgrowth. At that time the high tide waterline was in a different location,
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a scrapped section. The winches sit on elevated platforms, each on a slanted foundation that was
built up by horizontally stacked steel beams repurposed from the scrap ships. Pipes hold up the
metal corrugated roof and a partial exterior wall, also built from corrugated metal, shields the back
of the structure. To access the winch, a laborer needs to climb up a 14-step metal ladder located
on the side of the platform. Enormous cables are attached to the ground in front of the winch
structure and weaved through holes in the steel beam foundation. They exit the back of the platform
and are attached to the ground, helping to stabilize the entire structure. When the winch’s cables
are attached, and the winch engaged, it is capable of moving enormous fragments closer to and
eventually up onto the beach.
The narrow depth of the yard made the breaking area congested. Directly in front of the
office building, looking towards the empty tidal area (where the ship was expected), was an area
of large circular tanks, many of which were rusted and painted pale turquoise in the shape of halfmoons after having been sliced down their middle. To the right of this area was a pile of white and
black tubing neatly coiled and tied together. Moving toward the waterline behind these materials
was a muddied road where one of the trucks mentioned above was being loaded manually with
long 12’ to 15’ pipes. Next, there was a pile of metal girders that extended towards the right about
20’, behind that was another muddied driveway wide enough for one of the small trucks, then a
large area of precariously piled flat steel pieces. The pile extended down to the tidal zone where
there were less people and a clearer beach area that sloped slightly away from the shore, into the

having shifted over time due to the deltaic silt deposits. In a discussion with a local activist, he showed me on a map
where the fishing people lived and explained that now they have disappeared from this area, but in the early 1980s
they were there. He learned from a fisherman in 2006 (when he did a research project that in the early 1980s) that
there was a fight between the fishermen and the shipbreaker, and the shipbreaker decided to move their operations
down furthermore north into Sitakunda. (Muhammad, 2016, personal communication)
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location of an anticipated vessel. Most of the activity was taking place on the right side of the yard,
where laborers had been working on a vessel beached previously.
A common feature of typical yards is a secured area designated for costly metals such as
copper, often found in standard plumbing on ships (Image 44). Below the balcony I could see a
heavy ochre colored gate with a metal fence enclosing an area nearer the office building where the
copper piping was being piled and stored. Workers navigated barefoot through this pipe littered
area as they stacked longer rust colored pipes neatly in another area. In the next section of the yard,
steel girders blended unevenly with piles of steel sheets that hovered over workers at
approximately 8’ high. Further in the distance, closer to the waterline, larger fragments laid
prostrate on the beach. Bright orange sparks emanated from behind a larger piece of ship coming
from the primary cutting area. Stacked black metal barrels used for oil sludge were lined at the farright side of the yard. From the corner of the balcony, looking back towards the secured gated
entrance, there was one building, the laborer’s dormitory. The office building, dormitory, and
security offices were the only enclosed buildings in the whole yard.
On a previous trip to Bangladesh I had been invited to tour another typical yard on a Friday.
The choice of taking me on a Friday was deliberate since that is the workers day off. Unlike the
yard described above the yard on this occasion was considerably wider, at approximately 215
meters wide and 300 meters deep. The owner of this yard was the son of the yard I visited later,
and, as was told to me the younger generation of shipbreakers were more interested in “green”
shipbreaking practices. To this end, the owner brought in sand to create a gentler slope down from
the beach into the tidal zone which, I was told, helped the dragging of fragments into the beach
and also created a more level ground for the laborers to work on (Image 45). This form of ‘earthwriting’ was allowed because, as I learned from my meetings in Bangladesh, that while the
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government has jurisdiction over the intertidal zone, yard owners own and/or lease the beaches,
offering them the flexibility to make such improvements should they choose to.
We walked to the high tide waterline and in view were the remnants of different stages of the
breaking process. The area between the winches and shoreline was disorganized, pieces of brokendown vessels strewn around this section of yard. Some of the ship fragments were a couple stories
high, haphazard piles of steel and other materials were strewn across the yard, while other materials
were piled and stacked, ready to be moved out of the yards by vendors. During this visit, the agent
explained to me that the shipbreakers in Bangladesh prefer to buy bulk carriers because they are
designed more simply and large plates of steel are easier to extract through the cutting process, as
compared to oil tankers that often arrive with residues.121 Once on the beach, the welded girderlike parts have to be cut off from the steel structure to make the flat plates.
Both yards I visited, one in 2014 and the other in 2016 had newly built office buildings. The earlier
yard featured other structures as well, including a storage building with eight small rooms and the
signage above each of the doors identified a specific type of toxic or hazardous waste material.
There was a room designated for asbestos, paint chips, metal waste, and empty chemical
containers. When I walked by the waste and toxic material storage rooms, I noticed a sand like
substance spilling out from the doorway that was marked “empty chemical container” (Image 46).
There was no ventilation in these rooms, most of them had their doors a jar and there was no visible
equipment necessary to handle and store toxic materials in a designated safe way. Another
structure made from a cargo container was set up in the middle of the yard. I was told it was a
room for workers who needed to take a break from the blazing sun during the day, being
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While this is true, oil tankers bring benefits as well: sometimes they arrive with oil in their tanks which is a bonus
to the shipbreaker since they do not pay taxes to the government on the commodities in the vessel, only on the LDT.
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Image 44: Valuable non-ferrous metal organized by type behind fence
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Image 45: Sloping intertidal zone with propeller and security lookout
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Image 46: Waste material shed with pile of pipes
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Image 47: Scenes at a typical yard on a Friday
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that it was a metal container in the middle of a yard without shade I would imagine on a hot day
would not provide much safety from the sun and heat. Also set up in the middle of the yard was a
large water tank. It was placed on a four-foot-high cement foundation with a metal fence running
around it with and a small spigot extending out on one of the tanks sides for access. Though I was
told this tank supplied clean water to the workers, the only way to confirm this would have been
to test the water, which I was unable to do. Even in light of decades of pressure placed on the local
industry and BSBRA by NGOs and IGOs, access to potable water for laborers during a working
day was not yet implemented at all the yards. 122 The container and clean water structure was not
set up or mentioned in the other shipbreaking yard. (Image 47).
The descriptions compiled above are from typical yards in Chittagong between 2014 and
2016. Typical here is used to describe yards that have not implemented the infrastructure that
would make working at the yards safer and less hazardous for the environment. The directives to
follow this plan have been defined by years long collaborations between the IMO, ILO, NGOs in
collaboration with engineers, and materials specialists. Though there had been some yard
improvements made since the mid-1980s in some of the yards, decisions on what to improve, e.g.
magnets, office buildings and more powerful winches, have benefited the owners economic
positions more than the laborers safety. Access to basic necessities for laborers, including clean
water, bathrooms, medical facilities, are just not available. The next section presents a description
of an atypical yard—a yard in Chittagong that is investing in making yard improvements. The
juxtaposition between the typical and atypical yards offers a comparative analysis and reveals not
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Access to clean water has not been available to workers, and dehydration, a common illness, occurs regularly.
Recently, a few yards were beginning to provide clean water to the workers, as this example shows.
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only the material unevenness between shipbreaking yards but alludes the forces that are at work,
and how they work through the landscape of Bangladesh’s shipbreaking market.

Forces at work
All shipbreaking yards have some things in common. In the early days of this practice, as
they do today, yards needed winches, heavy weight cables, acetylene torches (with a supply of
oxygen), a supply of laborers, and a yard. These material inputs remained constant until 2009, a
time that has come to represent a critical conjuncture for the shipping and shipbreaking sectors.
There were four interconnected yet distinct contexts that will be brought into conversation here to
understand this transformative moment. The first was the affect the global financial crisis had (and
economic downturn that came in its wake) on the freight market that in turn dramatically devalued
ships and flooded the global demolition market with scrap vessels for sale (see Appendix 1). The
second was the increasing urban development of Bangladesh, that fueled a growing domestic
demand for steel, which radically changed the scale of steel demand and subsequently
shipbreaking in Chittagong. The third factor was the adoption of two sets of regulations. The Hong
Kong Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships (Convention) was
the first international convention adopted that was aimed at mitigating the hazardous and toxic
environmental and labor conditions produced by shipbreaking practices through the creation of a
set of responsibilities aimed at stakeholders involved various aspects of the productive life of the
vessel. In response to some gaps found in the Convention, the European Parliament and the Council
of the European Union adopted the European Union Ship Recycling Regulation (EUSRR) in
November 2013. The EUSRR has some overlaps with the Convention requirements, but one of the
most profound differences is the disallowing of EU flagged vessels to engage in the practice of
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beaching, a heavily critiqued aspect by those in support of the Convention. As part of this
regulation, the EU also established the “European List”. The list identifies and names those ship
recycling yards that are compliant with the technical guidelines of the EUSRR. At the time of
writing, 26 yards had gone through the evaluation process that determined their compliance and
are now on the EUSRR list, none of which are located in South Asia.
These two regulations represent the culmination of decades of activism and pressure placed
on international regulatory and governing bodies, the governments of shipbreaking nations, as well
as ship owning companies and the shipowner associations they belong to, by NGOs, journalists,
local activists, and at times, government officials. By the late 1990s Marine Environment
Protection Committee (MEPC) member states started calling on the IMO to address some of their
concerns about the industry, and by 2004 the IMO, ILO, and the Basel Convention had all adopted
“guidelines” that took into consideration most of the stakeholder’s concerns related to
shipbreaking (ILO, 2004). Also, in the early 2000s, NGOs and IGOs began publishing a series of
reports that focused on labor and environmental issues related to shipbreaking. In numerous
publications, they began to reveal—to a global audience—the toxic conditions and negative effects
the breaking process has had on labor and the environment (Rahman and Ullah, 1999; Bailey,
2000; UNEP, 2000; Andersen, 2001; Greenpeace, 2000; FIDH, 2002). Additionally, investigative
journalists reported on the shipbreaking industry with a special focus on the South Asian yards in
popular publications, short pieces of nonfiction, films and videos (Cohn and Englund, 1997-1998;
Langewiesche, 2000; Langewiesche, 2004; Buerk, 2006; Mohaiemen, 2006; Dill-Riaz, 2007;
Gwin, 2014; Jansen, 2014). By 2005, a coalition of NGOs was established in Brussels under the
name, NGO Shipbreaking Platform (Platform). The Platform was established to continue to raise
awareness about shipbreaking and to collect, aggregate, and analyze data and information from

241

activists working on the ground in the major shipbreaking nations (Pakistan, India and
Bangladesh). These collective efforts focused on pressuring government officials of both exporting
and importing states to establish regulations and to take up the issues of “toxic” exports of vessels
to South Asia. Their efforts helped bring about the Convention and the EUSRR.
The fourth and final factor manifested in the wake of a 2008 report conducted by the
Department of Environment (DoE) in Bangladesh, revealing that shipbreaking yards had been
operating without the proper environmental certification. A petition was filed by the Bangladesh
Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA) and in response to the petition, on March 17, 2009,
the Bangladeshi High Courts directed the DoE to shut down all yards (within two weeks of the
order) for all yards operating without the proper clearances (no yard had such clearances). A week
later, at the request of the shipbreakers, the Supreme Court (the highest court in Bangladesh, above
the High Court), reversed the closure mandate while upholding other parts of the order. Months
later, in January 2010, the government issued a "Statuary Regulatory Order" requiring a precleaning of all end-of-life ships entering Bangladeshi waters. If the yards could not certify their
environmental procedures they would face another state-imposed closure. In January 2011, the
Hight Court again issued a directive for the government to halt all forms of shipbreaking until
further notice. It took three months for the Court to lift the ban, again, only after the shipbreakers
petitioned and vowed to adopt stricter worker and environmental protection rules. Among
stakeholders, the opinions of why the yards close vary, but regardless of the reason, the affects the
closure had on the shipbreakers was tremendous and must be acknowledged as part of the
conjunctural moment that helped launch a new era and renew pressure to improve the material
conditions at the yards for shipbreaking laborers and the environment.
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For the shipbreakers, the closure represented the power of the state to limit or halt their
operations by putting a stay on the importation of scrap ships. Bangladesh’s shipbreaking market
had been the world’s largest yard between 2004-2008, and just as the shipping economy was
tanking (and the availability of scrap ships soaring) the yards were forced closed. It is at this multiscaled conjuncture, that stakeholders today refer to 2009 as a transformative moment, a turning
point for the domestic shipbreaking markets. Changes would come to take place that responded to
this new regulatory and global economic context, albeit very slowly.
At the most respected ship recycling conferences, produced annually by Tradewinds,
stakeholders across the shipping and shipbreaking markets met to discuss and debate the text,
intentions, contradictions, and possibilities of both of the regulations and the implications they
may have for creating a ‘new normal’ across the shipping sector. For shipbreakers in the domestic
markets, concerns over how to interpret the regulatory texts was apparent at two of the conferences
I attended, with some of the invited shipbreakers frustrated with the lack of clarity regarding the
language of the texts, and in relation to which set of guidelines to follow in order to become legally
compliant.123 Since 2009, many Bangladesh based shipbreakers have added material movers to
their yard inventory. As discussed above, these magnets and material movers do improve labor
conditions for the workers, but also benefit the bottom line of the yard owners. Some yards have
incorporated clean water tanks, and few yards have made available medical services, though the
NGO Shipbreaking Platform has critiqued these services, saying they do not provide the necessary
facilities for severe injuries (2016).124 As of my last correspondence with a yard owner in 2016,
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This became apparent to me during the TradeWinds Ship Recycling Forum 2016 in Dubai. Many of the questions
posed to panelists discussing the EU SRR and the Convention were directed at the meaning of the language in these
texts and requests for further clarification. Even in 2016, it was not clear to shipbreakers which regulation they should
follow to continue to attract business. This frustration was reiterated when I spoke to one of the owners of Prime Ship
Recyclers based in Chittagong during one of the breaks.
124
BSBRA had built a hospital, but on my visit in 2016, it was understaffed. I did meet an ophthalmologist there who
discussed the types of injuries he treats daily (Doctor, 2016, personal communication)
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the shipbreaking yards have implemented improvements in a very uneven way (Islam, 2017,
personal communication). Yard owners with access to capital and willingness to take a risk on
developing their yards are making yard improvements, although gradually. 125 One yard in
particular has taken on the commitment to make the necessary long-term investments in order to
transform their operations based on the new and impending regulatory guidelines. Before I discuss
this yard, it’s important to introduce the relevant regulatory text to understand this developing
context.
Part of the guidelines laid out in the Convention were developed in a series of six
resolutions adopted between 2011 and 2015. The second resolution, Resolution MEPC.210(63),
adopted on March 2, 2012, is of concern here as it offers a blueprint to understand the ways in
which shipbreaking yards are being directed to ‘develop’ in order for a yard to receive a Statement
of Compliance (SoC). 126 There are at least 73 yards who have received SoC from three
classification societies, with only one located in Bangladesh. Each of these blue-chip classification
societies have developed their own ship recycling plan based on their interpretation of the
MEPC.210(63). These classification societies are hired by individual yards and are acting as
private consultants, not representatives of the state of India, Bangladesh or Pakistan (NGO
Shipbreaking Platform, 2019)
The significance of the MEPC.210(63) directly relates to the ways in which the Convention
seeks to shape and structure the ship recycling yards and their operations. Article 3 of the
MEPC.210(63) introduces the Ship Recycling Facility Plan (SRFP), noting that, “The SRFP shall
125

Risk is used here to refer to economic risk, and it is one of the justifications invoked by yard owners not to make
yard investments. The argument is fundamental, if they make investments there is no guarantee of future business,
shipowners and cash buyers will find ways to circumnavigate any international law that comes into effect and the
shipbreakers will have been left with debt-financed improvements and no business because they will be unable to
remain competitive.
126
In the past two years some of the major classification societies, such as ClassNK, Lloyds Register, RINA, and have
issued SoC to ship recycling yards in India.
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be adopted by the board or appropriate governing body of the Recycling Company. The SRFP is
the main document that the Competent Authority(ies), or organization recognized by it, will rely
on in authorizing a Ship Recycling Facility. Site inspections are to be utilized to verify that Facility
operations conform to the description in the SRFP. It is therefore critical that the SRFP should
fully describe the operations and procedures that are in place at the Ship Recycling Facility to
ensure compliance with the Convention” (MEPC, 2012: 7). Among the extensive list of guidelines
included in this resolution are directives focused on the management of all systems related to
shipbreaking, including but not limited to facilities, workers, and records, as well as directives
aimed at establishing procedures and techniques that seek to mitigate health risks for shipbreaking
laborers and people in the local villages, in addition to minimizing risks to the environment
(MEPC, 2012: 1). “Facility Information” (Article 3.2.1) is of particular concern since it is the only
place that includes a description of what each ship recycling yard must do to improve their physical
facilities towards Convention compliance.
In Appendix 2 of the MEPC.210(63), an example of Facility Information and permits,
licenses and certification (3.2.2) is laid out for ship recycling yards that engage with beaching as
the method of bringing a ship to shore for dismantling. A schematic contour drawing from the
perspective of a bird’s eye is included as a diagrammatic example of how a yard will be evaluated
by a classification society (See Appendix 3). A ship is depicted as having been beached with more
than 75% of the vessel laying in the tidal zone and a small portion of it removed from the front of
the ship. Four lines drawn across the diagram, in the shape of a wave, demarcate the hightide
waterline. The overall structure of the yard, beginning at the waterline and leading inland, follows
a yard measuring approximately 60 meters wide by 86 meters deep. The main area where
dismantling activities takes place is 15 meters up from the hightide waterline and 20 meters back
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from the yard entrance. An impermeable floor made of rebars and concrete is the acceptable
foundation of this yard of the future and it is divided into four quadrants, two Primary Cutting
Areas, both 23 meters depth by 25 meters width, and two Secondary Cutting Areas of the same
dimensions. Two sludge collection chambers are located at the corners of the yard nearer the
waterline, each are one-meter square. They are connected to Wide Channels that run towards the
back of the yard and are designed to pick up sludge from the primary and secondary cutting
operations. Approximately one third of the yard, furthest from the waterline, is an area designated
for more permanent structures. Some include a canteen, workshop, first aid room, laundromat,
administrative offices and a security room. Between these structures and the Secondary Cutting
Area there are two smaller areas measuring 20 meters by 25 meters on either side of a road that
leads to the yards main gate. These are Finished Product Storage Areas. The only roads are those
marked on the most inland section of the yard, there is one that is laid from the entrance to the start
of the Secondary Cutting Area and one that loops around a garden area on the right side of the yard
behind a smaller storage area. A pedestrian way is also defined that extends from the main entrance
road to the right in front of the administrative office building. The heavy machinery noted in the
beaching yard plan includes three winches located in between the waterline and the concrete
Primary Cutting Area, and four cranes, one in each of the primary cutting areas and one located in
the Secondary Cutting Area.
In order for ship recycling yards to implement their personalized “Ship Recycling Facility
Plan”, classification societies along with independent consultants work with each individual yard
to develop a pathway towards certification and Convention compliance. Some of the leading
classification societies, including, ClassNK, Lloyds Register, and RINA, offers packages for yard
owners to develop these plans albeit for a cost. I was introduced to one of these individual
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consultants by name in March 2016 while touring PHP Ship Breaking and Recycling yards (PHP).
Later I met this consultant at the Tradewinds Dubai conference in 2016 where he introduced, to an
audience of stakeholders, his Convention compliant designs and implementations at the PHP
shipbreaking facility. At PHP I saw first-hand some of the outcomes of the improving conditions
through the work of this independent consultant, whose role is to be familiar with and be able to
implement the SRFP at any ship recycling yard with a desire to move towards receiving a SoC
from a classification society. On October 10, 2017 PHP received a SoC from RINA making them
the first ship recycling yard in Bangladesh to become Convention compliant (Maritime Executive,
2017b). PHP believes they will be more competitive in the global demolition market as they will
offer, at least at the time of this writing, the only yard in Chittagong that will be Convention
compliant, once the Government of Bangladesh ratifies it.

The concrete yards of tomorrow
In 2016, a meeting was organized for me by two bankers at the Chittagong based branch
of Standard Chartered. The bankers worked in the finance department and I had met them to
discuss financing for ship recycling and to meet Mr. Ali Showkat, at the Radisson Blu hotel lobby
in central Chittagong, adjacent to one of the oldest and most elite social clubs in South Asia, the
Chittagong Club. Mr. Showkat is known to be the wealthiest man in Bangladesh as well as the
owner of an important ship recycling yard, SN Corporation Shipyard. After the bankers briefly
introduced me to Mr. Showkat, and I introduced my research interests related to shipbreaking in
Chittagong, it became quickly apparent that Mr. Showkat had limited patience and or interest in
talking with me about anything to do with ship recycling. He did not trust that I would not criticize
the industry when I returned home, as he shared. I reiterated my interest in the historical context,
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and that I was not interested in talking to him about environmental and labor issues, which had
been the topic of persistent critiques. He was not encouraged by this and stayed to his position. He
told me that “whenever people like you, from the outside come, they talk nice, nice, nice, and then
tell 70% lies” (Showkat, 2016, personal communication).127 He then explained that he is no longer
in the ship recycling business and introduced me to Mr. Islam, a man sitting with us, who was
there to meet with Mr. Showkat on the same day. Mr. Zahirul Islam is the Managing Director of
the successful Bangladesh based family firm PHP Shipbreaking and Recycling Industries Limited
(PHP SBRIL).128 Mr. Islam’s father was one of the first businessmen to buy a scrap ship in 1982.
Unfortunately, Mr. Islam’s father was in Malaysia at the time of my visit and that trip was followed
by a planned pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, a yearly tradition. Mr. Islam was extremely friendly and
interested in my project, we continued to talk after Mr. Showat left. He also suggested that I cannot
blame Mr. Showkat for feeling the way he does because many people from the ‘outside’ have
critiqued ship recycling and his operations over the years and that has made “everyone here…very
defensive” (Islam, 2016, personal communication). These critiques are understandable considering
the abhorring conditions at the shipbreaking yards.
Mr. Islam and I spoke for over an hour about his family business, he shared with me the
PHP promotional video as we discussed the current market conditions. He invited me to come to
the PHP offices in Agrabad while I was in town and also suggested I visit the PHP yard.129 I visited
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This comment was in response to the critiques by NGO activists about the hazardous and toxic conditions for labor
and the environment. He explained that for 34 years he experienced these criticisms from journalists who visit the area
and critique the industry.
128
PHP stands for Peace, Happiness and Prosperity. The PHP website states that they have over 30 businesses in
sectors that range from flat steel, aluminum, textiles, petroleum products and more (2019). They are one of the most
successful companies in Bangladesh and are well respected across the different sectors.
129
Because of Mr. Islam’s father’s commitment to education, PHP became the only yard to invite journalists into their
yard to be featured as a subject. Ronald Burek gained access to the PHP yard and spoke with Mr. Islam’s father in
2005, and later for a documentary film, Eisenfresser, meaning Ironeaters, by the German based filmmaker Shaheen
Dill-Riaz in 2008. I am sure there are other examples of PHP’s willingness to invited outsiders into the yard, but these
two are by far the most circulated and known.
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PHP offices where Mr. Islam had arranged for me to visit the yard and the medical hospital that
had been funded by BSBRA a few years prior and was now in operation with a few doctors staffed
part-time there. Upon entering the gates of PHP’s shipbreaking facility, it was obvious this was
not like the typical yards I had visited (Figure 19). Our car dropped us off near the front of a
building that had a covered tile walkway, it turned out to be the newly constructed three-floor
office building. Along the wall in the walkway were glass display cases filled with photos taken
over the past couple years of international visitors who came to tour the yards. I had recognized
some of the people from my meetings and from the recycling conferences I attended. Another

Figure 19: Satellite image of an atypical yard (PHP) (Source: Google Images, 2019).

display case had a group of photocopied articles as well as two ISO Certificates, documenting the
fulfillment of PHPs management successes in the eyes of a blue-chip classification society, Bureau
Veritas. PHP had received the certificate for ISO 30000:2009 on January 2016 (noting an
expiration of 14 January 2019). The other certificate on display was ISO 9001:2008, ISO
14001:2004 and BS OHSAS 18001:2007 also received on 14 January 2016; each ISO with dates
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of different expiry corresponding with each standard.130 I was brought into the main entrance of
the building, there was a foyer and room on the first floor that was set up for yard visitors. The
Safety Manager instructed me to put on a hard hat and a pair of bright orange boots for protection
during our walk through the yard, which were very unpleasant on the 80-degree day. The Safety
Manager was the person in charge of giving me the tour on this warm sunny day in early March.
After I suited up, I was ready for the tour (Image 48).
The first stop was the PPE Room (Personal Protective Equipment), a small building, pink
in color with a concrete floor and glass door entrance. On the wall to the left of the door before the
entrance was an information card, which communicated to workers in Bengali text and
corresponding Imagery what the building contained. The Safety Manager explained that each day
the workers come to the yard to work, they register their name and come to the PPE Room to pick
up their equipment. The room had a supply of hard hats, safety gloves and boots, goggles, worker
body harnesses, flashlights, headphones, and ventilation masks. There was an emergency siren
located outside the PPE Room. He explained to me that it took the yard about eight to nine years
to become what it is today, and if I had visited 15 years ago, there would have been no buildings
or facilities like this one in any of the yards. The implementation of these practices today is in
direct relation to the guidelines laid out in the Convention.
We walked outside and past two large white boards set up to the left of the PPE room. The
boards have the name of the yard at the top with its location below, “Shitalpur”. Under the title is
a large table documenting the different forms of hazardous and non-hazardous waste that come off
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ISO 30000:2009 pertains to management systems for safe and environmentally sound ship recycling facilities; ISO
9001:2008 to quality management systems; ISO 14001:2004 to environmental management systems; and BS OHSAS
18001:2007 to occupational health and safety management.
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Image 48: Gearing up for tour at PHP, an atypical yard
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Image 49: Asbestos storage
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Image 50: Magnet moving steel plates
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Image 51: Security guard
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Image 52: Preparing for an impermeable floor at PHP
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Image 53: Cylinder in sand with ship fragments in background
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the scrap vessel: lead acid batteries, oily rag and sand, sludge, asbestos waste, plastic and rubber
waste, etc. Corresponding to each type of material is a number that represents how much stock, in
kilograms, they are storing each month. Behind the white boards was another smaller pink concrete
building, the Medical Centre. There are a handful of beds in the space and a part time doctor on
site who is based at the BGC Trust Medical College and Hospital, located in Chittagong. The
Doctor was very friendly; we talk a bit about living in New York City. He told me he went to New
York to attend LaGuardia and Queens College and that he lived in Jackson Heights. He began
working for PHP in 2010 and treats workers with cuts, breathing issues, sprains. He also gives
them routine check-ups. Outside the Medical Center are plastic bins color coded for different forms
of medical waste.
The Safety Manager walked me over to another concrete building named the Asbestos
Removal Facilities. The building is peach colored and has an area that is totally enclosed. The
asbestos handlers work in hazmat suits and follow the asbestos process defined by the Inventory
of Hazardous Management (IHM).131 Workers remove the pipe or piece of material from the ship
that contains the asbestos, then transport it to the enclosed room where handlers remove the
asbestos (Image 49). In Bangladesh there is no facility that processes the asbestos, so PHP hired a
consultant to advise the yard on what to do to meet Convention compliance. The solution they
developed was for the handlers to put the asbestos material into concrete cylinders and then seal
the cylinders. PHP holds all of these asbestos cylinders in a storage facility at the yard. When I
was touring the yard there were approximately 20 cylinders, all from one ship, outside the facility,
ready to be moved to their storage facility, also set up and managed by PHP.
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The Inventory of Hazardous Management, or IHM is a list required regarding the location and amount of hazardous
waste, materials, and stores on board a ship at the time of the ships construction (Part I covers material used during
construction) and twice more before a vessel is recycled (Part II covers materials generated during operation and Part
III includes stores). The IHM was developed in preparation for the Convention (Class NK, 2019).
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We left the back portion of the yard and passed an enormous brick raised platform
supporting a large winch. The sign on the outside of the structure read Winch-2. The winches were
designed by mechanical engineers and made from pieces of the scrap ships. The Manager
explained to me that in Bangladesh, standards require the shipbreaking yards to calibrate the
winch. PHP hires Bureau Veritas to do the calibration. We walked towards the waterline and close
to us on our right side was a turquoise colored Kobelco material mover with a giant magnet
attached to it. The magnet was loading flat pieces of steel onto a truck; as we walked by there was
a loud noise and a person yelled. The Safety Manager quickly escorted me away from the truck.
These plates were being moved to a manual rerolling mill (Image 50).132 The protocol is that one
well paid worker gives instructions to the magnet operator where and when to move the plate. The
worker we talked to told me he had been working for PHP since 1982. We continued our tour and
walked by an enormous and extensive pile of steel plates haphazardly stacked about five feet high
to our left. Prior to the arrival of the magnets, the way in which workers moved these plates would
have made this kind of awkward and unstable stacking impossible. . A group of twelve men,
coordinated through chant, would pick up the plates and move them onto trucks. To accomplish
this task, all four sides of the plates needed to be equally accessible.
Another area of the yard was designated for empty and full oxygen cylinders. The oxygen
in these cylinders fuel the cuttermen’s acetylene torches as they cut through the hull of the ships.
Similar to the other yard there were different types and shapes of metals, there were girders, smaller
uneven scraps, pipes, and larger curved pieces were stacked and piled up in a seemingly organized
way in the yard. Towering over us as we walked closer to the waterline were the largest fragments
and objects visible on the beach, one was an engine, the other large erect fragment of the ship’s
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See Definitions. For more information, see Mikelis (2013) for a thorough explanation of the two main processes in
modern steel making.
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interior. They had been pulled onto the beach by the winches and were in an area of the yard where
cuttermen and the hammer group could break the pieces down and clean the engines. The smaller
pieces would then be moved further back into the yard and organized into piles of steel plates and
other shaped materials, then loaded onto the trucks and moved out.
Before we crossed the yard, we walked towards a green sign demarcating an area
designated as Oil Delivery Point. Workers transported bilge water from the ship to a large Blige
Water Tank in a covered section of this area. From the tank the bilge water is pumped into an
adjacent concrete room where it is treated by an Oily Water Separator designed by the consultant,
an electrical engineer, from ship parts. The oil is then separated out in this process and becomes a
sludge that is then stored in barrels while the clean water is pumped out and eventually dumped
back into the sea (Image 51). A new group of laborers called “treater guys” handle this part of the
process. We left this treatment area and proceeded to walk through the main part of the yard. By
this point we were closer to the waterline and there was much more work being done in this area.
We walked across the yard on an uneven surface full of ditches, trenches, mounds and large rocks,
very close to large pieces of a not-yet-broken down ship. A pair of shoes were placed on top of a
stack of steel plates; nearby was a dirty red oxygen tank with a tube connected to a torch, set up
for one of the cuttermen we saw walking over the scrap pieces.
Once we passed to the other side of the yard the landscape changed dramatically. The
ground was no longer a dark dirt color, rather it was beige and sandy in texture. A larger area of
the ground had been levelled with red bricks with a blue tarp placed on top. On the tarp, workers
created a grid like runway from long rebars, extending a good portion of the yard from the
waterline inland towards the offices (Image 52). The Manger had explained to me that PHP was
following the EU SRR that required shipbreaking facilities to have an “impermeable floor”. We
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walked around the rebar/brick structure and, with our backs to the sea, the manager pointed to the
workers dormitory and said they are were building a new Mosque. The last structure was on the
other side of the bricks, an elongated pale-yellow building dedicated for Waste Storage. Like the
yard I visited before there were rooms designated for different types of waste. While unlike the
yard I visited before each of the rooms were large enough to hold a substantial amount of material
and the materials in view were bagged and neatly stacked. The building also housed an Incinerator
Facility. Important to note, the signage above each door was able to be read by those who could
read English and/or Bengali text, and those who could read only in Images. The other yard simply
had the material written in English; this was enough to wonder who they were writing for.
Our final view was an area that sloped down to meet the waterline of the tidal zone. This
area was vacant of all shipbreaking processes, instead there was an earth mover and a loader
moving the sand and dirt into piles and leveling the area (Image 53). They were preparing the zone
for the next stage of development, the rebar platform and the making of a concrete impermeable
floor. Visible even closer to the waterline was an arrangement of rebars that had been inserted into
the ground, that extended the entire width of the left side of the yard, indicating the construction
of a retaining wall right before the waterline. At the time of my visit, there were remnants of the
last scrap ship PHP had bought. Mr. Islam had explained to me earlier that the market had been
dropping the past couple weeks and since they were making these massive yard improvements and
investments, they were in a position where they could wait until the market improved before they
needed to start buying ships again. Four months after I returned home, I received and email from
Mr. Islam to share with me a recent update of his yard developments, “Just wanted to send a few
photographs from our yard. Lots of the development work is almost complete. In last 2 months we
had the Dutch, Danish and the Norwegian ambassadors visiting our yard. Also sending you their
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comments after their visit” (Islam, 2016, personal communication) (Image 54). For a company as
successful as PHP, making these capital investments did not need to be financed by a bank loan,
they paid for the improvements with the company’s surplus capital. But for a less vertically
integrated company, this scale of investment is too great especially when bands charge up to 15
percent o the development loan. The yard owners I spoke to at a typical yard explained that they
simply cannot afford these improvements without a bank loan and that would be too great of a risk
for them to do.133
The shipping markets are extremely volatile and as we have read in the previous chapters,
fluctuations depend on a complex intersection of other sectors and markets at the global, national
and local scales. When I visited PHP, Mr. Islam had explained that the market had not been doing
well in 2016, the demand for steel had slowed and Bangladesh had domestic steel stock for nine
months (Standard Chartered, 2016, personal communication). In addition to this market context,
PHP was also in the midst of making yard improvements that corresponded with the EU SRR,
basically, they could afford to wait until the market hit bottom. Other yards were not in the same
situation.
However, there some are yards financially capable of making the required capital
investments without going into debt, PHP is one of these yards. They have made the improvements
as defined by the Convention and EU SRR because they can, but also because they expect that
European shipowners will be under pressure to recycle at yards on the European List and yards
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Examples that deter the shipbreakers from making capital investments vary and relate to a decline in the domestic
demand for steel, or if there are steel surpluses too great to justify the importation of scrap ships. Additional pressure
could come from the billet manufacturers who have recently moved to becoming fully self-sufficient in billet
production. This has the effect of reducing demand for scrap steel and steel plates from shipbreaking. There are also
the domestic political issues related to the environment and the potential for future yard closures. If there is a
moratorium of on the scrap ship imports, then there is no business for the shipbreakers and those shipbreakers who
made the capital investment through bank debt financing would have a harder time staying afloat.
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that are compliant with the Convention. Compliant yards are expected to gain access to safer scrap
vessels, while non-compliant yards will be sold substandard ships, as there will always be
shipowners who will “flag out” to open registries with lower standards (use FOC). The effects
related to the combination of the EU SRR and the Convention, in connection with the different
financial positions and financial mechanisms available to recyclers, produce a two-tiered
shipbreaking market where the coercive laws of competition will help to make redundant those
actors and spaces that do not have the ability to keep up with the regulations, or do not have the
will to. The landscape and market of shipbreaking will continue to be undergirded by economic
expansion, and the contradictory tendencies of equalization and differentiation, which over time,
will produce new forms of uneven development.
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Image 54: Investments in PHP (Source: PHP)
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Conclusion
Impending Storm
Before we were able to make it back to the inlet we left from, the storm had arrived. My
host in Chandgaon had been watching the weather and called my companion, instructing him to
take the boat in before it became a greater danger to be on the water. We ended up going into
another inlet, and as we approached the shore, I was able to experience something that many of
workers experience numerous times a day every day: getting dangerously close to the cavity of a
piece of hull, opened up as if it were an enormous cave. Unlike the laborers, when I came off the
water on that day, I did not have to walk home in the rain or sleep on a concrete floor only to return
again in the morning to work another 12-hour day. I travelled with my companion back to the
safety of the residence in Chandgaon, out of the rain, out of harm’s way, with access to a warm
and dry dwelling and a staff that made sure I was fed.
On a subsequent trip to Chittagong, I was able to meet with one of the shipbreaking yard
workers. I was taken to the village of where local laborers work in Bhaitary. The village was inland
from the N1 highway situated next to the Chittagong-Dhaka rail line and a huge rerolling mill.
One of the laborers I spoke with was a Senior Cutterman who works on the beach. He was 34 years
old and moved to Chittagong from Sylhet an impoverished agricultural district in Northeastern
Bangladesh, when he was 21. He was encouraged by a family member who had also worked as a
shipbreaker. In the time we spent together we talked about his working day. He works 12-13 hours
each day, six days a week when it is not busy, and 15-16 hours when the yard is busy. He earns
290 taka/day (3 USD/day). The yard he works for employs 150-200 seasonal and regular laborers.
Safety equipment is limited, and he bought a denim outfit for 400 taka because it is safer to work
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in denim as a cutterman. He explained to me that the water at the yard is very salty due to its iron
content and that often people pass out from dehydration and become sick with diarrhea. He also
told me that his work at the yard is not hard, but life in general is hard; my companion was the
translator. He was a generous man and had a desire to discuss his family and life as well as his
experiences at the yard. He showed me videos on his phone of the conditions at the yards and told
me he wants to share them with NGOs, like the one my companion worked for. Daily life is not
easy for laborers. They go to work at 7:00 am, work a 12-hour day, walk home for a one-hour
lunch (eat a small portion of chicken and rice), return to work, then go home for dinner at 8:00 pm.
This schedule reflects the working life of a regular employee. Seasonal workers live in dormitories
located at the yards and travel home long distances during harvest season, only to return to
Chittagong to work as a shipbreaker when the harvest season is complete. When I asked him about
his future, and his children’s future, he explained that he did not want his son to work as a
shipbreaker, but he cannot see a future. He lives for each day, he works, buys food, there is no
time to dream. Some people say he is lucky to have survived for 14 years working as a shipbreaker,
others say that these men and boys will become idle if there is no shipbreaking work for them in
Bangladesh. But for many men and boys, this work is real and each day they risk their lives to be
able to eat and pay rent and send money to their families. Their ability to survive is tied to the
fluctuations of global capital, and how it circulates through the shipping sector and accumulates
from it.
A concrete landscape is becoming visible, one that represents a new kind of shipbreaking
market. Arguably it will be a two (or more) tiered system that must continue to circulate capital in
its fixed and fictious forms, and this circulation will continue to be determined by the offers made
by yard owners for the scrap ships. The anticipated result is that the regulations will help to
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transform the market, and this will be reflected in the landscape. While the concretization of the
yards portends to ameliorating shipping and environmental crises, there is no way to tell what other
crises will arrive with the poured cement. These sets of guidelines may alter the relationship
between the yard owner and laborer, the yard owner and the environment, the shipowner and
shipbreaker, the cash buyer and shipowner and so on, but they do little to reduce the need for the
shipbreaking market in the first place. Nor do they promise to radically alter the established social
relations: that the shipbreaking market and the shipbreakers themselves will remain a critical
lynchpin in the reproduction of global capital, and that we can be sure of.
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Four months after I returned home from my final research trip to Bangladesh, I received
an email from the Managing Director of PHP Shipbreaking and Ship Recycling Industries. He
emailed me to share a series of photographs of the progress they had made on the yard
improvements. He also shared with me a set of personalized comments offered to him by the
Ambassadors of Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands after their visits to his yard. The
Ambassadors’ handwritten notes expressed their gratitude for the hospitality PHP offered to them
and importantly noted the progress PHP was making on yard improvements. One of the letters
noted that it was “such a pleasure to see the tidy and well-organized yard, and the signs of
compliance with standards for health, security and the environment” (Islam, 2016, personal
communication). The photos shared revealed the progress made since the time of my visit. During
my tour, half the yard was covered in sand brought into level the beach area in preparation for
pouring the concrete floor. Rectangular shaped rebar constructions on top of huge blue tarps were
laid on top of the sand. The rebar structure would become embedded in the very foundation of the
yard itself. By 2016, PHP’s $5 million-dollar investment in yard improvements was apparent in
other areas of the yard too: the concrete medical and PPE structures, the hazardous waste building,
the three-story office building, the migrant laborers dormitory and yard’s new mosque. This plot
of coastal waterfront is being transformed into a “model” for the shipbreaking yards in Bangladesh.
This model yard is also a vision of Sitakunda’s future, a concrete and steel landscape along the
edge of the Bay of Bengal.
The yard reflects a future based on speculation. The steel materially represents not only the
development and pursuit of national infrastructure projects but also an expansion of the economy
into all scales of economic life. The circulation of recycled toilets, ladders, furniture, and kitchen
items reveal new forms of social life as where there are toilets, kitchen items, and furniture there
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is plumbing, restaurants and new homes along with plumbers and construction workers, furniture
refinishers, and restaurant staff. An example of this was shared with me as I drove with Captain
Anam back to Chittagong after a beaching. As we drove back on the N1 highway the Captain
pointed to a house and said that is where his grandmother’s home was, where he was born. It was
a modest house on the side of the road. He explained that when he was a boy in the 1960s, the
whole area was made up of small fishing villages. People did not have beds nor was there indoor
toilets. He reminded me that today there are more permanent structures and homes in need of
toilets, kitchen items, and furniture. He also pointed to a cluster of buildings and said, “see there,
that is a primary school, a house and a high school all built by Zaihrul’s father [owner of PHP], he
is a very literate man and gave this to the villagers” (Chowdhury, 2016, personal communication).
As shipbreaking developed in the area and the national economy grew, new patterns of social and
economic life emerged, apparent in the roadside markets selling all kinds of materials and objects,
the numerous rerolling mills built in Sitakunda and Chittagong, and the materials used in the
construction of permanent and semi-permanent dwellings among the villages in the area near the
shipbreaking zone. Cindi Katz makes a valuable contribution to the way in which we can
understand the profound transformations that take place over time, Katz uses the concept of
resilience to help make sense of and conceptualize how large scaled transformations, in particular,
global economic processes, alter the conditions under which people reproduce themselves:
changing the patterns and practices of daily life (2004). These changes occur all over the world,
and Bangladesh is no exception. From the development of the shipbreaking market over the past
four decades, people have learned to maneuver and survive in light of “oppressive and increasingly
mean-spirited circumstances” (244). One way this becomes evident is by understanding the labor
practices and patterns directly and indirectly related to shipbreaking. For almost four decades
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laborers have been migrating to Chittagong to work by means of scouting agents and kinship
networks. As the shipbreaking market expanded, some workers stayed in Chittagong and became
more permanent shipbreakers, others moved to work in rerolling mills, and still others continued
to migrate with the harvest season. In all cases the shipbreaking market has created new forms and
patterns of work that push-and-pull the worker into new migration patterns and between extremely
different types of work, seasonal harvesting and shipbreaking. And while the shipbreaking market
has engendered new forms of resilience, the yard improvements, the “concrete future” will further
transform relationships within the industry, especially as the regulations push the yards to
mechanize more, the historical tendency is to match this mechanization with a decline in labor. As
the agricultural areas of the north continue to decline from extensive flooding and erosion, helping
to push local people south for work in urban areas like Chittagong as shipbreakers, the
contradiction begins to emerge between regulatory efforts of improvement and its effect on social
reproduction. What will a “concrete future” mean for the laborers and the environment? Primarily
the new type of yard emerging alerts us to the increasingly uneven yet interconnected relations
between local actors including, yard and rerolling mill owners, financiers, exclusive agents, and
the laborers, with a global and transnational network of actors, some of whom were sitting at the
table when writing the regulations that may come to threaten the social reproduction of
shipbreaking laborers.
Chapter One showed that the production of new markets is determined and determines the
production of new landscapes, and they both take time to construct. However, once established the
markets continue to alter the way in which places are produced and able to be integrated into larger
scaled systems of production and reproduction. The demystification of the ‘origin’ of shipbreaking
revealed how, when, and under what conditions the Port of Chittagong was transformed into a
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modern port orientated towards export markets. Examples of this ‘modernization’ process were
explored through an introduction to the way in which the landscape was transformed: the ongoing
dredging of the river’s silted bed, the construction of metalled roads, embankments, berths, and
access roads, as well as the administrative apparatus that was set up to oversee the use of the berths
for the import and export of commodities. The maritime foundation built into the landscape of this
period encouraged a particular albeit uneven form of integration for the local people and economy
of Chittagong and south-eastern Bengal more generally. The development of the port started in the
1880s and extended to the construction of the final berth in the 1940s. While the port continued to
be altered under the authority and rule of Pakistan, and after 1971 the Government of Bangladesh,
the focus in Chapter One was on the transition from an inland and river trading port, to a port that
was to service the growing export markets for tea to British markets. Each berth and storage facility
were approved through multiple negotiations and at times contested, financing had to be identified
and organized, and the rail tracks had to be confirmed. Each decision deepened the uneven
economic integration of southeastern Bengal with British Imperial interests. The inclusion of this
history into the story of shipbreaking in Chittagong reveals how the maritime landscape (including
the hinterland) that was produced helped to richen the subsoil on which uneven geographies could
develop, paraphrasing Stoler, the soil whose protracted character came to saturate people’s lives
with toxic residues, recycled commodities, and a particular geographical imagination grounded in
the ideology of capitalist growth and development as expressed far into the twenty first century
summed up in the ideas of Captain Anam, the exclusive agents, and shipbreakers (2013).
Peck argues that there are limitations for scholars today who use theories of uneven
development that do not move beyond the foundational contributions made in the 1980s. He
proposes that economic geographers must revitalize and reimagine theories of uneven ‘spatial’
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development. He shares five observations on ways this could be and is being done. The first, he
notes, must consider how uneven spatial development can be used as an “explanatory hinge…a
way of connecting in a dialectical fashion the (re)production of places themselves with…the
politically mediated and contested (re)production of unequal social relations within places” (317:
2016). Drawing on Stoler we might add within different ‘subsoils’. A relational analysis of the
region reveals the subsoil of an early twentieth century Chittagong and hinterland being
interconnected; its local and extra-local relations working through constitutive networks (shipping,
rail, and planters) and across power hierarchies whether the GoI, 134 the local government, or
individual capitalists working in Chittagong, all made up a shipping nexus.
Chapter One introduces one half of the process of uneven development, equalization.
Theorized by Smith in the 1980s and 1990s, equalization manifests materially the ways in which
individual capitalists and enterprises survive, through profit making endeavors. Implicated in this
process is expansion. Smith (1996) notes “the tendency toward equalization emerges from the
more basic necessity for economic expansion”, and this expansion is “fueled by drawing more and
more workers in to waged labor and productive consumption, by locating and exploiting increased
quantities of raw materials and by developing the means of transportation that provide cheaper and
faster access to raw materials and markets” (74-75). The production and integration of a modern
maritime Chittagong reflects the early dialectical (re)production of particular places, but also helps
to reveal how the “the unequal social relations within places” was able to develop over time (Peck,
2016). Chapter One offers a window to understand the dialectical relations between the local and
global that were evolving, and decades later enabled the emergence, growth, and expansion of
shipbreaking.

134

GoI is the Government of India under British imperial rule.
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A new story is developing, which I introduced in Chapter Four: a story that emerges from
the conjuncture of political and economic challenges propelled by decades of activism that
culminated in a new legal context for shipbreakers and other stakeholders. This set of relationships
produces the context for the uneven spatial development that can be seen in the landscape of a
typical yard and the landscape of a ‘developing’ yard. Smith notes that “contemporary
geographical differentiation is increasingly driven forward by a quintessentially social dynamic
emanating from the structure of capitalism” (1996:76). But as my research suggests, the pressure
for yards to make improvements (according to a particular set of guidelines developed by
international agents which increasingly determine the conditions necessary for the development of
the yards that operate at a particular scale), complicates how we approach and understand
geographical differentiation, or the uneven development of shipbreaking markets.
The content presented in Chapter One and Chapter Four focused on the development of
particular maritime landscapes in Chittagong as a way to consider how these spaces were
operationalized to facilitate the circulation of capital on an expanding scale and becoming a vital
factor in global capital’s reproductive processes. Chapter Two presents the circulation of capital
more explicitly and delineates the conditions for the necessary development of a global ship
demolition market. In Chapter two the commercial ship is conceptualized as a form of fixed capital,
allowing for an analysis of the circulation of capital in and through the shipping sector. This
conceptual move makes explicit the role shipbreaking plays in the maintenance and expansion of
economic growth, especially during periods of economic crises. The multi-scaled stakeholders of
shipbreaking value the mitigation of one form of crises while producing new forms of crises
through the expansion of the shipbreaking market locally. The people who come to labor as
shipbreakers are already considered ‘disposable’ if not put to work, the value of the laborers is tied
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to their not remaining or becoming “idle”. Explored both empirically and theoretically by Harvey
is the significance of financialization for the reproduction of capital. The analysis presented in
Chapter Two takes Harvey’s insights and applies them to the shipping economy as it tracks the
profound affects the circulation of finance capital had on the sector. Through a brief foray into
tracking ship finance, the ways in which shipowners and ship financiers opened up new avenues
for accumulation was revealed and made explicit through the tracking of financial mechanisms
used to finance growth over the course of six decades. The implications of new financing strategies
become explicit early on by the mid 1970s when an intersection of political and economic factors
affected the shipping sector helping to produce the crises of the 1970s, which moved shipowners
to consider new forms of ship financing. As governments changed their national laws, aimed at
helping solve issues related to falling rates of profit and overall slower economic growth, they
created new conditions for crises to evolve in other sectors. This was exemplified in the growth of
the Euro-, petro-, and later by the late 1990s, the Asian-dollar market buildups. Chapter Two made
explicit the relationship between global economic crises, shipping sector crises and the
reproduction of global capital with a nod to the conditions created by political contexts. By way
of the establishment of new tax laws, geopolitical conflicts, canal closures and intergovernmental
capital adequacy requirements. What Chapter One and the data presented in Appendix One
illuminate is that the financialization of shipping had created the foundation on which shipbreaking
markets became vital.
None of the insights presented in this dissertation would have been possible without taking
seriously the ship as a form of fixed capital while also challenging orthodox understandings of
what effects the ship demolition market. Working from Smith’s (2018) and Harvey’s (2006; 2010)
insights into circulations of fixed capital, fixed capital formation, different forms of devaluation
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(periodic and progressive), and the capital surplus absorption problem, helped to theoretically
frame the underlying economic conditions of the contemporary global ship demolition market,
where the expansion of the ship scrapping market in Bangladesh is reflected in the complex
intersections of diverse and multi-scaled markets (steel, rebar, labor, global commodities) and
networks of stakeholders and actors who make and use these markets and the financial mechanisms
that produce and are created by them.
The analysis presented in Chapter Two guided the intervention presented in Chapter Three, a
focus on the making of the market through an introduction to the actors that make it work, the
devices they use to work it, and the spaces used and produced by them that facilitate it. The chapter
was inspired by the call of a group of economic geographers’ to prioritize projects that focus on
understanding how existing markets are “constructed, reproduced and legitimized” (Peck, 2012),
a way of ‘de-fetishizing’ markets and understanding how they are spatially constituted (Callon,
1998; Christophers, 2014; Cahill, 2018; Leon, et al., 2018). Peck notes that studies that explore
“barely known economic worlds” would be wise to take up studying “economic (market) devices”
made up of monetary objects, accounting procedures, trading facilities, or production
arrangements. My dissertation extends these devices to include letters of credit (LC), private equity
funds for ship finance, high-yield bonds, the Basel Accords, etc. (2012: 124). My project addresses
what Peck frames as the simultaneous inquiry into the “wider patterns of economic integration
within which these devices were embedded (their instituted context, the variant rules of the socioeconomic game, and so forth)” (124). Hall draws attention to Peck and notes that he is concerned
with demonstrating how local markets can be upscaled, “to reveal the ways in which they are
constitutive of globally integrated economies” (Hall, 2012: 143). The emphasis economic
geographers placed on critical approaches to markets can be traced back to a 2010 Economic
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Geography Workshop where participants gathered to discuss emerging research themes within this
subdiscipline. In the wake of the financial crisis and its devastating consequences, this group of
scholars proposed a direction for new research on how markets are put to work, the processes of
market-making, and efforts to understand how markets are produced, stabilized and dissolved
(Benner et al., 2010). The content presented in Chapter Three contributes to the developing
scholarship on markets in economic geography. I argue that it is a vital intervention, since
developing a deeper understanding of how shipbreaking was, and continues to be, produced would
not be possible without a detailed understanding of ‘the market’ that produces it.
The global production of shipbreaking in Chittagong is an ongoing process, continually
being transformed by the needs of global trade, the shipping and financial sectors and the domestic
economy. The particular form of development and integration of a modern Port of Chittagong
became the maritime foundation on which could support periods of equalization and differentiation
(Smith, 1984), and as Van Schendel noted, thickening and thinning, throughout the twentieth
century (2015). By the second half of the twentieth century the global shipping economy more
generally began a historic transformation in the context of a new world geography of trade. Ships
increased in size and sophistication while shipowners sought ways around oceanic barriers set up
by geopolitical tensions, that included two closures of the Suez Canal, periods of overproduction,
and international labor and environment related regulations that led shipowners to increase the use
of FOCs. When dramatic declines of profit margins collided with unprecedented debt and
unprecedented surpluses, the shipbreaking market became a critical way to help solve the cries of
overproduction in shipping. Emerging as a commercial market to unload the devalued vessels in
the 1980s, the Government of Bangladesh identified its domestic shipbreaking market as a vital
source for raw materials for their “developing economy” and offered shipbreakers incentives to
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increase their market positions. After enduring challenges as a result of circulations of global
finance capital Chittagong became one of the world’s leading shipbreaking markets by the early
1990s, a position it has maintained since. Accompanying and underlying its market position is the
exponential expansion of environmental degradation and hazardous and toxic conditions to those
people who labor in these yards.135
Having borne witness to the processes laborers engage in at different stages of the
shipbreaking process—cutting through ship hulls, moving large scale items onto small boats,
manually working with cables to pull barges closer to a vessel’s body, single file streams of men
walking barefoot through the mud and silt to connect winches to large fragments of ship in the
tidal zone, streams of sparks emanating from inside a vessel’s hull, atop the bridge, or from a
propeller—it remains hard for me to fathom how the largest ships in the world disappear through
the application of manual labor. What makes these breaking processes more incomprehensible is
to meet the shipbreaking laborers in their homes, to walk through the villages where some of the
laborers live, watching the women of the village wash their family’s garments in ponds that are
wedged between the shipbreaking beaches, the congested NI highway, Chittagong-Dhaka rail line
and massive rerolling mills, to listen and learn of the challenges they face in their daily lives, then
to see the challenges they face in their working lives at the shipbreaking yards. These are the
workers and workers’ families who carry the burden of capitalist growth. The legacy of the
modernization of the Port of Chittagong can be seen in these villages as much as in the data
collected by the World Bank and other institutions that classify Bangladesh now as an “emerging
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In 2018 there were 20 fatalities documented at the shipbreaking beaches in Chittagong. The latest incident was at
the Kabir Steel shipbreaking yard when a cutterman, working on the container ship Ever Union, fell from a great
height and was declared dead immediately (NGO Shipbreaking Platform, 2019). Muhammed Ali Shahin shared with
the NGO Shipbreaking Platform that the number of deaths in 2018 was the highest in the last eight years. So far, in
2019, there have been at least 10 workers killed working as shipbreaking laborers.
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economy”. It is the arrival and disappearance of these scrap ships that makes apparent the
continued circulation of global capital through all its forms—fixed, fictitious, and money forms—
and the human and environmental stakes of these circulations that make them possible.
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APPENDIX 1
Broken-up 1: World Scrapping Data, 1975-2017, in Gross Tons
Note: Bolded areas show periods of expansion.
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
1999
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Gross Tons (Gt)
5,077,265
6,614,651
6,093,071
10,070,101
6,664,524
6,021,729
7,252,047
13,624,422
16,758,847
17,750,962
22,229,335
20,287,742
12,008,712
5,015,051
2,477,386
1,806,599
2,365,678
6,569,314
10,756,093
10,415,618
8,523,170
9,667,926
8,707,072
13,740,000
18,060,000
13,550,000
15,520,000
17,830,000
16,210,000
7,100,000
3,770,000
4,580,000
3,990,000
7,960,000
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2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

24,720,000
18,310,000
25,016,373
36,891,398
29,833,768
22,764,630
23,037,000
28,968,000
22,916,000

Data compiled using Lloyd’s Register Casualty Returns, 1976-2010; Robin des Bois;
NGO Shipbreaking Platform Annual Reports and Annual Lists of Ships Scraps
Worldwide.

280

APPENDIX 2
Broken-up 2: World’s Top 5 Scrapping locations, 1967-2018

Year
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

No. 1

No. 2

No. 3

No 4.

USA
843,501
Taiwan
1,132,841
Taiwan
1,219,794
Taiwan
1,104,479
Taiwan
1,371,263
Taiwan
1,716,301 (205)
Taiwan
1,645,645 (195)
Taiwan
1,264,051 (135)
Taiwan
2,140,914 (128)
Taiwan
3,472,739 (154)

Japan
795,720
USA
642,883
USA
637,652
USA
859,725
Spain
913,134
Spain
1,121,568 (141)
Spain
750,782 (148)
Spain
593,652 (121)
Spain
1,222,261 (94)

Spain
413,383
Japan
388,188
Spain
621,473
Spain
693,945
USA
695,373
USA
682,084 (104)
USA
269,957 (46)
USA
176, 542 (27)
South
Korea
311,845 (16)

China
201,718
Spain
382,492
Japan
450,674
China
302,053
China
294,167
China
209,147 (27)
Turkey
113,373 (23)
China
282,333 (37)
Pakistan
270,025 (33)

Spain
1,273,622 (97)

South
Korea
415,117 (21)

U.S.
215,931 (27)

Taiwan
3,390,789
Taiwan
6,042,053 (235)
Taiwan60%
3,969,498 (255)
Taiwan73%
4,409,145 (222)

Spain
873,237
Spain
1,053,486 (83)
Spain
654,351 (87)
Pakistan5%
299,814 (57)

Italy
229,489
Pakistan
642,159 (90)
South Korea
430,363 (30)
South Korea
168,145 (7)

Taiwan-73%
5,267,572

Pakistan-10%
765,879

Taiwan
7,829,421
Taiwan
46.6%
7,814,511

South
Korea
2,176,090
South
Korea
3,896,495
South
Korea23.4
4,148,875

Pakistan
299,035
South
Korea
799,972 (28)
Japan
439,066 (283)
Spain
278,814 (68)
South
Korea4%
299,219
Pakistan
1,605,250
Pakistan 10.1%
1,688,984

1984

Taiwan
37.7%
6,687,075

1985

Taiwan 35.19%
7,821,739 (171)

China 22.58%
5,018,768 (282)

1986

Taiwan
38%
7,773,450 (287)

China
22.5%
4,567,208 (242)

China
2,113,851
South
Korea
11.48%
2,551,249 (56)
South
Korea
13.11%
2,658,960 (72)
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Spain
147,144
Spain
370,853
India
523,728
Pakistan
6.3%
1,120,748
India 5.86%
1,303,402
(135)
Japan 3.79%
769,757
(449)

No. 5

Total #
Ships

Gross
Tonnage

798

3,865,393

866

3,747,052

919

4,545,060

1030

4,310,604

962

4,266,007

917

4,994,148

812

3,578,291

696

2,959,493

626

5,077,265

734

6,614,651

914

6,093,071

1078

10,070,101

923

6,664,524

903

6,021,729

762

7,252,047

1,113

13,624,422

1,310

16,758,847

1,785

17,750,962

2,360

22,229,335

1,888

20,287,742

1987

Taiwan 36.76%
4,414,564 (210)

China 15.71%
1,886,730 (102)

1988

Taiwan 30.34%
1,521,397 (131)

China 11.09%
556,333 (33)

1989

India
27.37%
678,046 (66)

China- 19.25%
476,797 (37)

1990

India
60.42%
1,091,590 (112)

Bangladesh 12%
216,717 (21)

Turkey 5.62%
101,619 (26)

1991

India
29.41%
695,724 (63)

Bangladesh
21.65%
512,081 (40)

Pakistan 18.80%
444,825 (21)

1992-

China33.69%
2,212,890 (54)

India
29.30%
1,925,016 (146)

1993

China53.79%
5,785,775 (159)

India17.77%
1,911,269 (142)

1994

China
2,847,694 (115)

India
2,802,171 (186)

Bangladesh
2,134,154 (59)

India
2,809,612 (189)
India
4,920,107 (315)

Bangladesh
2,539,430 (53)
Bangladesh
2,196,280 (55)
Bangladesh
2,227,791 (74)

Pakistan
1,670,175 (25)
Pakistan
2,062,257 (33)
Pakistan
930,412 (21)

1995
1996

India
14.04%
1,683,648 (137)
Bangladesh
9.56%
479,666 (55)
Bangladesh
14.02%
347,324 (30)

Bangladesh
17.98%
1,181,181 (45)
Bangladesh
12.98%
1,396,289 (44)

1997

India
4,948,032 (363)

1998

India
6,256,158 (370)

Bangladesh
2,626,359 (63)

Pakistan
2,210,276 (57)

1999

India
6,740,000 (368)

Bangladesh
3,790,000 (67)

China
2,410,000 (65)

India
5,987,392 (340)
Bangladesh
4,992,402 (26)

China
2,637,463 (78)

Bangladesh
2,406,923 (62)

India
4,767,933 (347)

China
2,509,792 (70)

2002

India
6,751,349 (326)

Bangladesh
4,893,973 (87)

2003

India
5,890,000 (383)

China
5,580,000 (119)

2004

Bangladesh
3,260,000 (119)

India
1,660,000 (203)

2000
2001

China
3,138,838 (70)
Bangladesh
2,890,000 (79)
China
1,480,000 (69)
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South Korea
10.44%
1,253,870
(61)

1,474

12,008,712

India 9.21%
462,113 (60)

1,452

5,015,051

695

2,477,386

701

1,806,599

709

2,365,678

1004

6,569,314

832

10,756,093

641

10,415,618

669

8,523,170

711

9,667,926

732

8,707,072

969

13,740,000

Turkey
225,772 ((31)

1041

18,060,000

Turkey
294,541 (52)

827

13,550,000

Turkey
164,728 (41)

885

15,520,000

Pakistan
997,236 (20)

Turkey
385,437 (73)

923

17,830,000

Pakistan
820,000 (49)

Turkey
280,000 (77)

1,062

16,210,000

Turkey
200,000 (99)

Pakistan
210,000 (26)

803

7,100,000

Taiwan
6.62%
163,976 (21)
Japan 4.5%
81,375 (350)
China 4.49%
81,162 (10)
China7.27%
172,000 (7)
Pakistan
8.53%
917,539 (33)
Pakistan
8.53%
917,539 (33)
Pakistan
2,166,032
(34)
China
754,232 (53)
Turkey
136,870
Turkey
195,194 (41)
China
550,201 (30)
Pakistan
2,080,000
(38)
Pakistan
789,216 (25)
Pakistan
1,738,640
(27)

2005

Bangladesh
2,110,000(81)

India
1,120,000 (128)

China
150,000 (8)

Turkey
140,000 (54)

Pakistan
50,000 (12)

562

3,770,000

2006

Bangladesh
2,880,000 (159)

India
850,000 (102)

China
250,000 (9)

Pakistan
190,000 (19)

Turkey
150,000(63)

682

4,980,000

2007

Bangladesh
1,840,000 (104)

India
1,330,000 (134)

Pakistan
380,000 (24)

China
340,000 (26)

Turkey
120,000 (43)

596

4,290,000

Bangladesh
4,190,000 (170)
China
7,740,000 (301)

India
2,46,000 (198)

China
880,000 (38)

Turkey
140,000(56)

753

8,280,000

India
7,560,000 (198)

Bangladesh
6,610,000 (196)

Turkey
560,000 (117)

1,006

25,006,000

2010

India
6,530,000 (422)

China

Bangladesh
3,939,000 (107)

Turkey
660,000 (210)

952

18,670,000

2011

India
8,504,517 (458)

China
5,980,520

Bangladesh
5,837,137 (145)

Turkey
1,067,425

1,020

25,016,373

2012

India
12,210,082 (523)

Bangladesh
8,837,828 (228)

China
8,167,710 (207)

Turkey
1,540,800 (120)

1,328

36,819,398

India
8,087,096
India
6,794,891

Bangladesh
7,304,784
Bangladesh
5,519,035

China
7,083,536
China
4,975,527

1,240

29,833,768

1,062

22,764,630

2015

Bangladesh
9,553,930 (222)

India
8,220,191 (305)

Pakistan
6,035,228 (141)

Turkey
1,004,335 (92)

862

23,800,000

2016

Bangladesh
6,568,227 (197)

India
5,980,514 (239)

Pakistan
4,070,498 (107)

Turkey
1,380,955 (133)

835

20,700,000

India
6,818,993
India
7,355,652

Bangladesh
5,771,129 (198)
Bangladesh
4,786,369

China
3,712,040
Pakistan
1,410,751

Pakistan
270,000 (19)
Pakistan
2,100,000
(101)
Pakistan
2,440,000
(103)
Pakistan
3,013, 926
Pakistan
5,499,481
(152)
Pakistan
5,376,443
Pakistan
4,092,971
China
2,495,516
(74)
China
2,296,190
(98)
Pakistan
1,500,325
China
357,612

862

20,700,000

744

18,891,322

2008
2009

2013
2014

2017
2018

Turkey
1,369,955
Turkey
977,695

Data compiled using Lloyds Register Casualty Returns; IHS World Casually Statistics; Robin des
Bois; NGO Shipbreaking Platform Annual Reports and Annual Lists of Ships Scraps Worldwide.
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APPENDIX 3
Broken-Up 3: Diagram of a shipbreaking beach, from MEPC.210(63)

Source: Resolution MEPC.210(63), 2012.
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